The Joint Effects of Supervisor Pay Transparency and Vertical Pay Dispersion on Reporting Honesty

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaotao Kelvin Liu ◽  
Yu Tian ◽  
Yue May Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Joint Effects ◽  
Pay Dispersion

The Joint Effects of Supervisor Pay Transparency and Vertical Pay Dispersion on Reporting Honesty

2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 179-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaotao (Kelvin) Liu ◽  
Yu Tian ◽  
Yue (May) Zhang
Keyword(s):  
High Dispersion ◽  
Similar Amount ◽  
Joint Effects ◽  
Pay Secrecy ◽  
Pay Dispersion

ABSTRACT We experimentally investigate how supervisor pay transparency interacts with vertical pay dispersion to affect subordinates' reporting honesty in a budgeting setting. We find that the effect of supervisor pay transparency relative to pay secrecy becomes more negative as vertical pay dispersion becomes higher. Our findings suggest that while supervisor pay transparency complements an egalitarian pay structure by increasing reporting honesty, it does not fare along with high vertical pay dispersion as the combination of the two appears to decrease reporting honesty, even when such high dispersion can be justified. Further investigation suggests that our result is not driven by the feeling of unfairness toward high supervisor pay, but by a benchmarking effect (i.e., subordinates use supervisor pay as a pay standard and try to find ways to earn a similar amount).

Team Pay Inequality: Pay Disparity in Large Teams Increases Employee Turnover by Reducing Job Control.

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jon Jachimowicz ◽  
Christopher To ◽  
Oliver P Hauser
Keyword(s):  
Financial Services ◽  
Employee Turnover ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Job Attitudes ◽  
Organizational Outcomes ◽  
Job Control ◽  
Organizational Attribute ◽  
Pay Dispersion ◽  
Pay Inequality ◽  
Control Work

Pay dispersion is a core organizational attribute, but its’ relationship to employee turnover is relatively unclear. We propose this is the case because prior research suffers from two limitations: (1) it neglects how pay dispersion impacts employees’ psychological attitudes toward their job, and (2) it assumes that teams are homogenous, disregarding that variations in team characteristics shape how employees experience pay dispersion. The current research addresses these shortcomings by drawing on job demand-control theories to investigate how pay dispersion shapes employees’ job attitudes, and explicitly incorporates one aspect of team heterogeneity, team size variations. More specifically, our core proposition is that team pay inequality, i.e., the pay dispersion of employees within a team, reduces employees’ job control—their perceived capability to control work—particularly when teams are larger. This, in turn, makes it more likely employees in large unequal teams leave their organization. Two unique large-scale archival and survey datasets from a technology (N = 881) and financial services company (N = 22,816) provide support for our hypotheses. The current research thus offers a novel perspective on pay dispersion: salary differences within teams fundamentally shape employees’ job attitudes—particularly their job control—and thus determine important organizational outcomes.

Cyber and Air Joint Effects Demonstration (CAAJED)

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raphael S. Mudge ◽  
Scott Lingley
Keyword(s):  
Joint Effects
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