Equitable and Decentralized Solutions for the Allocation of Indivisible Objects

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Somdeb Lahiri
Keyword(s):  
Indivisible Objects

scholarly journals A Cooperative Approach to Queue Allocation of Indivisible Objects

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Herbert Hamers ◽  
Flip Klijn ◽  
Marco Slikker ◽  
Bas van Velzen
Keyword(s):  
Cooperative Approach ◽  
Indivisible Objects

scholarly journals Equitable distribution of indivisible objects

1988 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 145-158 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Demko ◽  
Theodore P. Hill
Keyword(s):  
Equitable Distribution ◽  
Indivisible Objects

scholarly journals Allocating Indivisible Objects With a Parallel Method Insensitive to Identities

IEEE Access ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
pp. 22880-22891 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Huang ◽  
Lei Zhang ◽  
Yu Huang ◽  
Jian Lou
Keyword(s):  
Parallel Method ◽  
Indivisible Objects

scholarly journals Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices: heterogeneous objects

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bettina Klaus ◽  
Alexandru Nichifor
Keyword(s):  
Econ Theory ◽  
Reservation Price ◽  
Price Vector ◽  
Heterogeneous Objects ◽  
Indivisible Objects ◽  
Reservation Prices ◽  
Priority Ordering ◽  
Serial Dictatorship ◽  
Strategy Proofness

AbstractWe adapt a set of mechanisms introduced by Klaus and Nichifor (Econ Theory 70:665–684, 2020), serial dictatorship mechanisms with (individual) reservation prices, to the allocation of heterogeneous indivisible objects, e.g., specialist clinic appointments. We show how the characterization of serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices for homogeneous indivisible objects (Klaus and Nichifor 2020, Theorem 1) can be adapted to the allocation of heterogeneous indivisible objects by adding neutrality: mechanism $$\varphi $$ φ satisfies minimal tradability, individual rationality, strategy-proofness, consistency, independence of unallocated objects, neutrality, and non wasteful tie-breaking if and only if there exists a reservation price vector r and a priority ordering $$\succ $$ ≻ such that $$\varphi $$ φ is a serial dictatorship mechanism with reservation prices based on r and $$\succ $$ ≻ .

scholarly journals A COOPERATIVE APPROACH TO QUEUE ALLOCATION OF INDIVISIBLE OBJECTS

2009 ◽  
Vol 11 (02) ◽  
pp. 215-227
Author(s):  
HERBERT HAMERS ◽  
FLIP KLIJN ◽  
MARCO SLIKKER ◽  
BAS VAN VELZEN
Keyword(s):  
Finite Number ◽  
Cooperative Approach ◽  
Side Payments ◽  
Efficient Outcome ◽  
Indivisible Objects

We consider the allocation of a finite number of indivisible objects to the same number of agents according to an exogenously given queue. We assume that the agents collaborate in order to achieve an efficient outcome for society. We allow for side-payments and provide a method for obtaining stable outcomes.

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