The Role of the BNDES in the Brazilian Development Financing – Contributions from the Paper 'Towards a Legal Theory of Finance' of Katharina Pistor

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexandre Coelho
2017 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
Author(s):  
Veronika Keir

<div class="page" title="Page 3"><div class="layoutArea"><div class="column"><p><span>Veronika is a recent graduate from the Honours Legal Studies program at the University of Waterloo. Her passions are socio-legal research, policy development, feminist legal theory, and crime control development. Veronika is currently working a full-time job at Oracle Canada, planning on pursuing further education in a Masters program. </span></p></div></div></div>


Author(s):  
Yogi Maron ◽  
Ismansyah Ismansyah ◽  
Azmi Fendri

<p align="center"> </p><p><em>As happened to the Notary Eli SatriaPilo, S.H, Mkn, who was appointed as the Notary who made the Deed of Relinquishment of Land Rights in the Land Acquisition activities for the Construction of Campus III of the State Islamic Institute (IAIN) of Padang which was located in Sungai Bangek District, Padang</em><em> </em><em>in 2010. The method used was descriptive, in which describing the applicable legislation associated with legal theory in the facts and realities about the Notary’s Responsibility in Making Deed of Land Acquisition for the construction of Campus III of IAIN Padang in Sungai</em><em> </em><em>Bangek. This study used a Normative Juridical approach, in which researching by using and processing secondary data or literature related to the</em><em> </em><em>study. The data collected were in the form of primary data obtained from the District Court of Padang, secondary data obtained from secondary legal materials and primary legal materials. Based on the study, it was found that the role of Notary Eli</em><em> </em><em>Satria</em><em> </em><em>Pilo, in the land acquisition of campus III IAIN was proven to have misused the authority resulting in violation of the Notary Ethics Code and was responsible for accepting termination disrespectfully. Furthermore, he was also shown to be committing a Criminal Corruption made based on the Deed of Relinquishment of Land Rights in the land acquisition for the construction of Campus III of IAIN Padang, so that the State incurred losses of Rp. 1</em><em>.</em><em>946</em><em>.</em><em>701</em><em>.</em><em>050 (one billion nine hundred forty-six million seven hundred one thousand and fifty rupiahs). And he was responsible for receiving and carrying out the sentence that had been handed down by the District Court of Padang, a prison sentence of 4 (four) years, and paying a fine of Rp. 200</em><em>.</em><em>000</em><em>.</em><em>000 (two hundred million rupiahs)</em><em>.</em></p><p> </p>


Author(s):  
Dan Jerker B. Svantesson

This chapter takes us into the domain of legal theory and legal philosophy as it places the questions of Internet jurisdiction in a broader theoretical, and indeed philosophical, context. Indeed, it goes as far as to (1) present a definition of what is law, (2) discuss what are the law’s tools, and (3) to describe the roles of law. In addition, it provides distinctions important for how we understand the role of jurisdictional rules both in private international law and in public international law as traditionally defined. Furthermore, it adds law reform tools by introducing and discussing the concept of ‘market sovereignty’ based on ‘market destroying measures’––an important concept for solving the Internet jurisdiction puzzle.


2011 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Edwin Baker

The essay concerns the manner private power threatens the proper democratic role of the press or mass media. But first, Part I examines two preliminary conceptual matters involved in locating this discussion in the context of a conference on private power as a threat to human rights: 1) the relation of human rights to private power in general. This relation is complicated due to fact that human rights can themselves be seen as the assertion of private power against government or against collective power while, depending on how conceptualized, human rights can be improperly threatened by private power even while private power operates in a generally lawful manner; 2) involves the relation of press freedom and human rights. Here I argue that human rights are ill-conceived if offered as embodying any particular right in respect to the press—more specifically, I argue that a free press is not a human right—but argue instead that an ideal media order that is embodied in a broad conception of free press provides the soil in which human rights can flourish and the armor that offers them protection. Both government power and private power are necessary for and constitute threats to these supportive roles of a free press.Political-legal theory—or in constitutional democracies, possibly constitutional theory—should offer some guide to how the tightrope between government as threat and government as source of protection against private threats ought to be walked. That is, the goal is to find both proper limits on government power and proper empowerment of government to respond to private threats. Part II examines the variety of private threats to the proper role of the press. It focuses on two forms of threats: first, market failures that can be expected in relatively normal functioning of the market; second, problems related to the purposeful use of concentrated economic power. Responsive policies are multiple—no magic bullet but varying different governmental (as well as private) responses are appropriate. However, Part III illustrates this point by considering only two types of governmental policies, both of which I have recently been involved in advocating: first, government promotion of dispersal of concentrated power by means of ownership rules and policies; second, tax subsidies in the form of tax credits for a significant portion of journalists salaries as a means to correct for underproduction of journalism on theory that this journalism generally produces significant positive externalities.


2018 ◽  
Vol 150 ◽  
pp. 05056
Author(s):  
Abdulrahman M.A.Albelahi ◽  
A. Ali ◽  
Faten Mohmed ◽  
Metwally Ali

Since the beginning, legal theory has concerned itself with the establishment of principles and precepts that govern the procedure of legal interpretation, from the initial stages of the judicial reasoning down to the promulgation of ruling and their implementation, Islam is a total way of life. Muslims are obliged to abide by the rules of Allah in every aspect of their lives, always and wherever they live. However, the actual rules of Allah as given in the Qur’an and the sunna are limited. The Qur’an contains only six hundred verses directly related to laws, and there are approximately two thousand hadiths. The function of interpretation is to discover the intention of the Lawmaker of the matter, therefore, interpretat primarily concerned with the discovery of that which is rot self-evident the objective of interpretation is to ascertain the intention c the Lawmaker with regard to what has been left unexpressed as a matter of necessary interference from the surrounding circumstances. Sometimes, the textual sources did not provide detailed guidelines in which to derive the law, and then the role of interpretation is important to determine the law. In Islamic law the role of Ijtihad undoubtedly important in order to meet new problems. But some of the Jurist contended that the role of Ijtihad had ended and we have to follow the rule that has been stated. An explanation given to this trend is that a point had been reached at which all essential question of law had been thoroughly discussed and further deliberation was deemed unnecessary. In Common law, man-made law and legislation are related to one another within a philosophy of law. Parliament makes law and it is the duty of the courts to give effect to them if properly enacted. While courts may rule that a particular statute or section is invalid for various reasons such as unconstitutionality, they cannot say, "We shall change this Act because it is not appropriate". That function belongs to Parliament (Wu Min Aun 1990: 120). So as in Islamic law, the Lawmaker is Allah S.w.t and the sacred text (Quran) is legislated due to His intention whereas Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad is enacted due to the Prophet's intention. Therefore, Ulama of Usul Fiqh, in making any Ijtihad, they are du y bound to be guided by Quran and Sunnah.


2012 ◽  
Vol 19 (1, 2 & 3) ◽  
pp. 2011
Author(s):  
Benjamin L. Berger

There is perhaps no more important access point into the key issues of modern political and legal theory than the questions raised by the interaction of law and religion in contemporary constitutional democracies. Of course, much classical political and moral theory was forged on the issue of the relationship between religious difference and state authority. John Locke’s work was directly influenced by this issue, writing as he did about the just configuration of state authority and moral difference in the wake of the Thirty Years’ War. Yet debates about the appropriate role of religion in public life and the challenges posed by religious difference also cut an important figure, in a variety of ways, in the writings of Hobbes, Rousseau, Spinoza, Hegel, and much of the work that we now view as being at the centre of the development of modern political philosophy.


2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-68
Author(s):  
Sam Adelman ◽  

Business as usual is widely acknowledged as the main driver of ecological collapse and climate breakdown, but less attention is paid to the role of law as usual as an impediment to climate justice. This article analyses how domestic and international environmental law facilitate injustices against living entities and nature. It calls for a paradigm shift in legal theory, practice and teaching to reflect the scale and urgency of the unfolding ecological catastrophe. Section 2 outlines the links between climatic harms and climate injustices. This is followed by discussions of unsustainable law and economic development in sections 3 and 4. Section 5 examines the potential contribution of new materialist legal theory in bringing about a legal paradigm shift that reflects the jurisgenerative role of nature in promoting climate justice.


Author(s):  
Linda Tvrdíková

If we look at the literature about judicial decision-making and interpretation of law, we can find many texts which are dedicated to legal arguments, logic and legal reasoning – in those texts the rationality, analytical and logical thinking is glorified and an interpretation seems ‘just’ as a logical operation where judges subsume certain facts under general legal norm or norms, those norms are formulated linguistically, so it seems that the whole job of judges is to analyze texts. What we can see more rarely are discussions and texts exploring the role of intuitions, feelings and emotions and their role in judicial decision-making – at least in the Czech Republic. Those of our faculties are seen as the source of bias and distortion. Even if we look to the past, those themes are not so common among legal theorists and philosophers – especially in our tradition where we are still influenced by Hans Kelsen and František Weyr and their normative theory – but we can find exceptions and those are the American legal realists. In this paper, we will show that their observations and insights seem to be right. How can we know it? Because in last decades cognitive scientists have made big progress in the area of decision-making and it seems that we are not so rational as we thought us to be. They have explored that our thinking does not take place only through the deliberative system but, surprisingly, there is also another one system which influences our decisions. This system is automatic, fast, and intuitive – some call this system S1, Seymour Epstein an experiential system. This automatic system is more influential than our deliberative system because it is always heard – we can use Jonathan Haidt’s metaphor of an elephant and a rider. S1, the intuitive, experiential system, is an elephant and S2, the deliberative, analytical system is the rider – in legal theory, we have talked about the rider a lot but we do not explore the elephant sufficiently. This paper will try to uncover the nature of the elephant.


2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 376-393 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xenia Chiaramonte

The relationship between social movements and the legal field is controversial and complex. This paper begins by recognizing that the concept of social movement does not belong to legal doctrine and then synthetically reconstruct the relevance of it for a legal understanding. In fact, even if this concept is not formally taken into account by constitutions or by legal codes, a socio-legal approach underscores the need for the comprehension and inclusion of collective phenomena into legal theory. First, the paper explores the way in which ‘social movement’ has been taken up and translated in the legal field through the concept of social change and constitutional change. Second, this research goes through various cases in which social movements use law strategically, from the phenomenon of cause lawyering to the litigation strategy. Finally, it stands for a theoretical understanding of the role of social movements in legal theory as a lively expression of ‘becoming-constituent’.


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