Results of a Pilot Study of Judicial Processing of Debt Collection Cases under Ceteris Paribus Conditions

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wolfgang Hirczy de Mino
2009 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-58
Author(s):  
John Levendis ◽  
Craig Santicola

Students often have difficulty understanding the importance of distinguishing between real and nominal prices, or more generally, why ceteris paribus conditions are important. We exploit students interests in popularity to teach the nominal/real distinction, and the importance of adjusting for inflation, population, and income levels. We illustrate the importance of these topics by asking, What is the most popular movie of all time?


2013 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Linda Shockey ◽  
Małgorzata Ćavar

Our previous research on perception of gated casual English by university students suggests that ceteris paribus, Polish students are much more accurate than Greeks. A recent pilot study of casually-spoken Polish leads us to the conclusion that many shortcuts found in English are also common in Polish, so that similar perceptual strategies can be used in both languages, though differing in detail. Based on these preliminary results, it seems likely that perceptual strategies across languages tend towards the “eagle” approach - where a birds-eye view of the acoustic terrain without too much emphasis on detail is found - or the “roadrunner” approach, where phonetic detail is followed closely. In the former case, perceivers adjust easily to alternation caused by casual speech phonology while in the latter, perceivers expect little variation and possibly even find it confusing. Native speakers of Greek are “roadrunners”, since there is little phonological reduction in their language there is little difference, for example, between stressed and unstressed syllables. We suggest that native speakers of Polish join English speakers as “eagles”, which gives them a natural perceptual advantage in English. There is a conceptual similarity between this idea and that of the stress- or syllable-timed language, and we hypothesise that as in this case, there is a cline rather than a sharp division between eagles and roadrunners. As usual, more research is called for.


1990 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-193 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Persky

In Webster's Dictionary is an example of how to use “ceteris paribus “: [S]taple-growing states are, ceteris paribus, more favorable to slave labor than manufacturing states.” I suspect it would take a minor treatise to elucidate fully the ceteris paribus conditions here. And once this was done, it would be doubtful that holding all these cetera constant would have much analytical meaning. Unfortunately, this is always the potential problem with the expression. In too many cases one is unsure of exactly what restraints are being imposed and by what authority the exercise is legitimated. Fittingly, the history of ceteris paribus is a history of studied ambiguity.


Author(s):  
Jeremy Seligman ◽  
Patrick Girard

Ceteris Paribus clauses in reasoning are used to allow for defeaters of norms, rules or laws, such as in von Wright’s example “I prefer my raincoat over my umbrella, everything else being equal”. In earlier work, a logical analysis is offered in which sets of formulas Γ, embedded in modal operators, provide necessary and sufficient conditions for things to be equal in ceteris paribus clauses. For most laws, the set of things allowed to vary is small, often finite, and so Γ is typically infinite. Yet the axiomatisation they provide is restricted to the special and atypical case in which Γ is finite. We address this problem by being more flexible about ceteris paribus conditions, in two ways. The first is to offer an alternative, slightly more general semantics, in which the set of formulas only give necessary but not (necessarily) sufficient conditions. This permits a simple axiomatisation.


Author(s):  
Jonah N. Schupbach

Schupbach (2008) puts forward a "possibility result" for Bayesian Coherentism, showing that there exist plausible sets of ceteris paribus conditions that imply that coherence is truth-conducive. Against this result, Schubert (2012) has argued that Schupbach's considered ceteris paribus conditions are "jointly inconsistent". In this article, I first show that Schubert's attempted proof of this claim is fallacious, and hence that the possibility result still stands. Next, I consider a related criticism of Schupbach's result, inspired by Olsson's (2005) constraints on ceteris paribus conditions. This leads to a general discussion of the principle(s) that should guide one in choosing such conditions.


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