A Second Chance to Deliver Peace through Power Sharing: A Comparative Analysis of South Sudan Peace Agreements

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Peter Malish
2018 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 178-204
Author(s):  
Anna Jarstad ◽  
Desirée Nilsson

2009 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
pp. 41-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna K. Jarstad

Why are some elections followed by armed conflict, while others are not? This article begins to explore this question by mapping the prevalence of power-sharing agreements and patterns of post-election peace in states shattered by civil war. While democracy builds on the notion of free political competition and uncertain electoral outcomes, power-sharing reduces the uncertainty by ensuring political power for certain groups. Nevertheless, new data presented in this article – the Post-Accord Elections (PAE) data collection – shows that the issues of peace, power-sharing and democracy have become intertwined as the vast majority of contemporary peace agreements provide for both power-sharing and elections. First, in contrast to previous research which has suggested that power-sharing is a tool for ending violence, this study shows that conflict often continues after an agreement has been signed, even if it includes provisions for power-sharing. Second, this investigation shows no evidence of power-sharing facilitating the holding of elections. On the contrary, it is more common that elections are held following a peace process without power-sharing. Third, a period of power-sharing ahead of the elections does not seem to provide for postelection peace. Rather, such elections are similarly dangerous as post-accord elections held without a period of power-sharing. The good news is that power-sharing does not seem to have a negative effect on post-election peace.


Author(s):  
Margit Bussmann

Demobilization of ex-combatants is a major obstacle in the transition to a stable postconflict society. The combatants must be convinced to abandon the armed confrontation and hand over their weapons in light of security concerns and a lack of alternative means of income. The challenges to overcoming the commitment problem differ in terms of numbers of combatants who must be demobilized for conflicts that end in a decisive victory and conflicts that reach a military stalemate. Peace agreements can offer several solutions for overcoming the parties’ commitment problems, but often the implementation of the provisions is incomplete. Third parties can offer to monitor an agreement and provide security guarantees. International actors increasingly assist with demobilization and reintegration programs for former combatants and help to overcome security-related concerns and economic challenges. Another solution offered is military power-sharing arrangements and the integration of rebel fighters into the national military. These measures are intended to reduce the pool for potential recruitment for existing or new rebel groups. If ex-combatants are left without means of income to support themselves and their families, the risk is higher that they will remobilize and conflict will recur. Reintegration in the civilian labor market, however, is often difficult in the weak economies of war-affected countries.


Significance A ‘framework agreement’ reached between President Salva Kiir and opposition leader Riek Machar in Khartoum on June 27 had been billed as a breakthrough in efforts to end South Sudan’s four-and-a-half-year civil war, but progress since then has been mired by infighting, especially around power-sharing formulas. Impacts Sudan and Uganda’s involvement as ‘guarantors’ could constrain would-be spoilers but will be deeply divisive. The several dozen other armed factions will fight to secure their place at the table. Already-dire humanitarian conditions will worsen without local-level security improvements.


Significance International stakeholders hope the meeting can restore momentum to stalled regional peace efforts. However, the bilateral format represents a reversion to the old mediation formula which failed to produce a sustainable deal. Impacts The conflict’s humanitarian toll will continue to rise, with famine risks a recurring concern. Rebel fragmentation and supply constraints mean the government will retain the military advantage if conflict continues. Focus on power-sharing ratios will distract attention from more fundamental issues of governance and reform.


2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 109-132
Author(s):  
Kazuhiro Obayashi

Most of the previous studies of power-sharing arrangements (PSAs) find the political PSA to be ineffective in stabilizing post-agreement peace. These studies argue that the political PSA is a signal that is not costly enough to moderate the information asymmetry or commitment problem among the signatories. In this article, I develop an alternative theory of the political PSA that identifies its “negative” effect on post-agreement stability by highlighting two issues that have attracted little attention in the previous studies, i.e. distributional effects of the political PSA and shifts in the bargaining power among the signatories. To assess the validity of the theory, I first conduct a logistic regression analysis of inclusion of political PSA provisions in peace agreements, and then conduct a survival analysis of post-agreement peace duration.


Significance Since South Sudan seceded in 2011, Khartoum has confronted conflict on three fronts. Armed conflict escalated in Blue Nile and South Kordofan in mid-2011, while clashes between pro- and anti-government forces and outbreaks of inter-communal fighting have plagued Darfur and West Kordofan. Impacts Ongoing conflict will dash hopes of Sudan's removal from the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list. Reports about fighting and atrocities in areas to which the government restricts access will further strain relations with the West. Khartoum will continue to pressure Juba against providing support to any rebel groups in Sudan. The government will step up its call that AU-UN peacekeepers withdraw from Darfur.


Significance Power-sharing has been highly contentious and a compromise between the two main factions marks a major breakthrough. However, the deal has not been formally signed, key issues remain unresolved and some opposition stakeholders have rejected the proposal. Impacts Sudan’s hope of renewed oil payments and Uganda’s of renewed export earnings will see both pressure the parties to uphold the deal. Continuing government arrests of domestic critics will undermine confidence. Economic recovery will be sluggish even in the best-case scenario.


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