Welfare Ranking of Emissions Taxes, Cap & Trade, and Banking & Borrowing

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Larry S. Karp
Keyword(s):  
Emissions Taxes ◽  
Welfare Ranking

scholarly journals The role of nonzero conjectural variation in pollution abatement and output in the design of emission taxes

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Luis Gautier
Keyword(s):  
Pollution Abatement ◽  
Emission Taxes ◽  
International Context ◽  
Cooperative Equilibrium ◽  
Emissions Taxes ◽  
Conjectural Variations ◽  
Polluting Firms ◽  
Global Emissions

Abstract The presence of nonzero conjectural variations in pollution abatement and output make emission taxes less effective with respect to reducing emissions. This has implications for the characterization of the optimal emission tax, particularly in an international context where there are large asymmetries in pollution intensities. A higher degree of collusion in output between polluting firms results in higher emissions taxes in the non-cooperative equilibrium. In contrast, a higher degree of collusion in abatement between polluting firms results in lower emissions taxes in the non-cooperative equilibrium. These results rely on the presence of nonzero conjectural variations and large asymmetries in pollution intensities across countries. The analysis is relevant to the design of international environmental policy, including cases where countries face increasing global competition and damages from rising global emissions.

PATENT LENGTH AND PRICE REGULATION IN AN R&D GROWTH MODEL WITH MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION

2013 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jinli Zeng ◽  
Jie Zhang ◽  
Michael Ka-Yiu Fung
Keyword(s):  
Growth Rate ◽  
Growth Model ◽  
Patent Protection ◽  
Monopolistic Competition ◽  
Policy Instrument ◽  
Price Regulation ◽  
Monopoly Pricing ◽  
Patent Length ◽  
Variety Expansion ◽  
Welfare Ranking

This paper considers the effects of patent length and price regulation in an R&D growth model with variety expansion. Innovation requires lower bounds on patent length and price. Increasing patent duration promotes growth; increasing the cap on the price of patented products promotes growth below the monopoly-pricing level. Each policy instrument can raise welfare unless excessively used, and their welfare ranking depends on parameterizations. It is desirable, on welfare grounds, to limit patent protection along both dimensions, namely by limiting patent length and capping the price of patented products. Such limits raise welfare despite reducing the growth rate.

scholarly journals Welfare Ranking of Environmental Policies in the Presence of Capital Mobility and Cross-Border Pollution

2017 ◽  
Vol 84 (1) ◽  
pp. 317-336 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nikos Tsakiris ◽  
Panos Hatzipanayotou ◽  
Michael S. Michael
Keyword(s):  
Capital Mobility ◽  
Environmental Policies ◽  
Cross Border ◽  
Welfare Ranking

scholarly journals Cap-and-Trade, Emissions Taxes, and Innovation

2011 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 29-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Suzanne Scotchmer
Keyword(s):  
Cap And Trade ◽  
Emissions Taxes

The impact of regional emissions taxes: the Spanish case

2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 255
Author(s):  
Jaime Vallés Giménez ◽  
Juan A. Román Aso
Keyword(s):  
Emissions Taxes ◽  
Regional Emissions ◽  
The Impact

scholarly journals Hormesis, hotspots and emissions trading

2004 ◽  
Vol 23 (6) ◽  
pp. 289-301 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan B Wiener
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Economics ◽  
Dose Response ◽  
Emissions Trading ◽  
Environmental Law ◽  
Performance Standards ◽  
Instrument Choice ◽  
Regulatory Standard ◽  
Choice Analysis ◽  
Emissions Taxes ◽  
Local Emissions

Instrument choice - the comparison of technology standards, performance standards, taxes and tradable permits - has been a major topic in environmental law and environmental economics. Most analyses assume that emissions and health effects are positively and linearly related. If they are not, this complicates the instrument choice analysis. This article analyses the effects of a nonlinear dose-response function on instrument choice. In particular, it examines the effects of hormesis (highdose harm but low-dose benefit) on the choice between fixed performance standards and tradable emissions permits. First, the article distinguishes the effects of hormesis from the effects of local emissions. Hormesis is an attribute of the dose-response or exposure-response relationship. Hotspots are an attribute of the emissions-exposure relationship. Some pollutants may be hormetic and cause local emissions-exposure effects; others may be hormetic without causing local emissionsexposure effects. It is only the local exposure effects of emissions that pose a problem for emissions trading. Secondly, the article shows that the conditions under which emissions trading would perform less well or even perversely under hormesis, depend on how stringent a level of protection is set. Only when the regulatory standard is set at the nadir of the hormetic curve would emissions trading be seriously perverse (assuming other restrictive conditions as well), and such a standard is unlikely. Moreover, the benefits of the overall programme may justify the risk of small perverse effects around this nadir. Thirdly, the article argues that hotspots can be of concern for two distinct reasons, harmfulness and fairness. Lastly, the paper argues that the solution to these problems may not be to abandon market-based incentive instruments and their cost-effectiveness gains, but to improve them further by moving from emissions trading and emissions taxes to risk trading and risk taxes. In short, the article argues that hormesis does not pose a general obstacle to emissions trading or emissions taxes, but that in those cases where hormesis does pose such a problem, a shift toward risk trading or risk taxes would be the superior route.

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