Colonel Blotto Games with Two Battlefields

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dong Liang ◽  
Yunlong Wang ◽  
Zhigang Cao ◽  
Xiaoguang Yang
Keyword(s):  
Colonel Blotto ◽  
Colonel Blotto Games

scholarly journals An Experimental Investigation of Colonel Blotto Games

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Subhasish M. Chowdhury ◽  
Daniel Kovenock ◽  
Roman M. Sheremeta
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Investigation ◽  
Colonel Blotto ◽  
Colonel Blotto Games

A Note on a Comparison of Simultaneous and Sequential Colonel Blotto Games

2012 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yumiko Baba
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Theoretical Prediction ◽  
Cyber Terrorism ◽  
Attack Pattern ◽  
Period 2 ◽  
Blotto Game ◽  
Irrational Behavior ◽  
Theoretical Predictions ◽  
Colonel Blotto ◽  
Colonel Blotto Games

Abstract Clark and Konrad (2007) introduce the weakest link against the best shot property to the Colonel Blotto game where the defendant has to win all the battle fields while the attacker only needs to win at least one battlefield. They characterize the Nash equilibrium assuming that the attacker attacks all the battlefields simultaneously. We construct a two stage model and endogenize the attacker’s attack pattern. We show that the attacker chooses a sequential attack pattern in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Therefore, the game analyzed by Clark and Konrad (2007) is never realized. We also conducted experiments and found that the subjects’ behavior was inconsistent to theoretical predictions. Both players overinvested and the variances were large. In the simultaneous game, the attackers took a guerrira strategy at 30% of the time in which they invested only in one battlefield and the defenders took a surrender strategy at 11% of the time in which they invested nothing in the simultaneous game. Both players invested more in period 1 than in period 2 in the sequential game. Although all of these are inconsistent to the theoretical predictions, the winning probability of a game was consistent to the theoretical prediction in the simultaneous games, but it was lower than the theoretical prediction in the sequential games. We conclude that the subjects’ irrational behavior is mainly a rational response to his/ her opponent’s irrational behavior. Our model can explain terrorism, cyber terrorism, lobbying, and patent trolls and the huge gap between the theory and the experiments are important considering the significance of the problems.

Colonel Blotto Games in Network Systems: Models, Strategies, and Applications

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 637-649 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sanghai Guan ◽  
Jingjing Wang ◽  
Haipeng Yao ◽  
Chunxiao Jiang ◽  
Zhu Han ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Network Systems ◽  
Colonel Blotto ◽  
Systems Models ◽  
Colonel Blotto Games

scholarly journals An experimental investigation of Colonel Blotto games

2011 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 833-861 ◽  
Author(s):  
Subhasish M. Chowdhury ◽  
Dan Kovenock ◽  
Roman M. Sheremeta
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Investigation ◽  
Colonel Blotto ◽  
Colonel Blotto Games
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