The Emergence of the Tullock-Contest

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eduard Buzila
Keyword(s):  
Public Choice ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 147 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 413-420 ◽  
Author(s):  
Subhasish M. Chowdhury ◽  
Roman M. Sheremeta
Keyword(s):  

2017 ◽  
Vol 85 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. Grandjean ◽  
D. Tellone ◽  
W. Vergote

Author(s):  
Roman M. Sheremeta ◽  
Subhasish M. Chowdhury
Keyword(s):  

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 281-303 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kasim Music

We analyze the impact of doping regulations on the doping decisions of athletes in a Tullock contest. We show that stricter anti-doping regulations may increase the profits of doped athletes, which makes doping more sustainable in the long run. Under certain conditions, a naturally more able athlete may receive a lower payoff than his naturally less able competitor, reversing the natural payoff order. We consider the case of different anti-doping agencies and show that harmonization of doping regulations may increase the doping intensity. We point out incentive problems that may arise in the case of strategic interaction between anti-doping agencies.


Author(s):  
Martin Grossmann ◽  
Markus Lang ◽  
Helmut Dietl

This paper constructs and analyzes open-loop equilibria in an infinitely repeated Tullock contest in which two contestants contribute efforts to accumulate individual asset stocks over time. To investigate the transitional dynamics of the contest in the case of a general cost function, we linearize the model around the steady state. Our analysis shows that optimal asset stocks and their speed of convergence to the steady state crucially depend on the elasticity of marginal effort costs, the discount factor and the depreciation rate. In the case of a cost function with a constant elasticity of marginal costs, a lower discount factor, a higher depreciation rate and a lower elasticity imply a higher speed of convergence to the steady state. We further analyze the effects of second prizes in the contest. A higher prize spread increases individual and aggregate asset stocks, but does not alter the balance of the contest in the long run. During the transition, a higher prize spread increases asset stocks, produces a more balanced contest in each period and increases the speed of convergence to the steady state.


2019 ◽  
Vol 129 (623) ◽  
pp. 2888-2915 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xing Li ◽  
Chong Liu ◽  
Xi Weng ◽  
Li-An Zhou

Abstract Motivated by the prevalence of economic targets at all levels of territory administration in China, this article proposes a Tullock contest model to study optimal target setting in a multi-layered tournament-based organisation. In our model, targets are used by upper-level officials to convey the importance of economic growth and incentivise subordinates in the tournaments. Our model predicts a top-down amplification of economic growth targets along the jurisdiction levels, which explains the observed pattern in China. Using both provincial and prefectural-level data, we test the model predictions and find consistent evidence.


Author(s):  
Helmut Dietl ◽  
Egon Franck ◽  
Martin Grossmann ◽  
Markus Lang

This article describes how the theory of contests is applied to professional team sports leagues. It presents the traditional Tullock contest and explains some basic properties of the equilibrium. It then addresses the applications of contest theory in sports. It shows how the assumption of flexible vs. fixed talent supply depends on the league under consideration and how it influences the equilibria. The relationship between competitive balance and social welfare is considered. Finally, it illustrates why many clubs tend to “overinvest” in playing talent in many team sports leagues. It is noted that an exclusive focus on competitive balance may result in inefficient policy conclusions. Due to the contest structure, team sports leagues carry the risk of over-investing in playing talent. The contest theory is a suitable instrument to analyze team sports leagues from a theoretical point of view.


2019 ◽  
Vol 88 (3) ◽  
pp. 405-429 ◽  
Author(s):  
Subhasish M. Chowdhury ◽  
Anwesha Mukherjee ◽  
Theodore L. Turocy

AbstractMost laboratory experiments studying Tullock contest games find that bids significantly exceed the risk-neutral equilibrium predictions. We test the generalisability of these results by comparing a typical experimental implementation of a contest against the familiar institution of a ticket-based raffle. We find that in the raffle (1) initial bid levels are significantly lower and (2) bids adjust more rapidly towards expected-earnings best responses. We demonstrate the robustness of our results by replicating them across two continents at two university labs with contrasting student profiles.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document