Target Setting in Tournaments: Theory and Evidence from China
Keyword(s):
Top Down
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Abstract Motivated by the prevalence of economic targets at all levels of territory administration in China, this article proposes a Tullock contest model to study optimal target setting in a multi-layered tournament-based organisation. In our model, targets are used by upper-level officials to convey the importance of economic growth and incentivise subordinates in the tournaments. Our model predicts a top-down amplification of economic growth targets along the jurisdiction levels, which explains the observed pattern in China. Using both provincial and prefectural-level data, we test the model predictions and find consistent evidence.
1986 ◽
Vol 46
(2)
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pp. 373-383
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Keyword(s):
2017 ◽
Vol 18
(1)
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pp. 64-75
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Keyword(s):
2019 ◽
Vol 19
(7)
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