Quantity-Contingent Auctions and Allocation of Airport Slots

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael O. Ball ◽  
Alexander Estes ◽  
Mark Hansen ◽  
Yulin Liu
Keyword(s):  
Airport Slots

Quantity-Contingent Auctions and Allocation of Airport Slots

2020 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 858-881 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael O. Ball ◽  
Alexander S. Estes ◽  
Mark Hansen ◽  
Yulin Liu
Keyword(s):  
Integer Programming ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Road Network ◽  
Programming Model ◽  
Continuous Model ◽  
Winner Determination Problem ◽  
Single Product ◽  
Winner Determination ◽  
Multiple Units ◽  
Airport Slots

In this paper, we define and investigate quantity-contingent auctions. Such auctions can be used when there exist multiple units of a single product and the value of a set of units depends on the total quantity sold. For example, a road network or airport will become congested as the number of users increase so that a permit for use becomes more valuable as the total number allocated decreases. A quantity-contingent auction determines both the number of items sold and an allocation of items to bidders. Because such auctions could be used by bidders to gain excessive market power, we impose constraints limiting market power. We focus on auctions that allocate airport arrival and departure slots. We propose a continuous model and an integer programming model for the associated winner determination problem. Using these models, we perform computational experiments that lend insights into the properties of the quantity-contingent auction.

Airport Slots

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Achim I. Czerny ◽  
Peter Forsyth
Keyword(s):  
Airport Slots

scholarly journals Basic approaches to air traffic and airport slots allocation

Pressacademia ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (9) ◽  
pp. 120-125
Author(s):  
Savas S. Ates ◽  
Mhd Noor Hayek
Keyword(s):  
Air Traffic ◽  
Basic Approaches ◽  
Airport Slots

Airport Slots and the Internalization of Congestion by Airlines

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Victor Miranda ◽  
Alessandro Vinncius Marques de Oliveira
Keyword(s):  
Airport Slots

Airline Frequency Competition in Airport Congestion Pricing

2012 ◽  
Vol 2266 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-77 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vikrant Vaze ◽  
Cynthia Barnhart
Keyword(s):  
Congestion Pricing ◽  
Constant Load ◽  
Vital Role ◽  
Load Factors ◽  
Marginal Cost Pricing ◽  
Efficient Resource ◽  
Airport Congestion ◽  
The Impact ◽  
High Congestion ◽  
Airport Slots

Airport congestion pricing has often been advocated as a way to control demand for airport operations and achieve efficient resource allocation. Competition between airlines affects the extent to which an airline is willing to pay for airport slots. Accurate modeling of competition is critical to determining the effectiveness of a congestion pricing mechanism. This paper develops an equilibrium model of airline frequency competition in the presence of delay costs and congestion prices. A small hypothetical network is used to evaluate the impacts of congestion prices on the various stakeholders and to investigate the dependence of effectiveness of congestion pricing on the characteristics of frequency competition in individual markets. The effectiveness of congestion pricing depends on three parameters of frequency competition. The results show that variation in the number of passengers per flight plays a vital role in determining the degree of attractiveness of congestion pricing to the airlines. A significant part of the impact of congestion pricing cannot be accounted for by using models in the literature, which are based on the assumptions of constant load factors and constant aircraft sizes. It was found that, compared with flat pricing, marginal cost pricing is more effective in reducing congestion without penalizing the airlines with exceedingly high congestion prices.

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