The Role of Public Pension Funds in Corporate Governance: Evidence from Proxy Voting

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ying Duan ◽  
Yawen Jiao ◽  
Kinsun Tam
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Pension Funds ◽  
Public Pension ◽  
Proxy Voting

Corporate Governance and the Role of Investment Funds

2002 ◽  
Vol 3 (11) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ulrich Seibert
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Driving Forces ◽  
Master Plan ◽  
Investment Funds ◽  
Proxy Voting ◽  
Striking Increase ◽  
The Law ◽  
To Come ◽  
Transparency And Disclosure

Since the mid-90\'s Germany has seen a whole range of laws on corporate governance: first and foremost the KonTraG, i.e. the law on control and transparency, followed by the NaStraG, i.e. the law on registered shares and the facilitating of proxy voting, then, more recently, the TransPuG, i.e. the law on transparency and disclosure, and - finally - the German Corporate Governance Codex issued by the Cromme Commission – and there is probably more to come during the next legislative period. What are the reasons for this striking increase in activity? What are the driving forces and is there a master plan behind these efforts?

The Role of Mutual Funds in Corporate Governance: Evidence from Mutual Funds’ Proxy Voting and Trading Behavior

2016 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 489-513 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ying Duan ◽  
Yawen Jiao
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Mutual Funds ◽  
Mutual Fund ◽  
Trading Behavior ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Insider Ownership ◽  
Proxy Voting ◽  
Fund Families ◽  
Mutual Fund Families

AbstractThis paper examines mutual fund families’ proxy voting records to analyze their choices between voting against management (“voice”) and voting with their feet (“exit”). Even though proxy voting is particularly conducive to governance through voice rather than exit, we provide evidence that both exit and voice are important governance mechanisms when Institutional Shareholder Services recommends voting against management. Funds with smaller ownership blocks and shorter investment horizons are more likely to exit, and funds are more likely to exit small, liquid firms with greater insider ownership.

scholarly journals Corporate governance and investments

2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 294-311
Author(s):  
Wei Wang
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Pension Funds ◽  
Free Cash Flow ◽  
Public Pension ◽  
Debt Overhang ◽  
Fundamental Information ◽  
Director Ownership ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Physical Investment ◽  
D Investment

We investigate the impact of corporate governance on physical and R&D investments in a Seemingly Unrelated Regressing (SUR) system. Marginal q’s are estimated using firm fundamental information for physical and R&D investments separately. We find that takeover pressure boosts both physical and R&D investments, public pension funds ownership has a U-shaped relation with physical investment, and greater director ownership is associated with lower physical investment and higher R&D investment. As far as investment distortions are concerned, takeover pressure mitigates the free cash flow problem and exacerbates the debt overhang problem, while public pension funds stockholding and director ownership alleviates the debt overhang for physical investment, and R&D investment, respectively.

Political Voice, Fiduciary Activism, and the Institutional Ownership of U.S. Corporations: The Role of Public and Noncorporate Pension Funds

1995 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 415-435 ◽  
Author(s):  
James P. Hawley
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Pension Funds ◽  
Market Mechanisms ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Modern Corporation ◽  
Political Voice ◽  
And Control

This article examines the significance of the change from ownership of corporate equity (and debt) primarily by individuals to about half held by institutions. Most important among these are pension funds, of which public and noncorporate funds are the focus of the article. It is argued that public and noncorporate funds play an increasingly important role in corporate governance and policy. These “fiduciary activists” are central actors in the emergence of “relationship investing” resulting in the bypassing of market mechanisms in many important instances. The article examines a variety of recent examples of political voices of these institutions, concluding there is a partial, if messy, “remarriage” between the ownership and control of the modern corporation. This implies that U.S. corporations are in a significant sense neither merely “private” capitalist enterprises, nor public either, but an emerging entity containing public and private aspects along with an emerging “civil” ownership quality (i.e., by unions and other nonstate entities).

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