The Role of Mutual Funds in Corporate Governance: Evidence from Mutual Funds’ Proxy Voting and Trading Behavior

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ying Duan ◽  
Yawen Jiao
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Mutual Funds ◽  
Trading Behavior ◽  
Proxy Voting

The Role of Mutual Funds in Corporate Governance: Evidence from Mutual Funds’ Proxy Voting and Trading Behavior

2016 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 489-513 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ying Duan ◽  
Yawen Jiao
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Mutual Funds ◽  
Mutual Fund ◽  
Trading Behavior ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Insider Ownership ◽  
Proxy Voting ◽  
Fund Families ◽  
Mutual Fund Families

AbstractThis paper examines mutual fund families’ proxy voting records to analyze their choices between voting against management (“voice”) and voting with their feet (“exit”). Even though proxy voting is particularly conducive to governance through voice rather than exit, we provide evidence that both exit and voice are important governance mechanisms when Institutional Shareholder Services recommends voting against management. Funds with smaller ownership blocks and shorter investment horizons are more likely to exit, and funds are more likely to exit small, liquid firms with greater insider ownership.

Corporate Governance and the Role of Investment Funds

2002 ◽  
Vol 3 (11) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ulrich Seibert
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Driving Forces ◽  
Master Plan ◽  
Investment Funds ◽  
Proxy Voting ◽  
Striking Increase ◽  
The Law ◽  
To Come ◽  
Transparency And Disclosure

Since the mid-90\'s Germany has seen a whole range of laws on corporate governance: first and foremost the KonTraG, i.e. the law on control and transparency, followed by the NaStraG, i.e. the law on registered shares and the facilitating of proxy voting, then, more recently, the TransPuG, i.e. the law on transparency and disclosure, and - finally - the German Corporate Governance Codex issued by the Cromme Commission – and there is probably more to come during the next legislative period. What are the reasons for this striking increase in activity? What are the driving forces and is there a master plan behind these efforts?

scholarly journals Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward Rock
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Mutual Funds ◽  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Historical Evolution ◽  
The Us ◽  
Competing Hypotheses ◽  
Institutional Shareholders ◽  
Over Time

This chapter examines the role of institutional investors in corporate governance and whether regulation is likely to encourage them to become active stewards. It considers the lessons that can be learned from the US experience for the EU’s 2014 proposed amendments to the Shareholder Rights Directive. After reviewing how institutional investors fit within the historical evolution of finance, the chapter documents the growth in institutions equity holdings over time. It explains how institutional investors are governed and organize share voting before turning to two competing hypotheses to account for the relative passivity of institutional investors: the excessive regulation and the inadequate incentives hypotheses. In evaluating these hypotheses, it reviews the results of the SEC’s attempt to incentivize mutual funds to vote their shares. The chapter concludes by highlighting the role of hedge funds in catalyzing institutional shareholders, along with some of the risks associated with such highly incentivized actors.

Convergence of Corporate Governance Models

2004 ◽  
pp. 129-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Tretyakov
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Institutional Environment ◽  
Driving Forces ◽  
Commodity Markets ◽  
Legal Systems ◽  
National Institutions ◽  
Governance Models ◽  
Changing Role

The article focuses on the analysis of the process of convergence of outsider and insider models of corporate governance. Chief characteristics of basic and intermediate systems of corporate governance as well as the changing role of its main agents are under examination. Globalization of financial and commodity markets, convergence of legal systems, an open exchange of ideas and information are the driving forces of the convergence of basic systems of corporate governance. However the convergence does not imply the unification of institutional environment and national institutions of corporate governance.

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