scholarly journals Establishment of the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory J. Werden
2020 ◽  
pp. 0000-0000 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anand Jha ◽  
Manoj Kulchania ◽  
Jared Smith

Using data on corruption convictions from the U.S. Department of Justice, we find that auditors charge higher fees when a firm is headquartered in a more corrupt district. This result is robust to a wide range of time and location fixed effects, using capital city isolation as an instrument, and propensity score matching. We also find that, relative to those in non-corrupt districts, firms in corrupt districts are more likely to have weak internal controls and to restate earnings and that their auditors exert greater effort. This evidence suggests that auditing firms in corrupt areas entails additional risk, which auditors price into fees.


Author(s):  
Christina L. Boyd ◽  
Michael J. Nelson ◽  
Ian Ostrander ◽  
Ethan D. Boldt

Scholars, politicians, and prosecutors themselves have repeatedly maintained that federal prosecutors have vast independence when carrying out their jobs. Despite this, we argue that federal prosecutors are constrained by the federal and local political environments in which they serve. U.S. Attorneys, the chief federal prosecutors for the 93 federal judicial districts around the country, are selected through a politically driven appointment process and operate within the purview of the Department of Justice, an executive branch agency. Federal prosecutors are led by the U.S. Attorney General, a presidential appointee and high-ranking member of the president’s cabinet. And U.S. Attorneys are invested members of their local community and are likely to be mindful of those preferences when making prosecutorial decisions. As a result, we should expect to find political influence at every stage of a U.S. Attorney’s service. The chapter closes with a preview of the full book.


2017 ◽  
Vol 111 ◽  
pp. 339-342
Author(s):  
Chuck Newcomb

Hi. My name is Chuck Newcomb from the U.S. Department of Justice. You spoke about the crisis of confidence for a lot of the international institutions and tribunals. What are some of the success stories? What are some of the examples that we can hold up to speak with our colleagues to talk about the good that you are doing or the examples that we can hold up for other or future institutions to follow from?


2010 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 214-219
Author(s):  
Kimberley Garrison ◽  
Ethel Mitty

2013 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Darryl L. Brown ◽  
Susan Z. Shu ◽  
Billy S. Soo ◽  
Gregory M. Trompeter

SUMMARY Although prior literature has suggested that independent audits provide an implicit form of insurance against investor losses (the “insurance hypothesis”), it has been challenging to isolate the “insurance” effect. In this paper, we use a unique setting to examine this effect. In 2002, KPMG was investigated by the U.S. Department of Justice in relation to tax shelters sold by the firm. From then until early 2005, several news reports suggested that KPMG would be indicted and suffer potentially the same fate as Arthur Andersen. However, in August of 2005 KPMG entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with the U.S. Department of Justice, which ended widespread speculation of an impending federal indictment against the accounting firm. Because the investigation centered around tax services offered by the firm, we argue that the circumstances surrounding the investigation and settlement provide a natural setting to test the insurance value provided by auditors. We show that KPMG audit client firms experienced significant negative abnormal market returns when it appeared more likely that KPMG would face criminal charges, but earned significantly positive abnormal returns following news reports of an impending settlement. Further, these abnormal returns appear to be driven by KPMG client firms in greater financial distress or subject to greater litigation risk. These findings are consistent with the insurance hypothesis. Although we cannot completely eliminate other explanations such as an assurance effect or switching costs, we argue that such explanations are unlikely to drive our main findings.


2021 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-79
Author(s):  
Carl Shapiro ◽  
Howard Shelanski

AbstractWe study how the courts have responded to the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued by the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. Looking at decided cases, we find that both the government and merging parties rely on the 2010 Guidelines in presenting their cases, each side respectively arguing that it should win if the court properly follows them . The 2010 Guidelines had the strongest effect on the case law in the area of unilateral effects, where a number of courts have embraced them in ways that clearly depart from earlier decisions. The case law now exhibits much greater receptivity to a government showing that the merger will lead to higher prices simply due to the loss of direct competition between the two merging firms. The courts also have followed the 2010 Guidelines by more willingly defining markets around targeted customers. We do not detect any effect on decided cases of the higher concentration thresholds found in the 2010 Guidelines. Both the average pre-merger level of market concentration and the average increase in market concentration alleged by the government in litigated cases to date declined after 2010 .


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