Grading the Clinton Antitrust Policy as Enforced by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice

2008 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 1027-1081 ◽  
Author(s):  
Theodore P. Kovaleff
2020 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 871-890 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Stelzner ◽  
Mayuri Chaturvedi

Abstract Starting in the 1980s, market concentration began to rise dramatically decreasing competition and increasing market power for the firms that remain. Such developments have important effects on a number of economic variables such as the efficiency of our economy and income inequality. Thus, it is important to ask: how has the administration of antitrust policy changed over the last half century? To shed more light on these important questions, we explore both change in policy outline by the Department of Justice in its Horizontal Merger Guidelines and change in administrative actions looking at both secondary requests for mergers and acquisitions of different sizes, and pre, post and change in Herfindahl–Hirschman Index in mergers and acquisitions contested by the Department of Justice through the courts.


2018 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 379-398
Author(s):  
Michelle Burtis ◽  
Daniel K. Oakes ◽  
Mary Beth Savio

It has been acknowledged by both practitioners and the government that transparency in the calculation of criminal antitrust fines by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) is important for the continued success of criminal antitrust policy. Recent auto parts investigations provide a large and diverse set of plea agreement observations that are compared to gain a better understanding of DOJ’s criminal fining policy for corporations and to assess whether the sentencing outcomes are consistent, both across the investigations and with DOJ’s stated policies. The analysis shows that with regard to certain inputs into the fine calculations, the DOJ provided additional transparency in the auto parts plea agreements, although in other areas the methods used to determine inputs remain opaque.


1982 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wilson D. Miscamble

No American presidency in this century has inspired quite so much controversy as the turbulent administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Even now, on the one-hundreth anniversary of his birth, and nearly fifty years after the coming of the New Deal, the contentious debates sparked during his four terms as chief executive are no less the subject of argument among historians than they were among the adversaries of the day. One issue in point is the question of antitrust, particularly the principles and practices of Thurman Arnold, who headed the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department during the later stages of the New Deal. While this essay will hardly resolve the contumacious debates over the policies of either Arnold or Roosevelt, Dr. Miscamble nonetheless offers some surprising, but persuasive, evidence about the internal workings of the administration, the antitrust philosophy of Roosevelt, and the remarkable practices of Arnold, the law professor turned antimonopolist.


1994 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 363-383
Author(s):  
William J. Lynk

Both common sense and economic theory demonstrate that the competitive behavior and financial performance of nonprofit hospitals—including the incentive to raise prices when faced with less competition—will not differ materially from investor-owned hospitals. Robert E. Bloch, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice.


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