scholarly journals Productivity and Wage Effects of Firm-Level Collective Agreements: Evidence from Belgian Linked Panel Data

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Garnero ◽  
François Rycx ◽  
Isabelle Terraz
Keyword(s):  
Panel Data ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Collective Agreements ◽  
Wage Effects

Productivity and Wage Effects of Firm‐Level Upstreamness: Evidence from Belgian Linked Panel Data

World Economy ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benoît Mahy ◽  
François Rycx ◽  
Guillaume Vermeylen ◽  
Mélanie Volral
Keyword(s):  
Panel Data ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Wage Effects

THE EFFECTS OF TAXATION ON INVESTMENT: NEW EVIDENCE FROM FIRM LEVEL PANEL DATA

1992 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 243-251
Author(s):  
JASON G. CUMMINS ◽  
KEVIN A. HASSETT
Keyword(s):  
Panel Data ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
New Evidence

scholarly journals State Control, Marketization, And Firm Value: Evidence From China

2014 ◽  
Vol 30 (6) ◽  
pp. 1577 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kun Su ◽  
Rui Wan
Keyword(s):  
Panel Data ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
State Control ◽  
Negative Effects ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
The Government ◽  
High Degree

<p>Using a firm-level panel data of Chinese listed firms, this paper examines the effects of state control on firm value and the different impacts that have under different degree of marketization deeply. The results show: compared with non-state controlled firms, state controlled firms are imposed by much policy burden and have more serious tunneling or expropriation behaviors. Therefore, firm values in state controlled firms are lower than in non-state controlled firms. For state controlled firms, the lower the government administrative ranks, the more serious the intervention or expropriation behaviors imposed by government, and thus the lower the firm value. Compared with low marketization regions, the negative effects of state control and low government administrative rank control on firm value is relatively smaller in regions with high degree of marketization.</p>

scholarly journals Trade Unions’ Rights, Work Councils’ Functions and the Legal Framework for Governing European Corporations: a Spanish Perspective

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-31
Author(s):  
Juan Pablo Landa
Keyword(s):  
Trade Unions ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
European Countries ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Collective Agreements ◽  
Effective System ◽  
Toma De Decisiones ◽  
European Regulations ◽  
Analytical Research ◽  
Double Channel

This paper provides analytical research about changing legislation on the functions of work councils and trade unions in participating in the decision making process at firm level in European countries with systems of double channel based models of representation (like Spain, France or Germany). The paper tests European regulations on the involvement of workers in management decisions, in connection with national rulings passed in some European countries, especially during the financial crisis. The paper will aim at responding the following key questions: What kind of complementarity is to be statutorily built between the functions of work councils and collective agreements in order to guarantee workers’ participation in the governance of corporations? Is codetermination a more effective system than collective bargaining to build on new forms of corporate governance in a transnational context? El presente artículo ofrece una investigación analítica de la cambiante legislación sobre las funciones de los comités de empresa y de los sindicatos para participar en los procesos de toma de decisiones en el seno de la empresa, en países europeos con sistemas basados en la doble representación, como España, Francia y Alemania. El artículo pone a prueba la capacidad de las regulaciones para implicar a los trabajadores en decisiones administrativas, en relación con legislaciones nacionales aprobadas en algunos países, especialmente durante la crisis financiera. El artículo se propone responder a las siguientes preguntas claves: ¿Qué tipo de complementariedad estatutaria debería construirse entre las funciones de los comités de empresa y los acuerdos colectivos para garantizar la participación de los trabajadores en el gobierno de las empresas? ¿Es acaso la codeterminación un sistema más efectivo que la negociación colectiva para construir nuevas formas de gobernanza corporativa en un contexto trasnacional?

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