Do Fixed-Prize Lotteries Crowd Out Public Good Contributions Driven by Social Preferences?

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Katuscak ◽  
Tommm Mikllnek
2014 ◽  
Vol 17 (03n04) ◽  
pp. 1450015
Author(s):  
MARCO A. JANSSEN ◽  
MILES MANNING ◽  
OYITA UDIANI

Human societies are unique in the level of cooperation among non-kin. Evolutionary models explaining this behavior typically assume pure strategies of cooperation and defection. Behavioral experiments, however, demonstrate that humans are typically conditional co-operators who have other-regarding preferences. Building on existing models on the evolution of cooperation and costly punishment, we use a utilitarian formulation of agent decision making to explore conditions that support the emergence of cooperative behavior. Our results indicate that cooperation levels are significantly lower for larger groups in contrast to the original pure strategy model. Here, defection behavior not only diminishes the public good, but also affects the expectations of group members leading conditional co-operators to change their strategies. Hence defection has a more damaging effect when decisions are based on expectations and not only pure strategies.


Author(s):  
Roland Menges ◽  
Janis Cloos ◽  
Matthias Greiff ◽  
Jacob Wehrle ◽  
Daniel Goldmann ◽  
...  

Abstract While recycling helps to limit the use of primary resources, it also requires considerable technological investments in regional circular flow systems. The effectiveness of recycling systems, however, also depends on household behavior. Therefore, current research increasingly focuses on behavioral and psychological theories of altruism, moral behavior, and social preferences. From an economic perspective, recycling systems can be understood as public goods with contributions resulting in positive externalities. In this context, the literature shows that recycling behavior highly depends on the perception of how others behave. In neutrally framed public good experiments, contributions tend to increase when alternative public goods are offered and group identity is generated. We aim to contribute to this discussion by observing household behavior concerning recycling opportunities in controlled settings. For this purpose, we study a laboratory experiment in which individuals contribute to recycling systems: At first, only one public recycling system (public good) is offered. After dividing societies into two clubs, “high” and “low” according to their environmental attitudes, excludable club systems (club goods) are added as alternative recycling options for each club. The results of our pilot experiment show that adding a more exclusive recycling club option increases individual contributions to recycling compared with a pure public good framework. However, this increase in cooperation is only significant for those clubs where members with higher environmental attitudes are pooled. Graphic abstract


Author(s):  
Robert Sugden

Chapter 9 considers a critique of the market and of the liberal tradition of economics that has been made both by virtue ethicists and by behavioural economists. According to this critique, market relations are based on self-interested and instrumental motivations, and so are morally impoverished; socially valuable practices (particularly those of trust and reciprocity) can depend on pro-social and intrinsic motivations which the market tends to ‘crowd out’. An important strand of behavioural economics is concerned with modelling intrinsic motivation, ‘social preferences’ and preferences for conforming to social norms. I identify a paradoxical implication of many of these models: there cannot be an equilibrium in which everyone is completely trustworthy, because if everyone were trustworthy, trust would not reveal pro-social intentions and so could not prompt trustworthiness. This is the ‘Paradox of Trust’.


2007 ◽  
Vol 97 (3) ◽  
pp. 999-1012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dirk Sliwka

An explanation for motivation crowding-out phenomena is developed in a social preferences framework. Besides selfish and fair or altruistic types, a third type of agent is introduced. These “conformists” have social preferences if they believe that sufficiently many of the others do as well. When there is asymmetric information about the distribution of preferences (the “social norm”), the incentive scheme offered or autonomy granted can reveal a principal's beliefs about that norm. High-powered incentives may crowd out motivation as pessimism about the norm is conveyed. But by choosing fixed wages or granting autonomy, trust in a favorable norm may be signaled. (JEL D64, D82, J41, Z13)


2014 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 311-326 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francisco Alpízar ◽  
Peter Martinsson ◽  
Anna Nordén

AbstractIn this paper, we investigate how different levels of entrance fees affect donations for a public good, a natural park. To explore this issue, we conducted a stated preference study focusing on visitors' preferences for donating money to raise funds for a protected area in Costa Rica given different entrance fee levels. The results reveal that there is incomplete crowding out of donations when establishing an entrance fee.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 466-491
Author(s):  
Marc Fleurbaey ◽  
Martin Van der Linden

We study fairness in economies where humans consume one private good and one public good representing the welfare of other species. We show that a social evaluator cannot be egalitarian with respect to humans while always respecting humans’ unanimous preferences. One solution is to respect unanimous preferences only when doing so does not lead to a decrease in the welfare of other species. Social preferences satisfying these properties reveal surprising connections between concerns for other species, egalitarianism among humans, and unanimity: the latter two imply a form of dictatorship from humans with the strongest preference for the welfare of other species. (JEL D11, D63, H41)


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