scholarly journals Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Good Experiments

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Urs Fischbacher ◽  
Simon Gachter
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Free Riding

scholarly journals El monopolio de las ideas: Contra la Propiedad Intelectual

2021 ◽  
pp. 47-104
Author(s):  
Albert Esplugas
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Key Words ◽  
Market Economy ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Private Property Rights ◽  
Original Meaning ◽  
Palabras Clave

This paper presents a critique of intellectual property from an ethical and economical point of view. Once patents and copyrights are characterized as a monopolies of ideas, it is argued that intellectual pro-perty violates private property rights in its original meaning and it is not based in real scarcity but creates artificial scarcity instead. In addition, the paper challenges intellectual property as an incentive to innovation and studies the several costs of this kind of regulation. Eventually, diffe-rent market alternatives to tackle the free-riding problem are explored. Key words: intelectual property, patents, copyrights, private property, scar-city, public good, innovation incentives, market economy. Clasificación JEL: O310, O320, O340, H410. Resumen: En este trabajo se presenta una crítica a la propiedad intelec-tual desde una perspectiva ética y económica. Tras caracterizar las paten-tes y los copyrights como monopolios sobre ideas, se arguye que la pro-piedad intelectual viola el derecho de propiedad privada en su sentido tradicional y crea una escasez artificial en lugar de fundarse sobre la esca-sez. Se cuestiona, asimismo, que la propiedad intelectual suponga un incen-tivo a la creación, estudiando los distintos costes de una regulación de este tipo. Por último se mencionan varias alternativas de mercado para hacer frente a los problemas de free-riding. Palabras clave: propiedad intelectual, patentes, copyrights, propiedad privada, escasez, bien público, incentivos a la innovación, mercado.

scholarly journals Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods Experiments

2010 ◽  
Vol 100 (1) ◽  
pp. 541-556 ◽  
Author(s):  
Urs Fischbacher ◽  
Simon Gächter
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Real World ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Voluntary Contributions ◽  
Conditional Cooperation ◽  
Individual Preferences ◽  
D 83 ◽  
Over Time ◽  
Voluntary Cooperation

One lingering puzzle is why voluntary contributions to public goods decline over time in experimental and real-world settings. We show that the decline of cooperation is driven by individual preferences for imperfect conditional cooperation. Many people's desire to contribute less than others, rather than changing beliefs of what others will contribute over time or people's heterogeneity in preferences makes voluntary cooperation fragile. Universal free riding thus eventually emerges, despite the fact that most people are not selfish. (D12, D 83, H41, Z13)

Contributing for Myself, but Free riding for My Group?

2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoshio Iida ◽  
Christiane Schwieren
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Real World ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Public Good Game ◽  
Individual Decision ◽  
Or Groups ◽  
Series Of Experiments ◽  
General Difference

Abstract Many real-world decisions are made by individuals as representatives of groups. Most research, however, studies either individuals or groups as decision-makers. This paper explores whether there is a general difference between a decision made as an individual and as a representative of a group in the context of a public good game. We conducted a series of experiments to test this question and to understand mechanisms contributing to potential differences. We found that representatives contributed less than individuals when they could not communicate with their constituency. However, when they could discuss their strategy before playing, they contributed at least as much as individual decision-makers. Furthermore, when they could justify their decision after playing, they contributed even more than individual decision-makers. We discuss potential reasons for this and directions for future research.

scholarly journals The Difficulty of Easy Projects

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 285-302
Author(s):  
Wioletta Dziuda ◽  
A. Arda Gitmez ◽  
Mehdi Shadmehr
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Direct Effect ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Government Grants ◽  
Strategic Effect ◽  
Private Contributions

We consider binary private contributions to public good projects that succeed when the number of contributors exceeds a threshold. We show that for standard distributions of contribution costs, valuable threshold public good projects are more likely to succeed when they require more contributors. Raising the success threshold reduces free-riding incentives, and this strategic effect dominates the direct effect. Common intuition that easier projects are more likely to succeed only holds for cost distributions with right tails fatter than Cauchy. Our results suggest government grants can reduce the likelihood that valuable threshold public good projects succeed. (JEL D71, H41, H81)

scholarly journals Development aid as a global public good – a case study

Competitio ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 86-97
Author(s):  
Boglárka Horváthné Angyal
Keyword(s):  
Nongovernmental Organizations ◽  
Public Good ◽  
International Aid ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Development Aid ◽  
Global Public Good ◽  
Economic Literature ◽  
The Public ◽  
Jel Classifications

This study introduces a new concept to the analysis of development aid. Aid is regarded as a global public good where donors benefit from the advantages of aid without rivalry and exludability. The public-goodnature of aid is a logical explanation for the deficiencies of the international aid regime, especially the suboptimal supply of aid and the free-riding of donors. The concept of aid as a public good raises the question whether there are any actors who could produce this global public good. The study analyses whether nongovernmental organizations are able to fill this gap in the international aid regime. The model is introduced through a case study: aid in Afghanistan in general, and the activities of the NGO Hungarian Baptist Aid in the country. Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) classifications: F590, H410

Domanda di inflazione come «bene pubblico» e regimi di indicizzazione dei redditi*

1985 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 159-171
Author(s):  
Mario Ferrero
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Real World ◽  
Decision Process ◽  
Traditional Approach ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Political Decision ◽  
The Real ◽  
Inflation Tax ◽  
Natural Way

Abstract The traditional approach to inflation as a tax does not take any account of the state of indexation of the economy, as if universal «implicit» indexation of individual incomes to inflation by adjustment of inflationary expectations prevailed. This article shows that if - as is the case in much of the real world today - explicit indexation through wage escalator clauses and the like is sufficiently widespread but does not cover all individuals in the economy, then it may become feasible and attractive for a coalition of voters to pass inflationary budgets. Since budget choices and the determination of the associated inflation tax are outcomes of a collective (political) decision process while indexation is privately negotiated in the market, indexed voters may try to make non-indexed voters pay the bill of budget benefits to themselves through the inflation tax. Inflation thus becomes a peculiar, negative public good with a private exit: the inflation tax can now be individually avoided through indexation, and a demand for inflation in the literal meaning can manifest itself through the electoral process. Various properties of this perverse budget-inflation game are discussed, showing that the only natural way out of it appears to be universal indexation, which would eliminate the incentive to free-riding behavior by the indexed voters, though at some transitional cost to society.

THE EFFECT OF SOCIAL PREFERENCES ON THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION IN PUBLIC GOOD GAMES

2014 ◽  
Vol 17 (03n04) ◽  
pp. 1450015
Author(s):  
MARCO A. JANSSEN ◽  
MILES MANNING ◽  
OYITA UDIANI
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Behavioral Experiments ◽  
Strategy Model ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Pure Strategies ◽  
Other Regarding

Human societies are unique in the level of cooperation among non-kin. Evolutionary models explaining this behavior typically assume pure strategies of cooperation and defection. Behavioral experiments, however, demonstrate that humans are typically conditional co-operators who have other-regarding preferences. Building on existing models on the evolution of cooperation and costly punishment, we use a utilitarian formulation of agent decision making to explore conditions that support the emergence of cooperative behavior. Our results indicate that cooperation levels are significantly lower for larger groups in contrast to the original pure strategy model. Here, defection behavior not only diminishes the public good, but also affects the expectations of group members leading conditional co-operators to change their strategies. Hence defection has a more damaging effect when decisions are based on expectations and not only pure strategies.

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