Vertical Integration With Multiproduct Firms: When Eliminating Double Marginalization May Hurt Consumers

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fernando Luco ◽  
Guillermo Marshall
Keyword(s):  
Vertical Integration ◽  
Multiproduct Firms ◽  
Double Marginalization

Does Vertical Integration Decrease Prices? Evidence from the Paramount Antitrust Case of 1948

2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 162-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ricard Gil
Keyword(s):  
Vertical Integration ◽  
Double Marginalization ◽  
Antitrust Case ◽  
Ticket Prices ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Unique Dataset

I empirically examine the impact of the 1948 Paramount antitrust case on ticket prices using a unique dataset collected from Variety magazine issues between 1945 and 1955. With information on prices, revenues, and theater ownership for an unbalanced panel of 393 theaters in 26 cities, I find that vertically integrated theaters charged lower prices and sold more admission tickets than nonintegrated theaters. I also find that the rate at which prices increased in theaters was slower while integrated than after vertical divestiture. These findings together with institutional details are consistent with the prediction that vertical integration lowers prices through the elimination of double marginalization. (JEL G34, K21, L11, L22, L42, L82)

scholarly journals Double Marginalization and Vertical Integration

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philippe Choné ◽  
Laurent Linnemer ◽  
Thibaud Vergé
Keyword(s):  
Vertical Integration ◽  
Double Marginalization

Integration of Complementary Multiproduct Firms

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hao Wang
Keyword(s):  
Vertical Integration ◽  
Multiproduct Firms ◽  
Equilibrium Prices ◽  
Product Series

Abstract Two firms offer product series from which multiple complementary pairs are formed. The firms engage in a price- or quantity-choosing game in the market. It is found that the integration of the two firms may not necessarily lower the equilibrium prices because it precludes “indirect competition” in the market. Therefore, the integration, which may appear as a vertical integration, could be an antitrust concern even in the absence of exclusionary purpose.

Assessing the size of agricultural holdings

2020 ◽  
pp. 105-116
Author(s):  
N. I. Shagaida
Keyword(s):  
Russian Federation ◽  
Vertical Integration ◽  
Total Revenue ◽  
Large Share ◽  
State Support ◽  
The Russian Federation ◽  
Agricultural Organizations ◽  
Business Entities ◽  
To Receive

The article clarifies the concept of “agricultural holding”, using an approach to assessing the size on the basis of the total revenue of all agricultural organizations within the agricultural holding. It has been revealed that only 100 of the total number of agricultural holdings that were identified can be attributed to large business entities. They comprise about 3% of agricultural organizations in the country, while their share in the proceeds is about 37%. A large share of agricultural holdings — large business subjects under the control of Russian entities operate in one, and under the control of foreign legal entities — in three or more regions of the Russian Federation. Vertical integration within the framework of large agricultural holdings with different schemes for including the stages of processing and sale of products produced in their agricultural organizations allows them to receive advantages. Strengthening the role of large business entities in agriculture puts on the agenda the issue of differentiating approaches to taxation and state support in agriculture, depending on the size of the companies’ agricultural businesses.

InP-Based Unipolar Heterostructure Diode for Vertical Integration, Level Shifting, and Small Signal Rectification

2010 ◽  
Vol E93-C (8) ◽  
pp. 1309-1314
Author(s):  
Werner PROST ◽  
Dudu ZHANG ◽  
Benjamin MÜNSTERMANN ◽  
Tobias FELDENGUT ◽  
Ralf GEITMANN ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Vertical Integration ◽  
Small Signal
Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document