Legal Realism and Functional Kinds: Michael Moore's Metaphysically Reductionist Naturalism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Torben Spaak
Keyword(s):  
Legal Realism ◽  
Functional Kinds

scholarly journals Legal Realism and Functional Kinds: Michael Moore’s Metaphysically Reductionist Naturalism

2021 ◽  
pp. 83-107
Author(s):  
Torben Spaak
Keyword(s):  
Natural Kinds ◽  
Legal Reasoning ◽  
Human Behaviour ◽  
Legal Rights ◽  
Legal Realism ◽  
Natural Properties ◽  
Theory Of Law ◽  
Functional Kinds ◽  
Michael Moore

Michael Moore defends an account of scientific, mental, moral, and legal properties, according to which there are not only natural kinds, but also moral and functional kinds; and he maintains, more specifically that: 1) distinctively legal phenomena, such as legal rights, precedent, malice, etc. are functional kinds, in the sense that they have a nature that consists in the function they fulfill in law, 2) the function of a functional kind is that effect, or those effects, of the functional kind that causally contribute more than does any of its other effects to the goal of the larger system within which it occurs, and 3) functional kinds can be reduced to indefinitely large disjunctions of natural properties, 4) the relevant version of naturalism is metaphysically reductionist naturalism, and 5) functional kinds play an indispensable role in the explanation of human behaviour. I argue, however, 1) that the method for determining the function of a (purported) functional kind proposed by Moore is too indeterminate to be able to pin down the function. I also argue 2) that it turns out to be very difficult to identify the properties that are part of the indefinitely large disjunction of natural properties which, on Moore’s analysis, is identical to a functional kind, 3) that functional kinds cannot be part of the best explanation of human behaviour, because they lack nomological unity, and that they lack such unity because they are necessarily multiply realizable, and 4) that Moore will therefore have to give up: a) the view that functional kinds are identical to indefinitely large disjunctions of natural properties, b) the view that functional kinds are part of the best explanation of human behaviour, or both (a and b). I also argue 5) that the idea of a functional kind should not play a central role in any theory of law or legal reasoning.

Cicero's Law

2016 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Courts ◽  
Criminal Trials ◽  
Apparent Contradiction ◽  
Legal Realism ◽  
Rhetorical Strategy ◽  
The Way

Why did Roman prosecutors typically accuse the defendant of multiple crimina, when in most standing criminal courts the punishment imposed on a guilty defendant was the same (typically “capital,” that is, a kind of exile), no matter how many charges were proven? The answer lies not in a failure to distinguish between legal charges leveled at the defendant and defamation of his character, but rather in a rhetorical strategy that made sense in light of what was legally necessary to obtain a conviction. The greater the number of charges, the more likely the jurors would be persuaded that the defendant had in some way violated the statute according to which the trial was being conducted. It is true that prosecutors typically argued that the defendant’s prior conduct made it plausible that he had committed the crimes with which he was charged, but in a way that, as much as possible, made his guilt on these particular charges seem likely, and defense patroni attempted to undermine the charges and the character defamation. This answer to the apparent contradiction between multiple charges and unitary punishment favors a moderate formalism over legal realism as the way to interpret Roman criminal trials.

Legal Realism Regained

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wouter de Been
Keyword(s):  
Legal Realism

On the Artifactual—and Natural— Character of Legal Institutions

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Corrado Roversi
Keyword(s):  
Natural Law ◽  
Common Ground ◽  
Legal Positivism ◽  
Legal Institutions ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Legal Realism ◽  
Natural Law Theory ◽  
The Law ◽  
Theory Of Law

Are legal institutions artifacts? If artifacts are conceived as entities whose existence depends on human beings, then yes, legal institutions are, of course, artifacts. But an artifact theory of law makes a stronger claim, namely, that there is actually an explanatory gain to be had by investigating legal institutions as artifacts, or through the features of ordinary artifacts. This is the proposition explored in this chapter: that while this understanding of legal institutions makes it possible to find common ground between legal positivism and legal realism, it does not capture all of the insights offered by these two traditions. An artifact theory of law can therefore be necessary in explaining the law, but it will not suffice to that end. This chapter also posits that legal artifacts bear a relevant connection to certain conceptions of nature, thus vindicating one of the original insights behind natural law theory.

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