Legal Realism and the Canonss Revival

2002 ◽  
Author(s):  
John F. Manning
Keyword(s):  
Legal Realism

Cicero's Law

2016 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Courts ◽  
Criminal Trials ◽  
Apparent Contradiction ◽  
Legal Realism ◽  
Rhetorical Strategy ◽  
The Way

Why did Roman prosecutors typically accuse the defendant of multiple crimina, when in most standing criminal courts the punishment imposed on a guilty defendant was the same (typically “capital,” that is, a kind of exile), no matter how many charges were proven? The answer lies not in a failure to distinguish between legal charges leveled at the defendant and defamation of his character, but rather in a rhetorical strategy that made sense in light of what was legally necessary to obtain a conviction. The greater the number of charges, the more likely the jurors would be persuaded that the defendant had in some way violated the statute according to which the trial was being conducted. It is true that prosecutors typically argued that the defendant’s prior conduct made it plausible that he had committed the crimes with which he was charged, but in a way that, as much as possible, made his guilt on these particular charges seem likely, and defense patroni attempted to undermine the charges and the character defamation. This answer to the apparent contradiction between multiple charges and unitary punishment favors a moderate formalism over legal realism as the way to interpret Roman criminal trials.

Legal Realism Regained

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wouter de Been
Keyword(s):  
Legal Realism

On the Artifactual—and Natural— Character of Legal Institutions

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Corrado Roversi
Keyword(s):  
Natural Law ◽  
Common Ground ◽  
Legal Positivism ◽  
Legal Institutions ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Legal Realism ◽  
Natural Law Theory ◽  
The Law ◽  
Theory Of Law

Are legal institutions artifacts? If artifacts are conceived as entities whose existence depends on human beings, then yes, legal institutions are, of course, artifacts. But an artifact theory of law makes a stronger claim, namely, that there is actually an explanatory gain to be had by investigating legal institutions as artifacts, or through the features of ordinary artifacts. This is the proposition explored in this chapter: that while this understanding of legal institutions makes it possible to find common ground between legal positivism and legal realism, it does not capture all of the insights offered by these two traditions. An artifact theory of law can therefore be necessary in explaining the law, but it will not suffice to that end. This chapter also posits that legal artifacts bear a relevant connection to certain conceptions of nature, thus vindicating one of the original insights behind natural law theory.

Theory of Custom, Dogmatics of Custom, Policy of Custom: On the Threefold Approach of Polish-Russian Legal Realism

Ratio Juris ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-122 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edoardo Fittipaldi ◽  
Elena Timoshina
Keyword(s):  
Legal Realism

The Return of Legal Realism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Priel
Keyword(s):  
Legal Realism ◽  
Current Trends

This chapter considers what might be called the ‘realist puzzle’: How can scholars who otherwise agree on very little all see themselves as legal realists? It suggests four possible explanations, not mutually exclusive: (a) that the Realists’ ideas were banal and obvious; (b) that they identified something fundamental that—despite all other differences—all contemporary legal scholars now accept; (c) that different people simply identified in the realists whatever they had already believed; and finally (d) that the Realists were less consistent than people commonly assume. Although there is little direct discussion of the realist puzzle in writings on legal realism, it is a useful framework for considering some current trends in scholarship on legal realism, in a way that helps put some recent discussions in a new light.

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