What Does Matched Bank-Firm Data Tell Us about the Moral Hazard in Lending Decisions of State-Owned Banks in India?

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Balagopal Gopalakrishnan
ALQALAM ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
Aswadi Lubis

The purpose of writing this article is to describe the agency problems that arise in the application of the financing with mudharabah on Islamic banking. In this article the author describes the use of the theory of financing, asymetri information, agency problems inside of financing. The conclusion of this article is that the financing is asymmetric information problems will arise, both adverse selection and moral hazard. The high risk of prospective managers (mudharib) for their moral hazard and lack of readiness of human resources in Islamic banking is among the factors that make the composition of the distribution of funds to the public more in the form of financing. The limitations that can be done to optimize this financing is among other things; owners of capital supervision (monitoring) and the customers themselves place restrictions on its actions (bonding).


ALQALAM ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 187
Author(s):  
Budi Harsanto

The fall of Enron, Lehman Brothers and other major financial institution in the world make researchers conduct various studies about crisis. The research question in this study is, from Islamic economics and business standpoint, why the global financial crisis can happen repeatedly. The purpose is to contribute ideas regarding Islamic viewpoint linked with the global financial crisis. The methodology used is a theoretical-reflective to various article published in academic journals and other intellectual resources with relevant themes. There are lots of analyses on the causes of the crisis. For discussion purposes, the causes divide into two big parts namely ethics and systemic. Ethics contributed to the crisis by greed and moral hazard as a theme that almost always arises in the study of the global financial crisis. Systemic means that the crisis can only be overcome with a major restructuring of the system. Islamic perspective on these two aspect is diametrically different. At ethics side, there is exist direction to obtain blessing in economics and business activities. At systemic side, there is rule of halal and haram and a set of mechanism of economics system such as the concept of ownership that will early prevent the seeds of crisis. Keywords: Islamic economics and business, business ethics, financial crisis 


CFA Magazine ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 23 (5) ◽  
pp. 20-21
Author(s):  
Osman Ghani
Keyword(s):  

2020 ◽  
Vol 26 (11) ◽  
pp. 2567-2593
Author(s):  
M.V. Pomazanov

Subject. The study addresses the improvement of risk management efficiency and the quality of lending decisions made by banks. Objectives. The aim is to present the bank management with a fair algorithm for risk management motivation on the one hand, and the credit management (business) on the other hand. Within the framework of the common goal to maximize risk-adjusted income from loans, this algorithm will provide guidelines for ‘risk management’ and ‘business’ functions on how to improve individual and overall efficiency. Methods. The study employs the discriminant analysis, type I and II errors, Lorentz curve modeling, statistical analysis, economic modeling. Results. The paper offers a mechanism for assessing the quality of risk management decisions as opposed to (or in support of) decisions of the lending business when approving transactions. The mechanism rests on the approach of stating type I and II errors and the corresponding classical metric of the Gini coefficient. On the ‘business’ side, the mechanism monitors the improvement or deterioration of the indicator of changes in losses in comparison with the market average. Conclusions. The study substantiates the stimulating ‘rules of the game’ between the ‘business’ and ‘risk management’ to improve the efficiency of the entire business, to optimize interactions within the framework of internal competition. It presents mathematical tools to calculate corresponding indicators of the efficiency of internally competing entities.


Author(s):  
Mark Bussin

This study was conducted in 2012 and replicates Bussin and Huysamen’s (2004) work, conducted in 2003, on remuneration policies. It investigates the factors driving remuneration policy in South Africa and determines whether these factors have changed since 2003. Anonymous e-mail questionnaires were received from 131 senior company representatives. All participating companies were members of the South African Reward Association (SARA) or clients of a large remuneration consulting firm. Data were analysed using a chi-squared test and factor analysis. Results support Bussin and Huysamen’s study, which found that the two main drivers of change in policy were the retention of talented staff and the financial results of the organisation. However, three components of remuneration are receiving greater prominence than they did in 2003: governance in the organisation, merit pay and retention strategies. These findings suggest a greater shareholder expectation that pay should be linked to performance, and that pay acts as a retention strategy for critical staff.


Author(s):  
Fivi Anggraini

Earnings management is the moral hazard problem of manager that adses because of the conflict of interest between the manager as agent and the stakeholder and the owner as principal. The behavior of earnings management will immediately influence the reported earning. The aims of this research at examining the relationship of board and audit committe to earnings management. The samples of this research is all of companies member Corporate Governance Perception Index (CGPI) in the years of 2003-2006 which were listed in Jakarta Stock Exchange. The results of this study show that (1) the proportion of independent directors on the board had not significant relationship to earning management, (2) competence of independent directors on the board had not significant relationship to earning management, (3) the size of board had significant relationship to earning management, (4) the proportion of independent directors on the audit committe had not significant relationship to earning management, and (5) competence of members of the audit committe had significant relationship to earning management.


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