Wettbewerbsregeln FFr Das Digitale Zeitalter Die konomik Personalisierter Daten, Verbraucherschutz Und Die 9.Gwb-Novelle (Competition Rules for the Digital Age - The Economics of Personalized Data, Consumer Protection, and the 9th Amendment of German Competition Law)

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oliver Budzinski
2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (16) ◽  
pp. 205-226
Author(s):  
Hanna Stakheyeva ◽  
Ertugrul Canbolat

In 2016, the Turkish Competition Authority (hereinafter, TCA) published the Cement Sector Inquiry Report (hereinafter, Cement Sector Report) following more than two years of market analysis. One of the reasons for conducting such a market inquiry was the fact that the implementation of competition rules and accuracy of the economic analysis by the TCA in cement cases were frequently criticized. In order to provide some guidance and have better understanding about the competitive dynamics of the cement market, the TCA initiated the inquiry in 2014. Another reason for the inquiry was the importance of the cement industry for the construction sector and the economy of Turkey, as well as numerous competition law concerns in this sector. The article provides an analysis of the substantive and procedural issues in the TCA activity in the cement sector in Turkey. Particular emphasis is placed on the assessment of the Cement Sector Report and common competition law violations in the sector in Turkey based on a review of the decisions of the TCA. Additionally, legal grounds for conducting sector inquiries in Turkey, as well as limits to and potential impact on the TCA’s powers to issue extensive compulsory information requests (in the light of the recent CJEU’s judgements in cement cartel cases) are discussed. Overall, the article provides the reader with a better understanding of the Turkish cement sector dynamics and most common anticompetitive practices there. In conclusion, it is argued that inspite of having a reputation of a “problematic sector”, the behaviour of cement producers and developments in the cement market in Turkey may be justified by economic reasons and the oligopolistic nature of this market.


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 15-33
Author(s):  
Caterina Fratea

Digital technology has changed our markets to an extent last seen during the industrial revolution and electronic commerce has been growing steadily over the last decade. This paper intends to assess how the development of online sales has affected market strategies and the application of competition law, with a particular focus on the selective distribution agreements within the fashion industry. Secondly, the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union is analysed in order to show how certain new contractual clauses, that have become frequent in the digital commercial landscape, require competition rules to be read under a new lens. The final part is dedicated to the recent Geo-blocking Regulation which represents one the most significant measures within the Digital Single Market, highlighting both its coordination with antitrust provisions and its application when competition law does not apply.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1019-1055
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey

This chapter deals with four issues. First it will briefly examine three sectors of the economy that are wholly or partly excluded from EU competition law, namely nuclear energy, military equipment and agriculture; the special regime that once existed for coal and steel products under the former European Coal and Steel Community (‘the ECSC’) Treaty is also mentioned in passing. Secondly, it will explain the application of the EU competition rules apply to the transport sector. Thirdly, the chapter will consider the specific circumstances of four so-called ‘regulated industries’, electronic communications, post, energy and water, where a combination of legislation, regulation and competition law seek to promote competition. Last, but by no means least, the current debate concerning digital platforms is discussed where it is likely that ex ante regulatory rules will be introduced, both in the EU and the UK, to address concerns about anti-competitive conduct and a tendency towards the monopolisation of markets.


Author(s):  
Geradin Damien ◽  
Layne-Farrar Anne ◽  
Petit Nicolas

This chapter describes the leading schools of thought in regards to competition economics as they have evolved over the years. Classical and neoclassical economists were the first to focus on competition issues. The classical economists saw competition as a behavioural process. Meanwhile, with the neoclassical economists came a structural interpretation of competition. Immediately after the Second World War, competition economics became more normative. The chapter then looks at the methodological aspects of competition economics or, more concretely, the instruments and concepts on which competition economics rely. The main focus of study of competition economics is ‘market power’. Indeed, EU competition rules today are based, if not wholly at least mainly, on the concept of market power. Market power can enable behaviours with pernicious effects on economic efficiency. Thus, economists have designed instruments to help authorities, courts, and undertakings to identify and measure market power and its possible abuses.


Author(s):  
Geradin Damien ◽  
Layne-Farrar Anne ◽  
Petit Nicolas

This chapter discusses the enforcement of EU competition law. EU competition law is primarily enforced through a system of ‘public enforcement’, where specialized administrative institutions initiate, decide, and terminate cases. Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are enforced by competition authorities at both the European—by the Commission—and national levels—by national competition authorities (NCAs). Since the adoption of Regulation 1/2003, the Commission and the NCAs form a ‘network’ of competition authorities called the European Competition Network (ECN). A set of specific legal mechanisms have been adopted to ensure a harmonious and effective enforcement of EU competition rules amongst the ECN. In addition, national courts also offer a remedial avenue for plaintiffs seeking to invoke EU competition rules. The chapter then looks at how the Commission and NCAs process competition cases. In general, a competition case goes through four stages: detection, investigation, evaluation, and decision.


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