scholarly journals Heterogeneity in Staggered Wage Bargaining and Unemployment Volatility Puzzle

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Engin Kara ◽  
Yongmin Park
Keyword(s):  
Wage Bargaining ◽  
Volatility Puzzle ◽  
Unemployment Volatility

scholarly journals A NOTE ON THE UNEMPLOYMENT VOLATILITY PUZZLE: IS CREDIBLE WAGE BARGAINING THE ANSWER?

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Bingsong Wang
Keyword(s):  
Wage Bargaining ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Wage Flexibility ◽  
Unrealistic Assumption ◽  
Volatility Puzzle ◽  
Unemployment Volatility

This paper shows that the ability of the credible wage bargaining model to match the observed unemployment volatility hinges on an unrealistic assumption about disagreement payoffs to the firm. Relaxing this assumption can lead to the substantial wage flexibility. As a consequence, the model is unable to capture the observed unemployment volatility.

scholarly journals The Unemployment Volatility Puzzle: Is Wage Stickiness the Answer?

2011 ◽  
pp. 65-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ch. Pissarides
Keyword(s):  
Nobel Prize ◽  
Job Creation ◽  
Nobel Prize Winner ◽  
Search And Matching ◽  
Wage Stickiness ◽  
Search And Matching Model ◽  
Volatility Puzzle ◽  
Unemployment Volatility ◽  
Job Finding ◽  
Cyclical Volatility

The author discusses the failure of the canonical search and matching model to explain the cyclical volatility in the job finding rate. The author - the Nobel Prize winner in economics in 2010 - shows that job creation in the model is influenced by wages in new matches. He summarizes microeconometric evidence and finds that wages in new matches are volatile and consistent with the models key predictions. Therefore, explanations of the unemployment volatility puzzle have to preserve the cyclical volatility of wages. The author discusses a modification of the model, based on fixed matching costs, that can increase cyclical unemployment volatility and is consistent with wage flexibility in new matches.

Experimentalism as a Tool of Economic Innovation in Germany

2001 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wade Jacoby ◽  
Martin Behrens
Keyword(s):  
Industrial Relations ◽  
Information Gathering ◽  
Wage Bargaining ◽  
The Other ◽  
Social Partner ◽  
Social Actor ◽  
Comparative Political Economy ◽  
System A ◽  
German Model ◽  
Economic Innovation

Our purpose in this article is to analyze changes in the German wagebargaining system, a system that has attracted enormous attentionfrom scholars of comparative political economy and comparativeindustrial relations. We argue that the wage bargaining portion ofthe German model is neither frozen in place, headed for deregulation,nor merely “muddling through.” Rather, we see the institutionalcapacities of the key actors—especially the unions and employerassociations—making possible a process we term “experimentalism.”In briefest form, experimentalism allows organizations that combinedecentralized information-gathering abilities with centralized decision-making capacity to probe for new possibilities, which, oncefound, can be quickly diffused throughout the organization. We willshow that the capacity for such experimentalism varies across actorsand sectors. And, to make things even tougher, neither major Germansocial actor can sustain innovation in the longer term withoutbringing along the other “social partner.”

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