Golden Parachutes: Credible Commitments or Evidence of Shirking?

2002 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dino Falaschetti
Keyword(s):  
Credible Commitments ◽  
Golden Parachutes

Golden Parachutes, Lead Balloons, and Silver Linings

CFA Magazine ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 24-25
Author(s):  
Bob Dannhauser ◽  
Kurt Schacht
Keyword(s):  
Golden Parachutes

scholarly journals Forecasting Stability or Retreat in Emerging Democratic Regimes

2013 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 32-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
Snigdha Dewal ◽  
Jack A. Goldstone ◽  
Michael Volpe
Keyword(s):  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Credible Commitments ◽  
National Elections ◽  
Middle Income ◽  
International Intervention ◽  
Democratic Development ◽  
Middle Income Countries ◽  
Democratic Regimes ◽  
Democratic Stability ◽  
The Stability

Drawing on the literatures on elite transitions, factionalism and the new institutionalism, this paper hypothesizes that the stability of partially democratic and emerging democratic regimes is dependent on the willingness of elites to make credible commitments to cooperate and comply with democratic rules. That willingness (or lack thereof) can be signaled by the presence of cooperative or conflict-precipitating events and actions in the periods around elections. We identify and analyze a variety of intra-elite interactions and demonstrate that conflict-precipitating events significantly increase the odds of a democratic retreat in the months before or just after an election, while cooperative events can balance them and prevent retreat. Using event data collected from 40 low- and middle-income countries for two-year periods around national elections between 1991 and 2007 we show that the imbalance of conflict-precipitating over cooperative events is far greater in cases of retreat from democracy. Furthermore, international intervention and pressure had a negative relationship with democratic stability. A logistic regression model accurately identified democratic retreat in 79 percent of the cases examined. Factor analysis revealed several common patterns of intra-elite conflict that can lead to democratic retreat, or conversely, patterns of cooperative events that bolster democratic consolidation. Finally, the data strongly argues for a model of democratic development that depends on open-ended elite maneuvering and the emergence of elite agreements, rather than a model where strong prior institutional constraints determine elite actions.

Credibility, Costs, and Institutions: Cooperation on Economic Sanctions

1993 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 406-432 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lisa L. Martin
Keyword(s):  
International Cooperation ◽  
International Institutions ◽  
Practical Interest ◽  
Economic Sanctions ◽  
Credible Commitments ◽  
Issue Linkage ◽  
Audience Costs ◽  
Free Ride ◽  
Side Payments ◽  
Issue Linkages

The conditions under which states will cooperate to impose economic sanctions are of both theoretical and practical interest. Generally, when sanctions are used, one state takes the lead in organizing and imposing them. Other states have incentives to free ride on the “leading sender's” efforts. To gain cooperation, the leading sender uses tactical issue-linkage in the form of either threats or side payments. The success of cooperation depends on the credibility of these issue-linkages. The use of high-cost sanctions and international institutions raises the potential for high audience costs if the leading sender reneges. These policies thus indicate credible commitments. Data on ninety-nine cases of post-1945 economic sanctions show that costly measures coincide with high levels of international cooperation.

How A Social Enterprise Wanes: The Transaction Costs of Credible Commitments at Etsy.com

2021 ◽  
pp. 026010792110382
Author(s):  
Alejandro Agafonow ◽  
Marybel Perez
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Social Enterprise ◽  
Economic Transition ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Credible Commitments ◽  
Social Mission ◽  
Corporate World ◽  
Online Marketplace

This article fathoms how a social enterprise wanes by applying the construct of imperative credible commitments from transaction cost economics to the case of Etsy.com, an online marketplace created to connect artisans and craftwork enthusiasts. In the absence of imperative credible commitments, Etsy’s social mission was bound to change, leaving the company’s major stakeholders without safeguards to protect the perpetuation of the transactions that Etsy was created to serve. The construct of credible commitments has proved to be fertile in understanding issues of political and economic transition, yet its relevance to puzzle out the corporate world has been underestimated. To bridge this gap, we have recourse to the analogy between disabling the discretion of monarchs and executives to prevent them from reneging on commitments. Hence, by building on political economy academics’ attention is drawn to strategies that, despite existing in the corporate world, have rarely been perceived as important by management and economics scholars.

Signals, strongholds, and support: Political party protests in South Africa

Politics ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 026339572093502
Author(s):  
Jacob S Lewis
Keyword(s):  
South African ◽  
African National Congress ◽  
African Politics ◽  
Credible Commitments ◽  
National Elections ◽  
Protest Movements ◽  
The People ◽  
South African Politics ◽  
Costly Signals ◽  
Opposition Parties

South African politics are in a period of transition: the dominant African National Congress (ANC) is in decline, support for opposition parties has been rising, and voters have been disengaging rapidly from the electoral process. As protest movements have become more common and more powerful, established political parties have increasingly led their own protests, often addressing the same issues that citizens rise up about. This phenomenon has been understudied but has important ramifications for the future of South African politics. This article addresses this gap in the literature, arguing that party-led protests can be interpreted as costly signals of credible commitments to address the very issues that citizens are upset about. In a time when established parties are losing support, they may turn to these costly protests to demonstrate their commitment to addressing the needs of the people. Using counts of party-led protests and riots as well as election outcomes in the 2004, 2009, 2014, and 2019 national elections, this article demonstrates that party-led protests primarily target stronghold municipalities. In doing so, they positively correlate with vote-shares during elections. This boon accrues primarily to the opposition parties, but not the incumbent ANC.

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