Jump Bidding in Auctions with Entry Fees

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrey Ssylochny
Keyword(s):  
Jump Bidding

A theory of jump bidding in ascending auctions

2007 ◽  
Vol 62 (1) ◽  
pp. 144-164 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Mark Isaac ◽  
Timothy C. Salmon ◽  
Arthur Zillante
Keyword(s):  
Ascending Auctions ◽  
Jump Bidding

scholarly journals Jump Bidding Strategies in Internet Auctions

2004 ◽  
Vol 50 (10) ◽  
pp. 1407-1419 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert F. Easley ◽  
Rafael Tenorio
Keyword(s):  
Internet Auctions ◽  
Bidding Strategies ◽  
Jump Bidding

A Study of Bidding Behavior in Voluntary-Pay Philanthropic Auctions

2018 ◽  
Vol 82 (3) ◽  
pp. 124-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ernan Haruvy ◽  
Peter T.L. Popkowski Leszczyc
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Boundary Conditions ◽  
Bidding Strategy ◽  
Bidding Behavior ◽  
Late Entry ◽  
Compliance Behavior ◽  
Jump Bidding ◽  
Charity Auctions ◽  
Corporate Social ◽  
Auction Formats

The authors investigate compliance behavior and revenue implications in winner-pay and voluntary-pay auctions in charity and noncharity settings. In the voluntary-pay format, the seller asks all bidders to pay their own high bid. The authors explore motives and boundary conditions for compliance behavior based on internal and external triggers of social norms. The voluntary-pay format generates higher revenue than the winner-pay format for charity auctions, despite imperfect compliance, but it generates lower revenues in noncharity settings. To characterize bidding strategy, the authors study time to bid, auction choice, and jump bidding and find evidence that bidders in voluntary-pay auctions more commonly use jump bidding and late entry. The findings have important implications for marketing managers, augmenting the growing stream of empirical auction studies and work on corporate social responsibility. Specifically, combining an auction with a charitable cause may result in increased revenues, but managers should ensure that they are accounting for differential compliance rates between auction formats. Even if low-compliance bidders can be identified and screened out, doing so is not advantageous, because noncompliant bidders bid up prices.

scholarly journals AN ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR IN eBAY AUCTIONS

2009 ◽  
Vol 54 (03) ◽  
pp. 441-472 ◽  
Author(s):  
RAUL GONZALEZ ◽  
KEVIN HASKER ◽  
ROBIN C. SICKLES
Keyword(s):  
Repeated Measures ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Panel Data Analysis ◽  
Consumer Surplus ◽  
Auction Mechanisms ◽  
Jump Bidding ◽  
Private Value Auctions ◽  
Computer Monitors ◽  
Reputation Effects ◽  
Recovery Protocols

A relatively new type of panel data analysis is becoming more and more topical in the applied econometrics literature as auction mechanisms are being explored in more depth. The typical data utilized in such studies involves repeated measures of auction outcomes, where the variable of interest involves order statistics from the sample of bids from many bids on completed auctions for a particular commodity. This article presents structural estimates of bidding behavior in eBay computer monitor auctions. We exploit characteristics of such repeated measures to analyze the efficiency of private value auctions for a relatively homogeneous good, computer monitors sold on eBay. We discuss how outcomes of the auction mechanism can be analyzed and their equilibrium outcomes assessed and evaluate the consumer surplus that is generated from such auctions. Particular attention is given to the collection of the eBay data from data recovery protocols that monitor in real time and in relative detail, characteristics of a particular auction with heterogeneity controls for different types of monitors and for different reputation effects of the auctioneer. Among other findings, our results point to a rejection of the use of Jump Bidding (Avery, 1998) or "Snipe or War" bidding (Roth and Ockenfels, 2002). We also find that longer auctions only have a small effect on price and experienced auctioneers respond to this incentive.

The Effect of Timing on Jump Bidding in Ascending Auctions

2009 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 483-494 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony M. Kwasnica ◽  
Elena Katok
Keyword(s):  
Ascending Auctions ◽  
Jump Bidding

An analysis of auction strategies in apartment sales

2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 202-223 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosane Hungria-Gunnelin
Keyword(s):  
Real Estate ◽  
List Price ◽  
Selling Price ◽  
Residential Real Estate ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Bidding Strategies ◽  
Ascending Auctions ◽  
Jump Bidding ◽  
Positive Effect

Purpose This paper aims to empirically test the effect of list price and bidding strategies in ascending auctions of residential real estate. Design/methodology/approach Three regression models are estimated, using a unique data set from 629 condominium apartments in the inner-city of Stockholm, Sweden, sold between January 2010 and December 2011. Findings The results show that jump bidding has the predicted effect of reducing competition by scaring off bidders. However, a higher average bid increment leads to a higher selling price. Furthermore, results show that a fast auction in terms of average time between bids acts to increase the probability of so-called auction fever as both the number of bidders and the selling price are positively correlated with the speed of the auction. While the average behavior of all auction participants, in terms of jump bidding and time between bids, significantly affects auction outcomes, differences in strategies applied by winners and losers show mixed results. The results of this study with respect to sellers’ list price strategy show that underpricing is an ineffective strategy in terms of enticing more bidders to participate in the auction. Furthermore, underpricing is not sufficient to have a positive effect on the selling price. Originality/value This paper is one of the first papers to empirically analyze how different bidding strategies affect the outcome of residential real estate auctions in terms of competition and the final selling price.

The impact of jump bidding in online auctions

2013 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 387-397 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yongfu He ◽  
Peter T. L. Popkowski Leszczyc
Keyword(s):  
Online Auctions ◽  
Jump Bidding ◽  
The Impact

Jump Bidding in Online Auctions: An in Vivo Experiment

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joyce Delnoij ◽  
Sarah Rezaei ◽  
Arnout van de Rijt
Keyword(s):  
Online Auctions ◽  
In Vivo Experiment ◽  
Jump Bidding
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