scholarly journals Strategy-Proof Multi-Object Auction Design: Ex-Post Revenue Maximization with No Wastage

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tomoya Kazumura ◽  
Debasis Mishra ◽  
Shigehiro Serizawa
Keyword(s):  
Revenue Maximization ◽  
Auction Design ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Strategy Proof

scholarly journals Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasi-linear preferences: ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryosuke Sakai ◽  
Shigehiro Serizawa
Keyword(s):  
Arbitrary Number ◽  
Econ Theory ◽  
Equal Treatment ◽  
Revenue Maximization ◽  
Object Allocation ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Monetary Transfers ◽  
Strategy Proof ◽  
Equal Treatment Of Equals ◽  
Strategy Proofness

AbstractWe consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand). We focus on allocation mechanisms satisfying individual rationality, non-wastefulness, equal treatment of equals, and strategy-proofness. Extending the result of Kazumura et al. (J Econ Theory 188:105036, 2020b), we show that for an arbitrary number of agents and objects, the minimum price Walrasian is the unique ex-post revenue maximizing mechanism among the mechanisms satisfying no subsidy in addition to the four properties, and that no subsidy in this result can be replaced by no bankruptcy on the positive income effect domain.

scholarly journals Revenue Maximization and Ex-Post Budget Constraints

2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Constantinos Daskalakis ◽  
Nikhil R. Devanur ◽  
S. Matthew Weinberg
Keyword(s):  
Revenue Maximization ◽  
Budget Constraints ◽  
Ex Post

scholarly journals Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions

2019 ◽  
Vol 109 (4) ◽  
pp. 1486-1529 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabrielle Fack ◽  
Julien Grenet ◽  
Yinghua He
Keyword(s):  
School Choice ◽  
Test Scores ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Truth Telling ◽  
Student Preferences ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Is Strategy ◽  
Deferred Acceptance ◽  
Strategy Proof ◽  
Novel Approaches

We propose novel approaches to estimating student preferences with data from matching mechanisms, especially the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance. Even if the mechanism is strategy-proof, assuming that students truthfully rank schools in applications may be restrictive. We show that when students are ranked strictly by some ex ante known priority index (e.g., test scores), stability is a plausible and weaker assumption, implying that every student is matched with her favorite school/college among those she qualifies for ex post. The methods are illustrated in simulations and applied to school choice in Paris. We discuss when each approach is more appropriate in real-life settings. (JEL D11, D12, D82, I23)

The Limits of Incentives in Economic Matching Procedures

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Avinatan Hassidim ◽  
Assaf Romm ◽  
Ran I. Shorrer
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Graduate Programs ◽  
Revenue Maximization ◽  
Matching Markets ◽  
Positive Signal ◽  
Best Interest ◽  
High Stakes ◽  
Field Evidence ◽  
Deferred Acceptance ◽  
Strategy Proof

Organizations often require agents’ private information to achieve critical goals such as efficiency or revenue maximization, but frequently it is not in the agents’ best interest to reveal this information. Strategy-proof mechanisms give agents incentives to truthfully report their private information. In the context of matching markets, they eliminate agents’ incentives to misrepresent their preferences. We present direct field evidence of preference misrepresentation under the strategy-proof deferred acceptance in a high-stakes matching environment. We show that applicants to graduate programs in psychology in Israel often report that they prefer to avoid receiving funding, even though the mechanism preserves privacy and funding comes with no strings attached and constitutes a positive signal of ability. Surveys indicate that other kinds of preference misrepresentation are also prevalent. Preference misrepresentation in the field is associated with weaker applicants. Our findings have important implications for practitioners designing matching procedures and for researchers who study them. This paper was accepted by Axel Ockenfels, decision analysis.

Mechanism Design for Correlated Valuations: Efficient Methods for Revenue Maximization

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Albert ◽  
Vincent Conitzer ◽  
Giuseppe Lopomo ◽  
Peter Stone
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Good Reason ◽  
Exact Distribution ◽  
Revenue Maximization ◽  
Computationally Efficient ◽  
Auction Design ◽  
Efficient Procedure ◽  
Underlying Distribution ◽  
Theoretical Results

Traditionally, much of the focus of the mechanism/auction design community has been on revenue optimal mechanisms for settings where bidders’ private valuations over outcomes can be reasonably thought of as independent of each other. This has been the case even though there is good reason to believe that valuations are often correlated and there are theoretical results suggesting that mechanisms designed with this correlation in mind can generate much higher revenue. In “Mechanism Design for Correlated Valuations: Efficient Methods for Revenue Maximization,” we look at the setting where there is correlation, but the exact distribution is unknown and must be estimated from samples. We show that in this setting, the previous extremely strong theoretical results around the usefulness of correlation are now very sensitive to the degree of correlation in the underlying distribution and the number of samples that the mechanism designer has access to. However, we also show that if correlation is sufficient, we can construct mechanisms, using a computationally efficient procedure, that significantly outperform traditional mechanism design paradigms.

Resource Block Allocation with Carrier-Aggregation: A Strategy-Proof Auction Design

2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (12) ◽  
pp. 3142-3155 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chih-Yu Wang ◽  
Hung-Yu Wei ◽  
Wen-Tsuen Chen
Keyword(s):  
Carrier Aggregation ◽  
Resource Block ◽  
Auction Design ◽  
Strategy Proof

scholarly journals Strategy-Proof Compromises

2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Postl
Keyword(s):  
Decision Rules ◽  
Dominant Strategy ◽  
Strategy Implementation ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Sufficient Condition ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient Condition ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Strategy Proof ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient ◽  
Dominant Strategy Implementation

We study strategy-proof decision rules in the variant of the canonical public good model proposed by Borgers and Postl (2009). In this setup, we fully characterize the set of budget-balanced strategy-proof deterministic mechanisms, which are simple threshold rules. For smooth probabilistic mechanisms, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for dominant strategy implementation. When allowing for discontinuities in the mechanism, our necessary condition remains valid, but additional conditions must hold for sufficiency. We also show that, among ex post efficient decision rules, only dictatorial ones are strategy-proof. While familiar in spirit, this result is not the consequence of any known result in the literature.

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