Making Sense of Soft Information: Interpretation Bias and Ex-Post Lending Outcomes

Author(s):  
Dennis Campbell ◽  
Maria Loumioti ◽  
Regina Wittenberg Moerman
2019 ◽  
Vol 68 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 101240 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dennis Campbell ◽  
Maria Loumioti ◽  
Regina Wittenberg-Moerman

2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 55-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guillaume Roger

I study a model of moral hazard with soft information: the agent alone observes the stochastic outcome of her action; hence the principal faces a problem of ex post adverse selection. With limited instruments the principal cannot solve these two problems independently; the ex post incentive for misreporting interacts with the ex ante incentives for effort. This affects the shape and properties of the optimal contract, which fails to elicit truthful revelation in all states. In this setup audit and transfer become strategic complements; this is rooted in the nonseparability of the problem. (JEL D82, D86)


Making Media ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 193-206
Author(s):  
Arne H. Krumsvik ◽  
Stefania Milan ◽  
Niamh Ní Bhroin ◽  
Tanja Storsul
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Alan Stephens ◽  
Nicola Baker
Keyword(s):  

2003 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 181-183
Author(s):  
Stanley Krippner
Keyword(s):  

1998 ◽  
Vol 43 (12) ◽  
pp. 856-857
Author(s):  
Eric D. Miller ◽  
Kenneth R. Valley
Keyword(s):  

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