Tax Avoidance, Income Diversion, and Shareholder Value: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment

Author(s):  
Samer R. Semaan
2022 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chen Feng ◽  
Xingshu Zhu ◽  
Yu Gu ◽  
Yuecheng Liu

Based on the natural experiment of carbon emissions trading pilots in China, this paper investigates the effect of environmental regulation on corporate tax avoidance. The results show that: 1) Market-incentivized environmental regulation significantly increase the level of corporate tax avoidance. 2) Heterogeneity analysis shows that the effect is more obvious on the non-state-owned firms, firms with severe financing constraints, and firms in highly competitive industries. 3) We find that the reduction of cash flow is the channel for environmental regulation to affect corporate tax avoidance. 4) Further analysis shows that government subsidies can alleviate the enhancement of tax avoidance by environmental regulation. The more government subsidies a company receives, the less tax avoidance it has.


2018 ◽  
Vol 48 ◽  
pp. 492-514 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ross McClure ◽  
Roman Lanis ◽  
Peter Wells ◽  
Brett Govendir

2017 ◽  
Vol 57 (5) ◽  
pp. 1517-1556 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Cen ◽  
Naqiong Tong ◽  
Yushi Sun

2018 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 907-923
Author(s):  
David J. Pedersen

Using a natural experiment to identify the causal effect of an increase in default risk on firm actions, I find little evidence managers shift risk to corporate pension plans following an exogenous shock to the firm’s long-term liabilities. The finding is robust to focusing on firms where the incentive to engage in risk shifting is arguably the greatest, such as financially vulnerable firms and firms with fewer agency conflicts. This study casts doubt on the risk-shifting hypothesis and shows managers do not take risk-shifting actions that would increase shareholder value even when those actions pose little threat to managerial utility.


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