scholarly journals Does Public Policy Crowd Out Private Contributions to Public Goods?

2001 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karine Nyborg ◽  
Mari Rege
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Crowd Out ◽  
Private Contributions

scholarly journals Does Public Policy Crowd Out Private Contributions to Public Goods

Public Choice ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 115 (3/4) ◽  
pp. 397-418 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karine Nyborg ◽  
Mari Rege
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Crowd Out ◽  
Private Contributions

Exploring Recipient Preferences and Allocation Mechanisms in the Distribution of Development Aid

2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 749-766
Author(s):  
Jeremy Shapiro
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Poverty Reduction ◽  
Development Aid ◽  
Cash Transfers ◽  
Low Resource ◽  
Perceived Need ◽  
Incentive Compatible ◽  
Private Contributions ◽  
Resource Levels

Abstract This study uses incentive-compatible techniques to obtain valuations of 14 common poverty reduction interventions from (probable) aid recipients. Recipients’ valuations for these interventions are highly heterogeneous both across interventions and across recipients of the same intervention. Valuation for interventions does not correlate with overall poverty or with perceived need for specific interventions, suggesting that targeting individuals with high valuations based on recipient characteristics is difficult. Through simulations, this study assesses how various allocation mechanisms—cash transfers and voting—compare in generating recipient surplus in the allocation of aid. When markets function and constraints on joint private contributions to public goods do not bind, cash transfers generate considerably more recipient surplus than voting. Even when cash transfers cannot enable public goods and some services, they may still outperform voting at very low resource levels. However, as resource levels increase, voting dominates cash transfers from a surplus-maximization perspective.

Understanding and Analyzing Natural Hazards Governance

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Gerber
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Risk Reduction ◽  
Natural Hazards ◽  
Cultural Context ◽  
Policy Decision ◽  
Community Members ◽  
Goods And Services ◽  
Conceptual Clarity ◽  
Wide Range

Governance is a complex, highly elastic term used in a wide range of settings which sometimes leads to ambiguity. As a result, defining natural hazards governance as a unique and specific construct is needed for conceptual clarity and analytic precision. At core, natural hazards governance pertains to two fundamental considerations: reducing risk and promoting resilience. While not always recognized as such in the hazards and disasters literature, risk reduction and resilience promotion are two pure public goods. But they are also highly complex public goods—amalgams of a series of distinct but interrelated public policy choices and the administrative systems that put those choices into effect. To understand better a logic for defining and assessing natural hazards governance it is essential to consider it as a set of explicitly collective choices over the production of a complex of public goods aimed at addressing hazards risk reduction and promoting resilience within or across defined political jurisdictions. Those choices create frameworks permitting a set of authoritative actions (lawful and legitimate) to be stated and executed by governmental entities, by non-governmental agents on their behalf (in some form), or for goods and services to be jointly co-produced by governmental and non-governmental actors. Those collective choices in a given setting are influenced by the institutional structure of formal public policy decision-making, which itself reflects variations in the political efficacy of community members, competing interests and incentives over policy preferences, and level of extant knowledge and understanding of critical challenges associated with given hazards. Those formal collective choices are also reflective of a broader cultural context shaping norms of behavior and conception of the relationship between communities and hazards.

When Do Renters Behave Like Homeowners? High Rent, Price Anxiety, and NIMBYism

2018 ◽  
Vol 112 (3) ◽  
pp. 473-493 ◽  
Author(s):  
MICHAEL HANKINSON
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Spatial Scale ◽  
San Francisco ◽  
National Survey ◽  
Experimental Measurements ◽  
High Rent ◽  
Neighborhood Scale ◽  
The City

How does spatial scale affect support for public policy? Does supporting housing citywide but “Not In My Back Yard” (NIMBY) help explain why housing has become increasingly difficult to build in once-affordable cities? I use two original surveys to measure how support for new housing varies between the city scale and neighborhood scale. Together, an exit poll of 1,660 voters during the 2015 San Francisco election and a national survey of over 3,000 respondents provide the first experimental measurements of NIMBYism. While homeowners are sensitive to housing’s proximity, renters typically do not express NIMBYism. However, in high-rent cities, renters demonstrate NIMBYism on par with homeowners, despite continuing to support large increases in the housing supply citywide. These scale-dependent preferences not only help explain the deepening affordability crisis, but show how institutions can undersupply even widely supported public goods. When preferences are scale dependent, the scale of decision-making matters.

Teachers Unions and Public Education

2012 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 130-133
Author(s):  
Peter A. Swenson
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Public Education ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
The United States ◽  
Teachers Unions ◽  
Goods And Services ◽  
Subsequent Discussion ◽  
Policy Analysts ◽  
The Relationship

Public education is one of the most important “public goods” of a democratic society. In recent decades, public policy analysts, public intellectuals, and politicians have debated the state of public education in the United States and have argued about the sorts of public policies that might best promote the academic achievement, educational success, and political socialization of youth. Terry Moe and John Chubb have been important contributors to these debates. Their 1990 book, Politics, Markets, and America's Schools, set the terms of much subsequent discussion about the importance of school autonomy and “educational choice.” Moe's Special Interest extends these arguments through a more frontal critique of the role of teachers unions. This book represents an important contribution to public discussion of school reform. It also incorporates a distinctive perspective on the relationship between power and public policy, and between the role of states and that of markets in the provision of public goods and services. In this symposium, we feature a range of serious commentaries on the book's central arguments about educational policy and politics and on its approach to “engaged” or “applied” political science.

Teachers Unions and Public Education

2012 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 126-129
Author(s):  
Leo Casey
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Public Education ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
The United States ◽  
Teachers Unions ◽  
Goods And Services ◽  
Subsequent Discussion ◽  
Policy Analysts ◽  
The Relationship

Public education is one of the most important “public goods” of a democratic society. In recent decades, public policy analysts, public intellectuals, and politicians have debated the state of public education in the United States and have argued about the sorts of public policies that might best promote the academic achievement, educational success, and political socialization of youth. Terry Moe and John Chubb have been important contributors to these debates. Their 1990 book, Politics, Markets, and America's Schools, set the terms of much subsequent discussion about the importance of school autonomy and “educational choice.” Moe's Special Interest extends these arguments through a more frontal critique of the role of teachers unions. This book represents an important contribution to public discussion of school reform. It also incorporates a distinctive perspective on the relationship between power and public policy, and between the role of states and that of markets in the provision of public goods and services. In this symposium, we feature a range of serious commentaries on the book's central arguments about educational policy and politics and on its approach to “engaged” or “applied” political science.

The Private Production of Public Goods: Organizational Maintenance, Managers' Objectives, and Collective Goals

1997 ◽  
Vol 91 (2) ◽  
pp. 308-323 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert C. Lowry
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Budget Constraint ◽  
Fund Raising ◽  
Exchange Theory ◽  
Financial Data ◽  
Selective Incentives ◽  
Alternative Hypotheses ◽  
Citizen Group ◽  
Collective Goals

I reformulate Mancur Olson's by-product theory of collective action as a theory of resource allocation by interest group managers. I then test alternative hypotheses about managers' objectives drawn from exchange theory and commitment theory. Financial data for 16 environmental citizen groups show that the production of public goods is subsidized by other activities, and revenues from member dues are not affected by spending on public goods. Spending on selective incentives and information generates revenues but also may contribute to the pursuit of collective goals. Estimated marginal revenues from fund-raising and selective incentives show that environmental citizen group managers are not preoccupied with maximizing revenues. Rather, they seek to maximize either spending on public goods or net resources available for influencing public policy and the environment, subject to a budget constraint.

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