Rediscovering Macro-Prudential Regulation: The National Banking Era from the Perspective of 2015

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles W. Calomiris ◽  
Mark A. Carlson
Keyword(s):  
Prudential Regulation ◽  
National Banking Era

The Systemic Effects of Prudential Regulation Toughening:The Results of a Stress-test for Russian Banks

2012 ◽  
pp. 4-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Mamonov ◽  
A. Pestova ◽  
O. Solntsev
Keyword(s):  
Financial Services ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
Stress Test ◽  
Credit Market ◽  
Capital Adequacy ◽  
Government Support ◽  
Government Ownership ◽  
Prudential Regulation ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Stability

The stability of Russian banking sector is threatened by three negative tendencies - overheating of the credit market, significant decrease of banks capital adequacy ratios, and growing problems associated with banks lending to affiliated non-financial corporations. The co-existence of these processes reflects the crisis of the model of private investments in Russian banking sector, which was observed during the last 20 years. This paper analyzes the measures of the Bank of Russia undertaken to maintain the stability of the banking sector using the methodology of credit risk stress-testing. Based on this methodology we conclude that the Bank of Russias actions can prevent the overheating of the credit market, but they can also lead to undesirable effects: further expansion of the government ownership in Russian banking sector and substitution of domestic credit supply by cross-border corporate borrowings. The later weakens the competitive positions of Russian banks. We propose a set of measures to harmonize the prudential regulation of banks. Our suggestions rely on design and further implementation of the programs aimed at developing new markets for financial services provided by Russian banks to their corporate and retail customers. The estimated effects of proposed policy measures are both the increase in profitability and capitalization of Russian banks and the decrease of banks demand for government support.

scholarly journals Systemic Risk and Insurance Regulation †

Risks ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 74 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabiana Gómez ◽  
Jorge Ponce
Keyword(s):  
Systemic Risk ◽  
Formal Model ◽  
Public Support ◽  
Solvency Ii ◽  
Capital Requirements ◽  
Insurance Companies ◽  
Prudential Regulation ◽  
High Exposure ◽  
Insurance Firms ◽  
Low Exposure

This paper provides a rationale for the macro-prudential regulation of insurance companies, where capital requirements increase in their contribution to systemic risk. In the absence of systemic risk, the formal model in this paper predicts that optimal regulation may be implemented by capital regulation (similar to that observed in practice, e.g., Solvency II ) and by actuarially fair technical reserve. However, these instruments are not sufficient when insurance companies are exposed to systemic risk: prudential regulation should also add a systemic component to capital requirements that is non-decreasing in the firm’s exposure to systemic risk. Implementing the optimal policy implies separating insurance firms into two categories according to their exposure to systemic risk: those with relatively low exposure should be eligible for bailouts, while those with high exposure should not benefit from public support if a systemic event occurs.

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