Does Winning a Patent Race Lead to More Follow-On Innovation?

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil Thompson ◽  
Jeffrey M. Kuhn
Keyword(s):  
Patent Race

scholarly journals Dark horse in superconductor patent race

Nature ◽  
1988 ◽  
Vol 335 (6189) ◽  
pp. 389-389
Author(s):  
David Swinbanks
Keyword(s):  
Patent Race

SPILLOVERS AND ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY IN A PATENT RACE

2006 ◽  
Vol 74 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTINE HALMENSCHLAGER
Keyword(s):  
Absorptive Capacity ◽  
Patent Race

Sleeping Process Patents and Environmental Innovation / Umweltpolitik und schlafende Patente

2002 ◽  
Vol 222 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marion Hübner
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Policy ◽  
Technological Progress ◽  
Foreign Firm ◽  
Closed Economy ◽  
Environmental Innovation ◽  
Duopoly Model ◽  
Patent Race

SummaryUsing a duopoly model of a patent race, it is shown that a stricter environmental policy might increase the probability of a sleeping patent instead of encouraging environmental technological progress. Two scenarios are discussed. The first concerns the regulation of a firm that competes with a foreign firm. The second concerns the regulation of a duopoly in a closed economy.

scholarly journals Lead in superconductivity patent race to go to Japan?

Nature ◽  
1988 ◽  
Vol 334 (6181) ◽  
pp. 368-368
Author(s):  
David Swinbanks
Keyword(s):  
Patent Race

Risk Premia and Preemption in R&D Ventures

2004 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 843-872 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lorenzo Garlappi
Keyword(s):  
Technical Progress ◽  
Risk Premium ◽  
Continuous Time ◽  
Completion Time ◽  
Risk Premia ◽  
Option Value ◽  
Market Uncertainty ◽  
Annual Basis ◽  
Patent Race ◽  
The Impact

AbstractI analyze the impact of competition on the risk premia of R&D ventures engaged in a multiple-stage patent race with technical and market uncertainty. After solving in closed form for the case of a two-stage race in continuous time, I show that a firm's risk premium decreases as a consequence of technical progress and increases when a rival pulls ahead. Compared to the case where firms collude, R&D competition erodes the option value to mothball a project, reduces the completion time and the failure rate of R&D, and causes higher and more volatile risk premia. Numerical simulations reveal that competition can generate risk premia up to 500 annual basis points higher and up to three times more volatility than in a collusive industry.

scholarly journals Two-Dimensional Effort in Patent-Race Games and Rent-Seeking Contests: The Case of Telephony

Games ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 116-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
João Faria ◽  
Franklin Mixon, Jr. ◽  
Steven Caudill ◽  
Samantha Wineke
Keyword(s):  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Two Dimensional ◽  
Patent Race
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