scholarly journals Lead in superconductivity patent race to go to Japan?

Nature ◽  
1988 ◽  
Vol 334 (6181) ◽  
pp. 368-368
Author(s):  
David Swinbanks
Keyword(s):  
Patent Race

scholarly journals Dark horse in superconductor patent race

Nature ◽  
1988 ◽  
Vol 335 (6189) ◽  
pp. 389-389
Author(s):  
David Swinbanks
Keyword(s):  
Patent Race

SPILLOVERS AND ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY IN A PATENT RACE

2006 ◽  
Vol 74 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTINE HALMENSCHLAGER
Keyword(s):  
Absorptive Capacity ◽  
Patent Race

Sleeping Process Patents and Environmental Innovation / Umweltpolitik und schlafende Patente

2002 ◽  
Vol 222 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marion Hübner
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Policy ◽  
Technological Progress ◽  
Foreign Firm ◽  
Closed Economy ◽  
Environmental Innovation ◽  
Duopoly Model ◽  
Patent Race

SummaryUsing a duopoly model of a patent race, it is shown that a stricter environmental policy might increase the probability of a sleeping patent instead of encouraging environmental technological progress. Two scenarios are discussed. The first concerns the regulation of a firm that competes with a foreign firm. The second concerns the regulation of a duopoly in a closed economy.

Risk Premia and Preemption in R&D Ventures

2004 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 843-872 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lorenzo Garlappi
Keyword(s):  
Technical Progress ◽  
Risk Premium ◽  
Continuous Time ◽  
Completion Time ◽  
Risk Premia ◽  
Option Value ◽  
Market Uncertainty ◽  
Annual Basis ◽  
Patent Race ◽  
The Impact

AbstractI analyze the impact of competition on the risk premia of R&D ventures engaged in a multiple-stage patent race with technical and market uncertainty. After solving in closed form for the case of a two-stage race in continuous time, I show that a firm's risk premium decreases as a consequence of technical progress and increases when a rival pulls ahead. Compared to the case where firms collude, R&D competition erodes the option value to mothball a project, reduces the completion time and the failure rate of R&D, and causes higher and more volatile risk premia. Numerical simulations reveal that competition can generate risk premia up to 500 annual basis points higher and up to three times more volatility than in a collusive industry.

scholarly journals Two-Dimensional Effort in Patent-Race Games and Rent-Seeking Contests: The Case of Telephony

Games ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 116-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
João Faria ◽  
Franklin Mixon, Jr. ◽  
Steven Caudill ◽  
Samantha Wineke
Keyword(s):  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Two Dimensional ◽  
Patent Race

scholarly journals Mediating artificial intelligence developments through negative and positive incentives

PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. e0244592
Author(s):  
The Anh Han ◽  
Luís Moniz Pereira ◽  
Tom Lenaerts ◽  
Francisco C. Santos
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Broad Class ◽  
Significant Benefit ◽  
Baseline Model ◽  
Safety Measures ◽  
Great Expectations ◽  
Safety Compliance ◽  
Patent Race ◽  
Regulatory Actions

The field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) is going through a period of great expectations, introducing a certain level of anxiety in research, business and also policy. This anxiety is further energised by an AI race narrative that makes people believe they might be missing out. Whether real or not, a belief in this narrative may be detrimental as some stake-holders will feel obliged to cut corners on safety precautions, or ignore societal consequences just to “win”. Starting from a baseline model that describes a broad class of technology races where winners draw a significant benefit compared to others (such as AI advances, patent race, pharmaceutical technologies), we investigate here how positive (rewards) and negative (punishments) incentives may beneficially influence the outcomes. We uncover conditions in which punishment is either capable of reducing the development speed of unsafe participants or has the capacity to reduce innovation through over-regulation. Alternatively, we show that, in several scenarios, rewarding those that follow safety measures may increase the development speed while ensuring safe choices. Moreover, in the latter regimes, rewards do not suffer from the issue of over-regulation as is the case for punishment. Overall, our findings provide valuable insights into the nature and kinds of regulatory actions most suitable to improve safety compliance in the contexts of both smooth and sudden technological shifts.

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