Resource Curse in Subnational Hegemonic and Competitive Authoritarian Regimes

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olga Vasilyeva
Keyword(s):  
Resource Curse ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes

Mass protests and the resource curse: The politics of demobilization in rentier autocracies

2016 ◽  
Vol 35 (5) ◽  
pp. 503-522 ◽  
Author(s):  
Desha M Girod ◽  
Megan A Stewart ◽  
Meir R Walters
Keyword(s):  
Regime Change ◽  
Resource Curse ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Protest Movements ◽  
Income Sources ◽  
The Government

Why are some dictators more successful at demobilizing protest movements than others? Repression sometimes stamps out protest movements (Bahrain in 2011) but can also cause a backlash (Egypt and Tunisia in 2011), leading to regime change. This article argues that the effectiveness of repression in quelling protests varies depending upon the income sources of authoritarian regimes. Oil-rich autocracies are well equipped to contend with domestic and international criticism, and this gives them a greater capacity to quell protests through force. Because oil-poor dictators lack such ability to deal with criticism, repression is more likely to trigger a backlash of increased protests. The argument is supported by analysis of newly available data on mass protests from the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO 2.0) dataset, which covers all countries (1945–2006). This article implies that publics respond strategically to repression, and tend to demobilize when the government is capable of continually employing repression with impunity.

The Politics of the Resource Curse

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael L. Ross
Keyword(s):  
Resource Curse ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Violent Conflict ◽  
Middle Income ◽  
Middle Income Countries ◽  
Mineral Wealth ◽  
Resource Wealth ◽  
Natural Resource Wealth ◽  
Harmful Effects

This article considers the debate over the “resource curse” (i.e., whether too much natural-resource wealth is harmful for developing countries) along with the debate about the mechanisms and conditions that likely generate the reported problems. After reviewing the literature on the resource curse, this article discusses the ways that scholars define “natural resources.” It then analyzes research on how resource wealth affects democracy, the quality of government institutions, and the incidence of violent conflict. It cites evidence showing that petroleum wealth, in particular, seems to have at least three harmful effects: to make authoritarian regimes more durable, to increase certain types of corruption, and to foster the onset of violent conflict in low- and middle-income countries, particularly when this form of mineral wealth is found in the territory of marginalized ethnic groups.

Nontax Revenue, Social Cleavages, and Authoritarian Stability in Mexico and Kenya: “Internationalization, Institutions, and Political Change” Revisited

2011 ◽  
Vol 44 (6) ◽  
pp. 719-746 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin M. Morrison
Keyword(s):  
Natural Resource ◽  
Political Change ◽  
Contextual Factors ◽  
Resource Curse ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Social Spending ◽  
Political Regimes ◽  
Social Cleavages ◽  
Resource Rents ◽  
Natural Resource Rents

What determines how authoritarian regimes use internationally attained revenues such as natural resource rents to stay in power? The answer, this article argues, lies partly in the nature of the socioeconomic cleavages in the country. The article presents a comparison of Kenya and Mexico, two countries that experienced similar rises and falls in internationally derived nontax revenue in the context of similar political regimes. The countries differed, however, in their socioeconomic cleavages: In Mexico, cleavages were along sectoral or class lines, whereas in Kenya they were along ethnic lines. The author demonstrates how these differences led governments in the countries to use nontax revenues in different ways, with important consequences in particular for social spending. Despite the recent turn in the resource curse literature emphasizing domestic contextual factors, socioeconomic cleavages have been relatively ignored. The findings here begin to fill that gap, with important implications for several literatures.

Investment climate and government turnover in russian regions

2014 ◽  
pp. 88-117 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. Syunyaev ◽  
L. Polishchuk
Keyword(s):  
Economic Development ◽  
Theoretical Model ◽  
Private Sector ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Russian Regions ◽  
Investment Climate ◽  
Regional Data ◽  
Endogenous Property Rights ◽  
The Impact

We study the impact of Russian regional governors’ rotation and their affiliation with private sector firms for the quality of investment climate in Russian regions. A theoretical model presented in the paper predicts that these factors taken together improve “endogenous” property rights under authoritarian regimes. This conclusion is confirmed empirically by using Russian regional data for 2002—2010; early in that period gubernatorial elections had been canceled and replaced by federal government’s appointments. This is an indication that under certain conditions government rotation is beneficial for economic development even when democracy is suppressed.

Trust in the Police: Cross-country Comparisons

2012 ◽  
pp. 24-47
Author(s):  
V. Gimpelson ◽  
G. Monusova
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Public Attitudes ◽  
Crime Rates ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Data Sets ◽  
The Public ◽  
Positive Attitudes ◽  
Cross Country ◽  
Police Activity

Using different cross-country data sets and simple econometric techniques we study public attitudes towards the police. More positive attitudes are more likely to emerge in the countries that have better functioning democratic institutions, less prone to corruption but enjoy more transparent and accountable police activity. This has a stronger impact on the public opinion (trust and attitudes) than objective crime rates or density of policemen. Citizens tend to trust more in those (policemen) with whom they share common values and can have some control over. The latter is a function of democracy. In authoritarian countries — “police states” — this tendency may not work directly. When we move from semi-authoritarian countries to openly authoritarian ones the trust in the police measured by surveys can also rise. As a result, the trust appears to be U-shaped along the quality of government axis. This phenomenon can be explained with two simple facts. First, publicly spread information concerning police activity in authoritarian countries is strongly controlled; second, the police itself is better controlled by authoritarian regimes which are afraid of dangerous (for them) erosion of this institution.

Mechanisms of Resource Curse and Economic Policy

2007 ◽  
pp. 4-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
V. Polterovich ◽  
V. Popov ◽  
A. Tonis
Keyword(s):  
Real Exchange Rates ◽  
Resource Curse ◽  
Budget Deficits ◽  
Resource Abundance ◽  
Fuel Prices ◽  
Use Of Resources ◽  
Resource Wealth ◽  
The One ◽  
The Right ◽  
Rich Countries

This paper compares various mechanisms of resource curse leading to a potentially inefficient use of resources; it is demonstrated that each of these mechanisms is associated with market imperfections and can be "corrected" with appropriate government policies. Empirical evidence seems to suggest that resource abundant countries have on average lower budget deficits and inflation, and higher foreign exchange reserves. Besides, lower domestic fuel prices that are typical for resource rich countries have a positive effect on long-term growth even though they are associated with losses resulting from higher energy consumption. On top of that resource abundance allows to reduce income inequalities. So, on the one hand, resource wealth turns out to be conducive to growth, especially in countries with strong institutions. However, on the other hand, resource abundance leads to corruption of institutions and to overvalued real exchange rates. On balance, there is no solid evidence that resource abundant countries grow more slowly than the others, but there is evidence that they grow more slowly than could have grown with the right policies and institutions.

Kryzys gospodarczy w Wenezueli. Przyczyny i konsekwencje

2019 ◽  
pp. 77-88
Author(s):  
Michał Zaremba
Keyword(s):  
Resource Curse

Ropa naftowa jest najważniejszym surowcem energetycznym świata. Od lat 40. XX wieku gospodarka wenezuelska w coraz większym stopniu uzależniała się od produkcji i sprzedaży ropy na rynkach światowych - przychody z eksportu ropy naftowej osiągały poziom 50% PKB i ok. 96% przychodów z eksportu ogółem. W konsekwencji, gwałtowny spadek cen ropy w ostatnich latach doprowadził do poważnego kryzysu gospodarczego, który obecnie nosi znamiona kryzysu humanitarnego. Zasadna wydaje się teza, że obecny kryzys, w jakim znalazła się Wenezuela, w dużym stopniu jest zatem skutkiem oparcia gospodarki na monokulturze ropy naftowej, co w czasach dekoniunktury musiało znacząco odbić na funkcjonowaniu całej gospodarki. Wenezuela byłaby więc modelowym przykładem gospodarki podlegającej tzw. „klątwie surowcowej” (ang. resource curse) lub też „paradoksowi bogactwa” (ang. paradox of plenty). Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie sytuacji gospodarczej Wenezueli, źródeł kryzysu, przebiegu oraz perspektyw wyjścia z kryzysu.

Princes and Parliaments in the Arab World

2004 ◽  
Vol 58 (3) ◽  
pp. 367-384 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Herb
Keyword(s):  
Arab World ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Political Life ◽  
The Political ◽  
The World

Several Arab monarchies have held reasonably free elections to parliaments, though all remain authoritarian. This article compares the Arab monarchies with parliaments in other parts of the world, including both those that became democracies, and those that did not. From this I derive a set of prerequisites, potential pitfalls, and expected stages in the monarchical path toward democracy. This helps us to understand not only the democratic potential of the parliamentary experiments in the Arab monarchies, but also the role these parliaments play in the political life of these authoritarian regimes.

Active and Passive Citizenship in the Arab World

2019 ◽  
Vol 73 (4) ◽  
pp. 607-627 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roel Meijer
Keyword(s):  
Middle East ◽  
19Th Century ◽  
Arab World ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Modern State ◽  
Active Citizenship ◽  
Passive Mode ◽  
Current Crisis ◽  
Early 19Th Century ◽  
Citizenship Regimes

This article argues that the current crisis of relations between states and citizens in the Arab Middle East cannot just be traced to the rise of postcolonial authoritarian regimes but further back, to the rise of the modern state in the early 19th century. The development of modern citizenship regimes has not empowered citizens, it has instead led to a more passive mode of citizenship. After a historical discussion of the various ruling bargains in modern regional history, the article concludes with a discussion of ongoing protests demanding more active citizenship regimes.

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