Licensing and Price Competition in Tied-Goods Markets: An Application to the Single-Serve Coffee System Industry

Author(s):  
Pradeep K. Chintagunta ◽  
Marco Shaojun Qin ◽  
Maria Ana Vitorino
Keyword(s):  
2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raphael Boleslavsky ◽  
Christopher Cotton ◽  
Haresh B. Gurnani
Keyword(s):  

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. Jason Choi ◽  
Kinshuk Jerath ◽  
Miklos Sarvary

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paddy V. Padmanabhan ◽  
Ivan P. L. Png

Author(s):  
Peter Scott

The vacuum cleaner was an archetypal new economy product of the early twentieth century. It offered both major time savings and qualitative advantages over previous household cleaning methods—the brush, broom, and manual carpet sweeper—and was sold in a novel way (by household demonstration). The direct sales techniques pioneered by vacuum manufacturers in the United States were to have a profound impact on the way vacuums were sold in Britain, and globally. Yet by 1939 their household diffusion was relatively slow compared to refrigerators or washing machines. This chapter explores why the industry evolved a structure based on high prices, high cost distribution methods (door-to-door sales), and a strong emphasis on non-price competition, based on differentiation through features. It also shows how door-to-door selling eventually came to constitute both a key firm-level competitive advantage and a substantial industry-level constraint on product diffusion.


Author(s):  
A. Bërdëllima

AbstractWe study a variation of the duopoly model by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983). Firms limited by their capacity of production engage in a two stage game. In the first stage they commit to levels of production not exceeding their capacities which are then made common knowledge. In the second stage after production has taken place firms simultane- ously compete in prices. Solution of this sequential game shows that the unique Cournot equilibrium outcome as in Kreps and Scheinkman is not always guaranteed. However the Cournot outcome is still robust in the sense that given sufficiently large capacities this equilibrium holds. If capacities are sufficiently small, firms decide to produce at their full capacity and set a price which clears the market at the given level of output.


Author(s):  
In Kyung Kim

AbstractIn this article, I study the effect of entry and ownership structure on product variety within a city. Using longitudinal data on theaters in Korea, I find that the positive effect of entry on city-wide movie variety is limited only to the first few entrants. This finding, together with the observation that movie variety in a theater does not respond to entry, suggests that a theater's incentive to soften price competition by screening less popular movies not otherwise available in the city decreases as more theaters enter. I also find evidence that movie variety is greater in more concentrated cities, implying that a chain that owns multiple theaters in a city may differentiate the movie lineup offered in each theater more than when the theaters are individually owned in order to avoid cannibalization or to preempt entry.


1994 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-139 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald W. Cotterill

This paper reviews prior research by agricultural economists on the demand for food products using scanner data. Thereafter, a differentiated product's oligopoly model with Bertrand price competition is developed and used to specify brand level demand and oligopoly price reaction equations. The model has sufficient detail to estimate brand level price elasticities and price response elasticities which in turn can be used to estimate three indices of market power. The first index estimated is the familiar Rothschild Index. The paper develops estimates two new indexes, the observed index and the Chamberlin quotient for tacit collusion. It concludes with comments on how the proposed method for the measurement of market power in a differentiated oligopoly can be improved.


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