Vertical Restraints, the Sylvania Case, and China's Antitrust Enforcement

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhiyong Liu ◽  
Yue Qiao
Keyword(s):  
Vertical Restraints ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement

The Antitrust Revolution: Charting the Course of Antitrust Enforcement

2020 ◽  
Vol 65 (4) ◽  
pp. 587-605
Author(s):  
Richard J. Gilbert
Keyword(s):  
Economic Analysis ◽  
Vertical Restraints ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
Legal Precedent ◽  
The Revolution

The seven volumes of The Antitrust Revolution published between 1989 and 2019 include dozens of excellent articles that describe topical antitrust cases and the circumstances that motivated them. Taken together, the volumes provide invaluable insights into the course of antitrust enforcement over more than three decades and the factors that influenced the direction of change. This essay follows the course described in the pages of The Antitrust Revolution for two major components of antitrust enforcement: mergers and vertical restraints. The cases demonstrate that economic analysis profoundly impacted merger decisions, although the trajectory has been anything but linear. The revolution was more dramatic for the treatment of vertical price and nonprice restraints of trade. Courts relied on economic principles to upset decades of legal precedent for these arrangements.

Vertical Restrictions: Development of Theory, Antitrust Legislation and Enforcement

2010 ◽  
pp. 110-122 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Avdasheva ◽  
N. Dzagurova
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Theory ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Theory Of The Firm ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Hierarchical Organization ◽  
Vertical Restraints ◽  
New Institutional Theory ◽  
Antitrust Laws ◽  
Antitrust Legislation ◽  
Market Organization

The article examines the interpretation of vertical restraints in Chicago, post-Chicago and New Institutional Economics approaches, as well as the reflection of these approaches in the application of antitrust laws. The main difference between neoclassical and new institutional analysis of vertical restraints is that the former compares the results of their use with market organization outcomes, and assesses mainly horizontal effects, while the latter focuses on the analysis of vertical effects, comparing the results of vertical restraints application with hierarchical organization. Accordingly, the evaluation of vertical restraints impact on competition differs radically. The approach of the New Institutional Theory of the firm seems fruitful for Russian markets.

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