The ECN - Network Antitrust Enforcement in the European Union

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Damien M.B. Gerard
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
The European Union

scholarly journals Quantification of Harm and the Damages Directive: Implementation in CEE Countries

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (5) ◽  
pp. 111-131
Author(s):  
Valentinas Mikelėnas ◽  
Rasa Zaščiurinskaitė
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
National Legislation ◽  
National Courts ◽  
General Rules ◽  
Full Compensation

Quantification of harm is regarded as one of the most significant obstacles for the full compensation of harm and development of private enforcement within the European Union, including CEE Member States. Consequently, the Damages Directive establishes general rules and requirements for the quantification of harm, such as a rebuttable presumption of harm in case of cartels, the power of national courts to estimate harm as well as others, which closely interact with the principle of full compensation emphasized by the case-law of the European Union and directly established in the Damages Directive. The main focus of this paper is the effectiveness of the rules on the quantification of harm in general, and how these rules will contribute to the development of private antitrust enforcement in CEE Member States. Therefore, one of the issues to be discussed in the paper is the analysis of how, and to what extent specific rules and requirements for the quantification of harm have been transposed into the national legislation of CEE Member States. As certain CEE national jurisdictions have had certain rules for the quantification of harm already before the implementation of the Damages Directive, the paper analyses how effective these rules have been, and how much they have contributed to the development of private antitrust enforcement of those CEE national jurisdictions. Previous experience of those CEE Member States in applying specific rules for the quantification of harm is important, in order to assess the possible impact of the newly introduced rules on the quantification of harm and on private antitrust enforcement in general in other CEE Member States. The rules for the quantification of harm will not enhance private antitrust enforcement on their own, however, their effective application by national courts together with other rules under the Damages Directive should contribute to a quicker development of private enforcement in CEE Members States.

Competition law post-Brexit

2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 51-54
Author(s):  
Jonathan Scott
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
International Cooperation ◽  
Transition Period ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Internal Market ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Market Enforcement ◽  
Future Work

The end of the Transition Period following the UK's exit from the European Union and COVID-19 are major catalysts for the Competition and Markets Authority's future work, including in the fields of merger control and antitrust enforcement. This article considers how these, and other events, will influence the CMA's work, including the establishment of the Digital Markets Unit and the Office for the Internal Market, enforcement priorities and international cooperation.

scholarly journals Provisions of the Damages Directive on Limitation Periods and their Implementation in CEE Countries

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (5) ◽  
pp. 147-175
Author(s):  
Ana Vlahek ◽  
Klemen Podobnik
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
Legal Systems ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
General Rules ◽  
Limitation Periods

The article analyses the provisions on limitation of antitrust damages actions set out in Directive 2014/104/EU on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union. It presents (draft) implementing legislation of CEE countries from the perspective of their general rules on limitation, and the problems the Member States have faced in the process of transposing the Directive into their national legal systems. Within that, focus is placed upon the analysis of the types of limitation periods, their length and their suspension or interruption. In addition, the authors present the effects of the new limitation regime on the balance between the interests of the claimants and of the defendants, as well as on the relation between public and private antitrust enforcement.

scholarly journals La localizzacione dell’illecito concorrenziale nel regime di Bruxelles: riflessioni alla luce della Sentenza FLYLAL II della Corte di Giustizia dell’Unione Europea = The localization of antitrust torts underthe Brussels regime: reflections in the light of the Judgment FLYLAL II of the Court of Justice of the European Union

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 693
Author(s):  
Caterina Benini
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
International Law ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Private International Law ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Contractual Obligations ◽  
State Of Affairs

Riassunto: Nella sentenza flyLAL II la Corte di giustizia dell’Unione Europea ha affermato che un calo delle vendite provocato da un illecito concorrenziale costituisce il “danno” rilevante agli effetti della individuazione del giudice competente ai sensi dell’art. 5 n. 3 del regolamento (CE) n. 44/2001 (“Bruxelles I”) e ha ritenuto che tale danno vada localizzato nel paese in cui si trova il mercato inte­ressato dagli effetti dell’illecito. Lo scritto, prendendo spunto da questa sentenza, esamina criticamente la disciplina internazionalprivatistica europea degli illeciti concorrenziali, soffermandosi sulle ricadute negative della stessa in termini di private antitrust enforcement. Dinnanzi a questo stato delle cose, la soluzione della Corte appare perseguire l’obiettivo di garantire coerenza tra la disposizione oggetto di pronuncia e l’art. 6, par. 3, lett. a), del regolamento (CE) n. 864/2007 (“Roma II”) sulla legge applicabile alle obbligazioni extracontrattuali derivanti da atti limitativi della concorrenza. Essa inoltre agevola il private enforcement del diritto della concorrenza, contribuendo al contempo alla funzione regolatoria del diritto internazionale privato nel contesto regionale dell’Unione Europea.Parole chiave: illeciti concorrenziali, foro speciale degli illeciti, localizzazione del danno, criterio del mercato, private antitrust enforcementAbstract: In the flyLAL II judgment, the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled that the loss of sales incurred as a result of antitrust tort can be regarded as “damage” for the purposes of iden­tifying the competent jurisdictional authority pursuant to Art. 5 n. 3 of the Regulation (EC) n. 44/2001 (“Brussels I”) and ruled that such damage is localized in the country whose market was affected by the anticompetitive conduct. Taking that judgment as point of departure, this article critically analyses the EU private international law regime of antitrust torts, focusing on its negative impact on private antitrust enforcement. Given this state of affairs, the solution adopted by the Court seems to pursue the goal of consistency between the provision under scrutiny and Art. 6, par. 3, lit. a), of the Regulation (CE) n. 864/2007 (“Rome II”) on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations arising from acts restricting free competition. It also promotes the private enforcement of antitrust rules, thereby enhancing the re­gulatory function of private international law in the internal market.Keywords: antitrust torts, special jurisdiction in matters relating to tort, localization of the loss, market criterion, private antitrust enforcement.

“UMBRELLA EFFECTS” AND PRIVATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT

2014 ◽  
Vol 73 (3) ◽  
pp. 510-513 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niamh Dunne
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Preliminary Ruling ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Legal Implications ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
The Right

UMBRELLA effects arise where anti-competitive conduct by one or more market actors results in general price rises across the sector concerned. The Court of Justice of the European Union has, with its preliminary ruling in Case C-557/12, Kone and others v OBB-Infrastruktur AG, Judgment of 5 June 2014, EU:C:2014:1317, now addressed the potential legal implications of such umbrella effects. In confirming that the right to compensation stemming from breach of EU competition law extends to umbrella claims as a matter of principle, the Court of Justice has offered its most expansive, and arguably most emphatic, interpretation of the scope and importance of private antitrust enforcement to date.

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