Disentangling Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard and Supply Induced Demand: An Empirical Analysis of the Demand for Healthcare Services

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vincenzo Atella ◽  
Alberto Holly
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Healthcare Services ◽  
Induced Demand

AGENCY PROBLEM DALAM PENERAPAN PEMBIAYAAN AKAD MUDHARABAH PADA PERBANKAN SYARIAH

ALQALAM ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
Aswadi Lubis
Keyword(s):  
High Risk ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Human Resources ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Agency Problem ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Islamic Banking ◽  
The Public

The purpose of writing this article is to describe the agency problems that arise in the application of the financing with mudharabah on Islamic banking. In this article the author describes the use of the theory of financing, asymetri information, agency problems inside of financing. The conclusion of this article is that the financing is asymmetric information problems will arise, both adverse selection and moral hazard. The high risk of prospective managers (mudharib) for their moral hazard and lack of readiness of human resources in Islamic banking is among the factors that make the composition of the distribution of funds to the public more in the form of financing. The limitations that can be done to optimize this financing is among other things; owners of capital supervision (monitoring) and the customers themselves place restrictions on its actions (bonding).

scholarly journals Moral Hazard and Claims Deterrence in Private Disability Insurance

2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 110-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Autor ◽  
Mark Duggan ◽  
Jonathan Gruber
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Time Variation ◽  
Rate Increase ◽  
Disability Insurance ◽  
Severe Disabilities ◽  
Replacement Rate ◽  
Waiting Period ◽  
Over Time

Exploiting within-firm, over-time variation in plan parameters for nearly 10,000 Long Term Disability (LTD) policies held by US employers, we present the first empirical analysis of the determinants of private LTD spells. We find that a shorter waiting period and a higher replacement rate increase the incidence of LTD spells. Sixty percent of the latter effect is due to the mechanical censoring of shorter spells, with the remainder due to the deterrence of spells that would have continued beyond the waiting period. Deterrence is driven primarily by a reduction in the incidence of shorter duration spells and less severe disabilities. (JEL D82, G22, J28, J32)

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document