Dynamic Defined-Contribution Pension Design with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tsz-Nga Wong
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Defined Contribution

AGENCY PROBLEM DALAM PENERAPAN PEMBIAYAAN AKAD MUDHARABAH PADA PERBANKAN SYARIAH

ALQALAM ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
Aswadi Lubis
Keyword(s):  
High Risk ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Human Resources ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Agency Problem ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Islamic Banking ◽  
The Public

The purpose of writing this article is to describe the agency problems that arise in the application of the financing with mudharabah on Islamic banking. In this article the author describes the use of the theory of financing, asymetri information, agency problems inside of financing. The conclusion of this article is that the financing is asymmetric information problems will arise, both adverse selection and moral hazard. The high risk of prospective managers (mudharib) for their moral hazard and lack of readiness of human resources in Islamic banking is among the factors that make the composition of the distribution of funds to the public more in the form of financing. The limitations that can be done to optimize this financing is among other things; owners of capital supervision (monitoring) and the customers themselves place restrictions on its actions (bonding).

scholarly journals Village Level Analysis of Credit and Livelihood Enhancement of Microfinance in Andhra Pradesh

2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-60
Author(s):  
Jaya Priyadarshini Yarikipati ◽  
Srinivasa Rao Pinamala
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Andhra Pradesh ◽  
Rural Poverty ◽  
Secondary Data ◽  
Vulnerable Groups ◽  
Primary Data ◽  
Rural Credit ◽  
Positive Effects ◽  
The Impact

Micro finance as an institution are seen to have characteristics that help to solve the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection, which are the existing problems of rural credit institutions which other institutions failed to do. Group lending, peer monitoring and joint liability systems solve the adverse selection and moral hazard issues associated with rural credit markets. This study also focused in finding out the impact of micro finance programme on poverty, money lenders, women empowerment and living standards of the rural poor based on the primary and secondary data collected from Kamavarapukota mandal in Andhra Pradesh in India. Using primary data collected from the filled survey through the constructive schedules and personal interview to estimates the linkages between microfinance and its impacts on rural credit facilities, dependency ratio of money lenders for their credit needs, reduction of rural poverty, and empowerment of women in socio-economic activities.  The conclusion of this study, clearly states that the introducing microfinance inducing the overall improvements of their credit facilities as well as augmentations of their livelihood facilities in different sections of the society.  Further positive effects of this programme is that to  reinforcements of vulnerable groups or targeted population Particularly, SCs, STS, OBCs and other weaker section of the society directly to empower and to participate  in social, economic,  and political activities

Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in Procurement Contracting

1996 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
James C. Cox ◽  
R.Mark Isacc ◽  
Paula-Ann Cech ◽  
David Conn
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection
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