scholarly journals Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency for Non-Quasi-Linear Common-Tiered-Object Preferences: Characterization of Minimum Price Rule

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yu Zhou ◽  
Shigehiro Serizawa
Keyword(s):  
Minimum Price ◽  
Price Rule ◽  
Strategy Proofness

scholarly journals Monopoly Pricing under a Medicaid-Style Most-Favored-Customer Clause and Its Welfare Implication

2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Klibanoff ◽  
Tapas Kundu
Keyword(s):  
Prescription Drugs ◽  
Pricing Strategy ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Average Price ◽  
Rule Model ◽  
Monopoly Pricing ◽  
Minimum Price ◽  
Price Rule ◽  
Optimal Pricing Strategy ◽  
The Difference

Abstract To control Medicaid's expenditure on prescription drugs, 1990 legislation established a rebate program guaranteeing Medicaid a rebate on each unit purchased by Medicaid participants. The rebate is the difference between the minimum price and the average manufacturer price (minimum price rule) or a proportion of the average manufacturer price (average price rule). We characterize the optimal pricing strategy of a third-degree price discriminating monopolist under these rules. Under the minimum price rule, the minimum price gross of rebate always increases whereas prices gross of rebate in at least some of the markets always decrease. In contrast, under the average price rule, these prices may move in the same direction in all markets, with all increasing in some circumstances and all decreasing in others. We also examine the effects of such provisions on social welfare. We analyze a modified version of our minimum price rule model suitable for applications beyond Medicaid.

A characterization of possibility domains under Pareto optimality and group strategy-proofness

2019 ◽  
Vol 183 ◽  
pp. 108567
Author(s):  
Madhuparna Karmokar ◽  
Souvik Roy ◽  
Ton Storcken
Keyword(s):  
Pareto Optimality ◽  
Group Strategy ◽  
Strategy Proofness

A Strategy-Proofness Characterization of Plurality Rule

2016 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 610-623 ◽  
Author(s):  
DONALD E. CAMPBELL ◽  
JERRY S. KELLY
Keyword(s):  
Plurality Rule ◽  
Strategy Proofness

scholarly journals Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices: heterogeneous objects

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bettina Klaus ◽  
Alexandru Nichifor
Keyword(s):  
Econ Theory ◽  
Reservation Price ◽  
Price Vector ◽  
Heterogeneous Objects ◽  
Indivisible Objects ◽  
Reservation Prices ◽  
Priority Ordering ◽  
Serial Dictatorship ◽  
Strategy Proofness

AbstractWe adapt a set of mechanisms introduced by Klaus and Nichifor (Econ Theory 70:665–684, 2020), serial dictatorship mechanisms with (individual) reservation prices, to the allocation of heterogeneous indivisible objects, e.g., specialist clinic appointments. We show how the characterization of serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices for homogeneous indivisible objects (Klaus and Nichifor 2020, Theorem 1) can be adapted to the allocation of heterogeneous indivisible objects by adding neutrality: mechanism $$\varphi $$ φ satisfies minimal tradability, individual rationality, strategy-proofness, consistency, independence of unallocated objects, neutrality, and non wasteful tie-breaking if and only if there exists a reservation price vector r and a priority ordering $$\succ $$ ≻ such that $$\varphi $$ φ is a serial dictatorship mechanism with reservation prices based on r and $$\succ $$ ≻ .

Correction to “A Strategy-proofness Characterization of Majority Rule”

2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-124 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald E. Campbell ◽  
Jerry S. Kelly
Keyword(s):  
Majority Rule ◽  
Strategy Proofness

A strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule

2003 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 557-568 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald E. Campbell ◽  
Jerry S. Kelly
Keyword(s):  
Majority Rule ◽  
Strategy Proofness
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