A Strategy-Proofness Characterization of Plurality Rule

2016 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 610-623 ◽  
Author(s):  
DONALD E. CAMPBELL ◽  
JERRY S. KELLY
Keyword(s):  
Plurality Rule ◽  
Strategy Proofness

A characterization of possibility domains under Pareto optimality and group strategy-proofness

2019 ◽  
Vol 183 ◽  
pp. 108567
Author(s):  
Madhuparna Karmokar ◽  
Souvik Roy ◽  
Ton Storcken
Keyword(s):  
Pareto Optimality ◽  
Group Strategy ◽  
Strategy Proofness

scholarly journals Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices: heterogeneous objects

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bettina Klaus ◽  
Alexandru Nichifor
Keyword(s):  
Econ Theory ◽  
Reservation Price ◽  
Price Vector ◽  
Heterogeneous Objects ◽  
Indivisible Objects ◽  
Reservation Prices ◽  
Priority Ordering ◽  
Serial Dictatorship ◽  
Strategy Proofness

AbstractWe adapt a set of mechanisms introduced by Klaus and Nichifor (Econ Theory 70:665–684, 2020), serial dictatorship mechanisms with (individual) reservation prices, to the allocation of heterogeneous indivisible objects, e.g., specialist clinic appointments. We show how the characterization of serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices for homogeneous indivisible objects (Klaus and Nichifor 2020, Theorem 1) can be adapted to the allocation of heterogeneous indivisible objects by adding neutrality: mechanism $$\varphi $$ φ satisfies minimal tradability, individual rationality, strategy-proofness, consistency, independence of unallocated objects, neutrality, and non wasteful tie-breaking if and only if there exists a reservation price vector r and a priority ordering $$\succ $$ ≻ such that $$\varphi $$ φ is a serial dictatorship mechanism with reservation prices based on r and $$\succ $$ ≻ .

scholarly journals Approval voting without ballot restrictions

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 759-775
Author(s):  
Federica Ceron ◽  
Stéphane Gonzalez
Keyword(s):  
Axiomatic Characterization ◽  
Plurality Rule ◽  
Social Outcome ◽  
Approval Voting ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Family ◽  
Informational Basis ◽  
Approval Balloting

We axiomatically study voting rules without making any assumption on the ballots that voters are allowed to cast. In this setting, we characterize the family of “endorsement rules,” which includes approval voting and the plurality rule, via the imposition of three normative conditions. The first condition is the well known social‐theoretic principle of consistency; the second one, unbiasedness, roughly requires social outcomes not to be biased toward particular candidates or voters; the last one, dubbed no single voter overrides, demands that the addition of a voter to an electorate cannot radically change the social outcome. Building on this result, we provide the first axiomatic characterization of approval voting without the approval balloting assumption. The informational basis of approval voting as well as its aggregative rationale are jointly derived from a set of conditions that can be defined on most of the ballot spaces studied in the literature.

Correction to “A Strategy-proofness Characterization of Majority Rule”

2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-124 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald E. Campbell ◽  
Jerry S. Kelly
Keyword(s):  
Majority Rule ◽  
Strategy Proofness
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