CEO compensation, IOS and the role of corporate governance

2001 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 23-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fathi Elloumi ◽  
Jean‐Pierre Gueyié
2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Ruonan Liu

Purpose This study aims to examine whether compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors are less effective in mitigating the CEO horizon problem. Design/methodology/approach The author uses a sample of 7,280 firm-year observations from 1998 to 2011. Findings In this study, the author finds evidence of opportunistic research and development (R&D) reduction and accruals management in firms with retiring CEOs and compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors. Moreover, it is found that R&D reduction and income-increasing accruals are less discouraged when determining the compensation for retiring CEOs by compensation committees that are dominated by co-opted directors. The results suggest that compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors are less effective in adjusting CEO compensation to mitigate the CEO horizon problem. Originality/value The study reveals that co-opted directors are weak monitors. Moreover, the study adds empirical evidence to the debate of organizations’ CEO horizon problem. Finally, the study adds to the literature on corporate governance, revealing that compensation committees play an important role in mitigating an organization’s CEO horizon problem by adjusting CEO compensation.


2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 44
Author(s):  
Faitira Manuere ◽  
Precious Hove

The purpose of this paper is to review the literature on various theories that are used in organisations today to determine executive compensation. This paper analyses the relevance of the theories that are used to determine CEO compensation in modern corporations. The paper makes an attempt to review extensively the literature on CEO compensation. This paper looks at the concerns of sixteen theories of executive compensation. This paper further analyses the special features that are associated with CEO pay. These features help us to understand the problems that experts on executive pay experience when they try to define the exact CEO pay when compared to other rewards that are non financial. The drivers of executive pay are quantified and qualified in order to provide the conceptual background needed to understand the core factors that determine executive pay. Therefore the role of institutional investors in driving managerial salary is explored in detail. Finally, the effects of firm size and good corporate governance on executive pay are carefully analysed.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Julija Winschel

Purpose In view of the current climate change emergency and the growing importance of the climate-related accountability of companies, this paper aims to advance a comprehensive understanding of the determinants of carbon-related chief executive officer (CEO) compensation. Design/methodology/approach Building on the agency-theoretical perspective on executive compensation and existing work in the fields of management, corporate governance, cultural studies, and behavioral science, this paper derives a multilevel framework of the determinants of carbon-related CEO compensation. Findings This paper maps the determinants of carbon-related CEO compensation at the societal, organizational, group, and individual levels of analysis. It also provides research propositions on the determinants that can support and challenge the implementation of this instrument of environmental corporate governance. Originality/value In the past literature, the determinants of carbon-related CEO compensation have remained largely unexplored. This paper contributes to the academic discussion on environmental corporate governance by showcasing the role of interlinkages among the determinants of carbon-related CEO compensation and the possible countervailing impacts. In view of the complex interdisciplinary nature of climate change impact, this paper encourages businesses practitioners and regulators to intensify their climate change mitigation efforts and delineates the levers at their disposal.


2004 ◽  
pp. 129-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Tretyakov

The article focuses on the analysis of the process of convergence of outsider and insider models of corporate governance. Chief characteristics of basic and intermediate systems of corporate governance as well as the changing role of its main agents are under examination. Globalization of financial and commodity markets, convergence of legal systems, an open exchange of ideas and information are the driving forces of the convergence of basic systems of corporate governance. However the convergence does not imply the unification of institutional environment and national institutions of corporate governance.


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