The Implications of a Jeopardy! Computer Named Watson: Beating Corporate Boards of Directors at Fiduciary Duties?

This article studies the gender composition of corporate boards of Russian companies, including its relation to company performance. The analysis is based on a unique longitudinal dataset of virtually all Russian companies whose shares were traded on the stock market in 1998-2014. It shows a relatively small representation of women, just 12% of all the seats, while about 40% of the companies did not have any female director. At the same time, both the share of companies that appoint female directors and the share of female directors on boards show a clear upward trend. The econometric analysis suggests a positive link between the presence of female directors on boards and company performance, especially when firms appoint several, rather than one, female directors.

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The World Economic Forum Principles on "Climate Governance on Corporate Boards": can soft law help to face climate change around the world?

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT STUDIES ◽

10.3280/cgrds1-2019oa8509 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 37-55

Author(s):

Sabrina Bruno

Keyword(s):

Climate Change ◽

South Africa ◽

Comparative Analysis ◽

Boards Of Directors ◽

Soft Law ◽

Corporate Boards ◽

World Economic Forum ◽

Financial Factor ◽

The World ◽

World Economic

Climate change is a financial factor that carries with it risks and opportunities for companies. To support boards of directors of companies belonging to all jurisdictions, the World Economic Forum issued in January 2019 eight Principlescontaining both theoretical and practical provisions on: climate accountability, competence, governance, management, disclosure and dialogue. The paper analyses each Principle to understand scope and managerial consequences for boards and to evaluate whether the legal distinctions, among the various jurisdictions, may undermine the application of the Principles or, by contrast, despite the differences the Principles may be a useful and effective guidance to drive boards' of directors' conduct around the world in handling climate change challenges. Five jurisdictions are taken into consideration for this comparative analysis: Europe (and UK), US, Australia, South Africa and Canada. The conclusion is that the WEF Principles, as soft law, is the best possible instrument to address boards of directors of worldwide companies, harmonise their conduct and effectively help facing such global emergency.

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Gender Changes In Corporate Boards Of Directors

10.15405/epsbs.2019.03.25 ◽

2019 ◽

Author(s):

M.E. Rodionova

Keyword(s):

Boards Of Directors ◽

Corporate Boards

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Differentiating control, monitoring and oversight

Accounting Auditing & Accountability Journal ◽

10.1108/aaaj-12-2015-2345 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 30 (8) ◽

pp. 1867-1894 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Margaret M. Cullen ◽

Niamh M. Brennan

Keyword(s):

Boards Of Directors ◽

Role Theory ◽

Legal Responsibility ◽

Primary Role ◽

Investment Fund ◽

Corporate Boards ◽

Content Type ◽

Board Of Director ◽

Expectations Gap ◽

Board Type

Purpose Boards of directors are assumed to exercise three key accountability roles – control, monitoring and oversight roles. By researching one board type – investment fund boards – and the power relations around those boards, the purpose of this paper is to show that such boards are not capable of operating the three key roles assumed of them. Design/methodology/approach The authors conducted 25 in-depth interviews and a focus group session with investment fund directors applying a grounded theory methodology. Findings Because of their unique position of power, the authors find that fund promoter organisations (that establish and attract investors to the funds) exercise control and monitoring roles. As a result, contrary to prior assumptions, oversight is the primary role of investment fund boards, rather than the control role or monitoring role associated with corporate boards. The findings can be extended to other board-of-director contexts in which boards (e.g. subsidiary boards, boards of state-owned entities) have legal responsibility but limited power because of power exercised by other parties such as large shareholders. Practical implications Shareholders and regulators generally assume boards exercise control and monitoring roles. This can lead to an expectations gap on the part of shareholders and regulators who may not consider the practical realities in which boards operate. This expectations gap compromises the very objective of governance – investor protection. Originality/value Based on interviews with investment fund directors, the authors challenge the control-role theory of investment fund boards of directors. Building on our findings, and following subsequent conceptual engagement with the literature, the authors differentiate control, monitoring and oversight roles, terms which are often used interchangeably in prior research. The authors distinguish between the three terms on the basis of the level of influence implied by each.

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The Composition Of Corporate Boards Of Directors: Does Industry Matter?

Journal of Business & Economics Research (JBER) ◽

10.19030/jber.v10i3.6854 ◽

2012 ◽

Vol 10 (3) ◽

pp. 157 ◽

Cited By ~ 6

Author(s):

Dan Marlin ◽

Scott W. Geiger

Keyword(s):

Boards Of Directors ◽

Retail Trade ◽

Future Research ◽

Corporate Boards ◽

Font Size ◽

Corporate Board ◽

Publicly Traded ◽

Trade Finance ◽

Board Characteristics ◽

Publicly Traded Firms

The purpose of this study is to identify and examine differences in corporate board characteristics across four industries. Using a sample of 2592 US publicly traded firms, eleven board characteristics were identified and then examined across manufacturing, retail trade, finance/insurance, and services industries. Our analyses revealed significant differences in each of the eleven board characteristics examined. Implications and areas for future research are discussed.

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Presence of Women on Board: Reference to BSE-30 Companies from 2010-2014

International Journal of Accounting & Finance Review ◽

10.46281/ijafr.v1i1.15 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 1 (1) ◽

pp. 24-30

Author(s):

Nisa S

Keyword(s):

Boards Of Directors ◽

Gender Diversity ◽

Corporate Boards ◽

Women Directors ◽

Global Workforce ◽

Talent Pool ◽

Women Employees ◽

Board Performance ◽

Changing Demographics

The need for gender diversity in the board rooms is getting accepted at corporate levels both national and international. Any change which is brought about voluntarily is more effective and long lasting. Gender representation on corporate boards of directors refers to the proportion of men and women who occupy board member positions. Studies have shown that even though there is no real dearth of talent pool, India, comparatively, has significantly a very low percentage of women representation on boards. No one doubts the importance of diversity in boardrooms, especially in improving corporate governance. With the changing demographics of the global workforce and the fact that women will control 75% of discretionary spending by 2028, globally companies cannot underestimate the importance of improving the gender balance on their boards. Women are increasingly becoming a major driver of the economy, both as contributors and as customers; it is appropriate that they be a part of the team leading companies. Past researches have shown that boards with more women members act as a motivator to other women employees within the organization. Continuing reliance on existing directors is likely to dilute the quality of board members. Broadening the talent pool by including women directors will help boards get skilled and competent members with a diversity of perspectives and leadership styles who can significantly contribute to board performance. The following study was conducted to assess the presence of women on board in BSE 30 listed companies from 2010 to 2014.

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Implementing the board of directors’ mechanism – An empirical study of the listed firms in Libya

Corporate Board role duties and composition ◽

10.22495/cbv14i1art2 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 14 (1) ◽

pp. 22-33 ◽

Cited By ~ 6

Author(s):

Jill Atkins ◽

Mohamed Zakari ◽

Ismail Elshahoubi

Keyword(s):

Corporate Governance ◽

Board Of Directors ◽

Boards Of Directors ◽

Listed Companies ◽

Board Members ◽

Corporate Boards ◽

Listed Firms ◽

Stakeholder Groups ◽

The Board Of Directors ◽

Executive Managers

This paper aims to investigate the extent to which board of directors’ mechanism is implemented in Libyan listed companies. This includes a consideration of composition, duties and responsibilities of the board directors. This study employed a questionnaire survey to collect required data from four key stakeholder groups: Boards of Directors (BD), Executive Managers (EM), Regulators and External Auditors (RE) and Other Stakeholders (OS). The results of this study provided evidence that Libyan listed companies generally comply with the Libyan Corporate Governance Code (LCGC) requirements regarding the board composition: the findings assert that most boards have between three and eleven members, the majority of whom are non-executives and at least two or one-third of whom (whichever is greater) are independent. Moreover, the results indicate that general assemblies in Libyan listed companies are practically committed to the LCGC’s requirements regarding the appointment of board members and their length of tenure. The findings provide evidence that boards in Libyan listed companies are carrying out their duties and responsibilities in accordance with internal regulations and laws, as well as the stipulations of the LCGC (2007). Furthermore, the stakeholder groups were broadly satisfied that board members are devoting sufficient time and effort to discharge these duties and responsibilities properly. This study helps to enrich our understanding and knowledge of the current practice of corporate boards as a significant mechanism of corporate governance (CG) by being the first to address the board of directors’ mechanism in Libyan listed companies.

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