scholarly journals Investing in Skill and Searching for Coworkers: Endogenous Participation in a Matching Market

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chris Bidner ◽  
Guillaume Roger ◽  
Jessica Moses
Keyword(s):  
Matching Market ◽  
Endogenous Participation

scholarly journals Investing in Skill and Searching for Coworkers: Endogenous Participation in a Matching Market

2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 166-202
Author(s):  
Chris Bidner ◽  
Guillaume Roger ◽  
Jessica Moses
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Skilled Labor ◽  
Search Frictions ◽  
Static Properties ◽  
Matching Market ◽  
Endogenous Participation

We demonstrate how search frictions have important yet subtle implications for participation in a skilled labor market by studying a model in which agents invest in skill prior to searching for coworkers. Search frictions induce the existence of acceptance-constrained equilibria, whereby matching concerns—as opposed to investment costs—dissuade the marginal agent from investing and participating in the skilled matching market. Such equilibria are robust, relevant, and have comparative static properties that contrast sharply with the intuitive properties arising in a benchmark static setting. We consider an extension with separate matching “marketplaces,” and show that our main results continue to hold. (JEL C78, D83, J24)

A Moment Matching Market Implied Calibration

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Florence Guillaume ◽  
Wim Schoutens
Keyword(s):  
Moment Matching ◽  
Matching Market

scholarly journals Core Stability and Core Selection in a Decentralized Labor Matching Market

Games ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heinrich Nax ◽  
Bary Pradelski
Keyword(s):  
Core Stability ◽  
Matching Market ◽  
Core Selection

STABLE SOLUTIONS ON MATCHING MODELS WITH QUOTA RESTRICTION

2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (02) ◽  
pp. 159-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
DELFINA FEMENIA ◽  
MABEL MARÍ ◽  
ALEJANDRO NEME ◽  
JORGE OVIEDO
Keyword(s):  
Stable Solution ◽  
Complete Characterization ◽  
Stable Sets ◽  
Matching Market ◽  
Stable Solutions ◽  
Matching Models

In this paper, we present a matching market in which an institution has to hire a set of pairs of complementary workers, and has a quota that is the maximum number of candidates pair positions to be filled. We define a stable solution and first show that in the unrestricted institution preferences domain, the set of stable solution may be empty and second we obtain a complete characterization of the stable sets under responsive restriction of the institution's preference.

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