The Internal and External Constraints of Data Protection on Competition Law in the EU

On October 3rd, 2014, the European Commission (EC) concluded the analysis of the transaction by which Facebook, Inc. (“Facebook”, USA) had acquired WhatsApp Inc. (“WhatsApp”, USA) by way of a purchase of shares for US$ 19 billion, which contributed to Facebook’s strategy of focusing its business on mobile development (Case no. COMP/M.7217). In its decision, the EC stated that the deal would raise no competition concerns and authorised the proposed acquisition of WhatsApp by Facebook concluding that Facebook Messenger and WhatsApp are not close competitors and that consumers would continue to have a wide choice of alternatives for consumer communication apps after the acquisition. The EC analysed potential data concentration issues only within the scope that the acquisition could weigh down competition in the online advertising market. Privacy-related concerns from the increased concentration of data within the control of Facebook because of the deal with WhatsApp are not an EU Competition Law matter. Notwithstanding, just some months after the decision two national competition authorities (Germany and Italy) opened procedures against Facebook. In Germany, the Bundeskartellamt initiated in March 2016 a proceeding against Facebook – Facebook Inc., USA, the Irish subsidiary of the company, and Facebook Germany GmbH, Hamburg – on suspicion that Facebook had abused its market power by infringing data protection rules with its specific terms of service on the use of user data. In Italy, in May 2017, the Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato (AGCM) fined WhatsApp EUR 3 million for having forced its users to share their personal data with Facebook as a conclusion of two investigations opened in October 2016 concerning infringements of the Consumer Code. The present article proposes to answer three main questions concerning the EC decision on the WhatsApp acquisition by Facebook: (i) Did the EC apply the best tools to analyse the case?; (ii) Could the EC have addressed a decision that would somehow interfere in the privacy field?; and (iii) Could the procedures in Germany and Italy have been avoided?

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Projecting a European Diploma in Psychology

European Psychologist ◽

10.1027//1016-9040.7.3.221 ◽

2002 ◽

Vol 7 (3) ◽

pp. 221-224 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Bernhard Wilpert

Keyword(s):

Research Process ◽

Project Team ◽

Future Research ◽

Research Results ◽

External Constraints ◽

Internal Procedures ◽

The Eu

The paper presents an inside evaluation of the EuroPsyT project, funded by the EU Leonardo Program in 1999-2001. While standard research usually neglects to reflect on the internal and external constraints and opportunities under which research results are achieved, the paper stresses exactly those aspects: starting from a brief description of the overall objectives of the 11 countries project, the paper proceeds to describe the macro-context and the internal strengths and weaknesses of the project team, the internal procedures of cooperation,. and obstacles encountered during the research process. It winds up in noting some of the project's achievements and with a look towards future research.

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A refusal to grant access to a grid within the provision of crude oil transfer services as an example of a prohibited abuse of a dominant position in the EU and Polish competition law

The Central and Eastern European Journal of Management and Economics ◽

10.29015/ceejme.627 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 5 (2) ◽

pp. 199 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Wojciech Paweł SZYDŁO

Keyword(s):

Crude Oil ◽

Competition Law ◽

Eu Law ◽

The European Union ◽

Dominant Position ◽

Oil Companies ◽

Effective Competition ◽

Oil Pipelines ◽

Transfer Services ◽

The Eu

Aim: The paper discusses cases in which a refusal by an energy enterprise to connect other enterprises to the network is treated as a prohibited abuse of the enterprise's dominant position and, equally, will represent behavior prohibited by art. 12 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and by art. 9 par. 2 item 2 of the Competition and Consumer Protection Law as well as legal consequences of such refusal. It is important to pinpoint such cases since the EU sectoral regulation does not provide for obligating any undertakings which manage and operate oil pipelines to enter into contracts with other undertakings such as contracts on connecting into their network or contracts on providing crude oil transfer services. Conditions for accessing oil pipelines and selling their transfer capacities are determined by the owners of the networks: private oil companies in the countries across which the pipelines are routed. These conditions are not governed by the EU law. Furthermore, the very obligation of connecting other entities to own network by energy undertakings operating in the oil transfer sector in Poland will only arise from generally applicable provisions of the Polish competition law. Design / Research methods: The purpose of the paper has been reached by conducting a doctrinal analysis of relevant provisions of Polish and EU law and an analysis of guidelines issued by the EU governing bodies. Furthermore, the research included the functional analysis method which analyses how law works in practice. Conclusions / findings: The deliberations show that a refusal to access the network will be a manifestation of a prohibited abuse of a dominant position and will be a prohibited action always when the dominant's action is harmful in terms of the allocation effectiveness. It will be particularly harmful when delivery of goods or services objectively required for effective competition on a lower level market, a discriminatory refusal which leads to elimination of an effective competition on the consequent market, a refusal leading to unfair treatment of consumers and an unjustified refusal. Originality / value of the article: The paper discusses the prerequisites which trigger the obligation to connect entities to own network by energy undertakings operating in the oil transfer sector. The obligation has a material impact on the operations of the oil transmitting undertakings, in particular on those who dominate the market. The regulatory bodies in the competition sector may classify a refusal of access to own network by other enterprises as a prohibited abuse of the dominant position, exposing such undertakings to financial consequences.Implications of the research: The research results presented in the paper may be used in decisions issued by the President of the OCCP and in judgement of Polish civil courts and EU courts. This may cause a significant change in the approach to classifying prohibited practices to prohibited behavior which represent abuse of the dominant position. The deliberations may also prompt the Polish and EU legislator to continue works on the legislation.

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