Comments on Richard Markovitss Claim that the Requirement of Possession of Pre or Post Market Power Is Unnecessary in Monopolization and Attempt to Monopolize Cases and a Proposed Second-Best Reconciliation of the Per Se and Conventional Approaches to Dangerous Probability

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Lynch Harrison
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Second Best ◽  
Post Market ◽  
Per Se

28. Competition Law: Article 102

EU Law ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1126-1162
Author(s):  
Paul Craig ◽  
Gráinne de Búrca
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Legal Regulation ◽  
The Core ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Per Se ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu ◽  
Number Of Firms

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing students with a stand-alone resource. This chapter focuses on another principal provision concerned with competition policy: Article 102 TFEU. The essence of Article 102 is the control of market power, whether by a single firm or, subject to certain conditions, a number of firms. Monopoly power can lead to higher prices and lower output than would prevail under more normal competitive conditions, and this is the core rationale for legal regulation in this area. Article 102 does not, however, prohibit market power per se. It proscribes the abuse of market power. Firms are encouraged to compete, with the most efficient players being successful. The UK version contains a further section analysing issues concerning EU competition law and the UK post-Brexit. EU law

scholarly journals Penerapan Pendekatan Rule Of Reason Oleh Kppu Dalam Dugaan Pengenaan Harga Eksesif (Studi Kasus Putusan KPPU Nomor Perkara 03/Kppu-I/2017)

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Indra Sanjaya
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Public Interest ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
The Public ◽  
Rule Of Reason ◽  
Per Se ◽  
Abuse Of Dominant Position ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Case Number

To assess whether a particular action of a business actor violates the provisions in Statute Number 5 of 1999, the KPPU and the Court may apply the per se illegal approach or rule of reason, depending on the formulation of the provisions allegedly violated. The rule of reason approach is an approach used by business competition authorities to make an evaluation of the consequences of certain agreements or business activities, to determine whether an agreement or activity is inhibiting or supporting competition. This paper analyzes the rule of reason approach applied by KPPU in cases with Case Number 03 / KPPU-I / 2017 to determine whether PT. Angkasa Pura II (Persero) which does not reduce the cost of shipping and taking cargo at Kualanamu Airport, even though its workload has been reduced, can be classified as a form of monopolization and constitutes a violation of the provisions of Article 17 paragraph (1) and paragraph (2) of Statute Number 5 of 1999. The results of the study showed that the application of the rule of reason by KPPU was carried out through 4 (four) steps, namely: (1). Market identification; (2) Identification of market power; (3) Identification of abuse of dominant position; (4) Identification of impacts on the public interest. Through the application of the rule of reason, KPPU decides that the actions of PT. Angkasa Pura II is a form of monopolization and that the action fulfills the elements in Article 17 paragraph (1) and (2) of Statute Number 5 of 1999.

scholarly journals Applying the rule of per se and rule of reason to assess the violation of the Competition Law by the IPRs owners

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. First
Author(s):  
Bui Thi-Hang Nga
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Competitive Advantage ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Intellectual Property Rights ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Rule Of Reason ◽  
Per Se ◽  
The Right ◽  
Exclusive Right ◽  
Monopoly Position

With the nature of practically irreplaceable and the monopoly of the protection documents, the law has given the intellectual property rights (IPRs) owner a competitive advantage, as well as a market power. As a result, to extent the market power and create a monopoly position to maximize profitability, IPRs owners tend to abuse IPRs to limit competition. Although the exclusive right to IPRs is a legal monopoly comes from protection documents, it does not mean that the owner has the right to abuse this monopoly to limit competition. This is because such behavior is not considered an exception under the Competition Law and shall be prohibited in case the satisfaction of provision violating conditions of the Competition Law. However, in order to balance the interests of related subjects, in assessment of the Competition Law violations of IPRs abuses, the laws of countries fully recognized and applied the rule of reason instead of per ser as Competition Law violations in general. The article aims to analyze and explain the purpose of the application of the rule of reason when assessing the violation of the Competition Law of IPRs owner and when using the per se, in respect of the legal monopoly of the IPRs subjects. The paper then provides proposals to complete the Vietnamese Competition Law which governs the abuse of IPRs owners.

27. Competition Law:

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Craig ◽  
Gráinne de Búrca
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Legal Regulation ◽  
Monopoly Power ◽  
The Core ◽  
Per Se ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu ◽  
Number Of Firms ◽  
Academic Debate

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing able students with a stand-alone resource. This chapter focuses on another principal provision concerned with competition policy: Article 102 TFEU. The essence of Article 102 is the control of market power, whether by a single firm or, subject to certain conditions, a number of firms. Monopoly power can lead to higher prices and lower output than would prevail under more normal competitive conditions, and this is the core rationale for legal regulation in this area. Article 102 does not, however, prohibit market power per se. It proscribes the abuse of market power. Firms are encouraged to compete, with the most efficient players being successful.

scholarly journals Fuel Subsidies Versus Market Power: Is There a Countervailing Second-Best Optimum?

2019 ◽  
Vol 74 (4) ◽  
pp. 1619-1646
Author(s):  
Morakinyo O. Adetutu ◽  
Thomas G. Weyman-Jones
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Market Failure ◽  
Climate Change Policy ◽  
Consumer Surplus ◽  
Environmental Cost ◽  
Gasoline Prices ◽  
Second Best ◽  
Change Policy ◽  
Fuel Subsidies ◽  
End Use

Abstract Fuel subsidies distort end-use prices below cost, resulting in overconsumption and huge environmental cost. On the other hand, the mark-up over cost due to the exercise of market power results in the social loss of consumer surplus. We open a new line of inquiry into the potential for a market-based solution from these two countervailing forces: can the two offsetting distortions conceivably achieve a second- best optimum? Relying on dynamic panel techniques and gasoline market data for 68 developing countries, we uncover an excessive second-best subsidy offset to market power mark-up on the order of 4.5. Our results indicate that the potential for policy failure strongly exceeds the potential for market failure in our model, and gasoline prices across our sample may not be aligned with vigorous anti-climate change policy.

Beneficial Moral Hazard and the Theory of the Second Best

2009 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 229-240 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin D. Frick ◽  
Michael E. Chernew
Keyword(s):  
Health Insurance ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Medical Care ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Economic Efficiency ◽  
Second Best ◽  
Welfare Consequences

This article examines the welfare consequences of moral hazard, and brings together several arguments suggesting that, in many cases, the additional consumption associated with health insurance could be welfare enhancing. Since conditions for maximum economic efficiency fail to hold in the market for medical care, the theory of the second best is useful. We focus on three efficiency-related reasons why insurance-induced consumption may improve welfare: 1) insurance can offset market power; 2) insurance can remedy some externalities; and 3) insurance can mitigate problems that are associated with misinformation and result in the underutilization of many types of care. These arguments strengthen the case for expanding coverage.

28. Competition Law: Article 102

EU Law ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1087-1121
Author(s):  
Paul Craig ◽  
Gráinne de Búrca
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Legal Regulation ◽  
The Core ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Per Se ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu ◽  
Number Of Firms

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing students with a stand-alone resource. This chapter focuses on another principal provision concerned with competition policy: Article 102 TFEU. The essence of Article 102 is the control of market power, whether by a single firm or, subject to certain conditions, a number of firms. Monopoly power can lead to higher prices and lower output than would prevail under more normal competitive conditions, and this is the core rationale for legal regulation in this area. Article 102 does not, however, prohibit market power per se. It proscribes the abuse of market power. Firms are encouraged to compete, with the most efficient players being successful. The UK version contains a further section analysing issues concerning EU competition law and the UK post-Brexit. EU law

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