Tax Information Exchange with Developing Countries and Tax Havens

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julia Braun ◽  
Martin Zagler
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Information Exchange ◽  
Tax Havens ◽  
Tax Information Exchange

scholarly journals Logic of Appropriateness or Logic of Consequence?  Competing Explanations for the OECD Campaign against  Tax Havens

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Melinda Wood
Keyword(s):  
Information Exchange ◽  
Historical Development ◽  
International Institutions ◽  
Alternative Explanation ◽  
Transformative Change ◽  
Tax Havens ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Future ◽  
Underlying Causes ◽  
Tax Information Exchange

<p>This thesis provides an alternative explanation to existing constructivist accounts of the OECD campaign against tax havens. It reinterprets the OECD project through a neoliberal institutionalist lens and offers a different take on each major historical development. It brings the narrative up to date, describing the events of the past two years and explaining the underlying causes in a manner consistent with the neoliberal reinterpretation. It finishes by considering what this account might predict for the future of tax information exchange. The thesis finds that transformative change happens in accordance with state interests rather than with identities and norms. International institutions fundamentally exist to advance the interests of their memberstates and will adapt their goals to reflect changing collective interests. States that are coerced to change their behaviour can be expected to comply only to the extent required to avoid sanctions.</p>

scholarly journals Black Money in India: Retrospect and Prospect

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Arindam Gupta
Keyword(s):  
Social Movement ◽  
Information Exchange ◽  
Tax Havens ◽  
Tax Amnesty ◽  
The Government ◽  
Economic Measure ◽  
Tax Information Exchange

The paper makes a review of the attempts of the earlier governments to control black money through various measures vis-à-vis those taken by the present government. The paper finds some leniency in the recently declared Electoral Bond scheme otherwise such other measures of the present government appear to be more focused and reasonably effective. Demonetization was criticized due to the fall-out on the economy in general and its failure as an economic measure to curb black money in particular. The government remains successful in signing too the long awaited Tax Information Exchange Agreement with countries known as tax havens. It is implementing the new Black Money Act. Thus, not remaining exclusively dependent upon tax amnesty schemes like that of the previous governments; the present government has taken a few stern measures in pursuit of fulfilling the ruling political party's election promise to curb the black money menace. Appointment of anticorruption authority or ombudsman following the required legislation having passed under the pressure of an apolitical social movement is the need of the hour. The already existing Prevention of Corruption Act should be suitably amended as proposed, thus not to retain the same any more as a blunt legal weapon to restrain corruption engineered black money.

scholarly journals Tax Havens, Tax Evasion and Tax Information Exchange Agreements in the OECD

2017 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 519-542 ◽  
Author(s):  
David M. Kemme ◽  
Bhavik Parikh ◽  
Tanja Steigner
Keyword(s):  
Tax Evasion ◽  
Information Exchange ◽  
Tax Havens ◽  
Tax Information Exchange

scholarly journals Tax Information Exchange Influence on Czech Based Companies’ Behavior in Relation to Tax Havens

2017 ◽  
Vol 65 (2) ◽  
pp. 721-726 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Rohan ◽  
Lukáš Moravec
Keyword(s):  
Czech Republic ◽  
Information Exchange ◽  
Double Taxation ◽  
Difference In Differences ◽  
Tax Havens ◽  
The Czech Republic ◽  
Exchange Of Information ◽  
Tax Haven ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Tax Information Exchange

In recent years, borders between countries have been opened gradually thanks to globalization, which is reflected in minimal barriers to the movement of persons and capital. This situation could be potentially abused by taxpayers willing to shift the capital to preferential tax jurisdictions. Due to facts aforementioned, several instruments for tax administrators have been introduced. Bilateral and multilateral instruments are concluded with particular countries for the purpose of obtaining information about foreign residents staying abroad but also to avoid double taxation or double non‑taxation. In recent years there has been an increased number of companies in the Czech Republic whose owners come from preferential tax jurisdiction from 12,676 up to 13,167. This paper is focused on the Czech taxpayers’ reaction on concluding agreements concerning exchange of information in tax matters with preferential tax jurisdictions, the so‑called “Tax havens”. The Difference‑in‑Differences Method was carried out to predict the taxpayers’ behavior. The model shows that the agreements work well as a preventive tool. If the Czech Republic concludes the agreement with the tax haven, the taxpayers lose their anonymity. This results in their relocation into tax havens that are not covered by the agreement in order to keep their anonymity.

scholarly journals Logic of Appropriateness or Logic of Consequence?  Competing Explanations for the OECD Campaign against  Tax Havens

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Melinda Wood
Keyword(s):  
Information Exchange ◽  
Historical Development ◽  
International Institutions ◽  
Alternative Explanation ◽  
Transformative Change ◽  
Tax Havens ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Future ◽  
Underlying Causes ◽  
Tax Information Exchange

<p>This thesis provides an alternative explanation to existing constructivist accounts of the OECD campaign against tax havens. It reinterprets the OECD project through a neoliberal institutionalist lens and offers a different take on each major historical development. It brings the narrative up to date, describing the events of the past two years and explaining the underlying causes in a manner consistent with the neoliberal reinterpretation. It finishes by considering what this account might predict for the future of tax information exchange. The thesis finds that transformative change happens in accordance with state interests rather than with identities and norms. International institutions fundamentally exist to advance the interests of their memberstates and will adapt their goals to reflect changing collective interests. States that are coerced to change their behaviour can be expected to comply only to the extent required to avoid sanctions.</p>

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