scholarly journals Tax Havens, Tax Evasion and Tax Information Exchange Agreements in the OECD

2017 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 519-542 ◽  
Author(s):  
David M. Kemme ◽  
Bhavik Parikh ◽  
Tanja Steigner
Keyword(s):  
Tax Evasion ◽  
Information Exchange ◽  
Tax Havens ◽  
Tax Information Exchange

scholarly journals Logic of Appropriateness or Logic of Consequence?  Competing Explanations for the OECD Campaign against  Tax Havens

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Melinda Wood
Keyword(s):  
Information Exchange ◽  
Historical Development ◽  
International Institutions ◽  
Alternative Explanation ◽  
Transformative Change ◽  
Tax Havens ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Future ◽  
Underlying Causes ◽  
Tax Information Exchange

<p>This thesis provides an alternative explanation to existing constructivist accounts of the OECD campaign against tax havens. It reinterprets the OECD project through a neoliberal institutionalist lens and offers a different take on each major historical development. It brings the narrative up to date, describing the events of the past two years and explaining the underlying causes in a manner consistent with the neoliberal reinterpretation. It finishes by considering what this account might predict for the future of tax information exchange. The thesis finds that transformative change happens in accordance with state interests rather than with identities and norms. International institutions fundamentally exist to advance the interests of their memberstates and will adapt their goals to reflect changing collective interests. States that are coerced to change their behaviour can be expected to comply only to the extent required to avoid sanctions.</p>

scholarly journals Black Money in India: Retrospect and Prospect

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Arindam Gupta
Keyword(s):  
Social Movement ◽  
Information Exchange ◽  
Tax Havens ◽  
Tax Amnesty ◽  
The Government ◽  
Economic Measure ◽  
Tax Information Exchange

The paper makes a review of the attempts of the earlier governments to control black money through various measures vis-à-vis those taken by the present government. The paper finds some leniency in the recently declared Electoral Bond scheme otherwise such other measures of the present government appear to be more focused and reasonably effective. Demonetization was criticized due to the fall-out on the economy in general and its failure as an economic measure to curb black money in particular. The government remains successful in signing too the long awaited Tax Information Exchange Agreement with countries known as tax havens. It is implementing the new Black Money Act. Thus, not remaining exclusively dependent upon tax amnesty schemes like that of the previous governments; the present government has taken a few stern measures in pursuit of fulfilling the ruling political party's election promise to curb the black money menace. Appointment of anticorruption authority or ombudsman following the required legislation having passed under the pressure of an apolitical social movement is the need of the hour. The already existing Prevention of Corruption Act should be suitably amended as proposed, thus not to retain the same any more as a blunt legal weapon to restrain corruption engineered black money.

scholarly journals Tax Information Exchange Influence on Czech Based Companies’ Behavior in Relation to Tax Havens

2017 ◽  
Vol 65 (2) ◽  
pp. 721-726 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Rohan ◽  
Lukáš Moravec
Keyword(s):  
Czech Republic ◽  
Information Exchange ◽  
Double Taxation ◽  
Difference In Differences ◽  
Tax Havens ◽  
The Czech Republic ◽  
Exchange Of Information ◽  
Tax Haven ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Tax Information Exchange

In recent years, borders between countries have been opened gradually thanks to globalization, which is reflected in minimal barriers to the movement of persons and capital. This situation could be potentially abused by taxpayers willing to shift the capital to preferential tax jurisdictions. Due to facts aforementioned, several instruments for tax administrators have been introduced. Bilateral and multilateral instruments are concluded with particular countries for the purpose of obtaining information about foreign residents staying abroad but also to avoid double taxation or double non‑taxation. In recent years there has been an increased number of companies in the Czech Republic whose owners come from preferential tax jurisdiction from 12,676 up to 13,167. This paper is focused on the Czech taxpayers’ reaction on concluding agreements concerning exchange of information in tax matters with preferential tax jurisdictions, the so‑called “Tax havens”. The Difference‑in‑Differences Method was carried out to predict the taxpayers’ behavior. The model shows that the agreements work well as a preventive tool. If the Czech Republic concludes the agreement with the tax haven, the taxpayers lose their anonymity. This results in their relocation into tax havens that are not covered by the agreement in order to keep their anonymity.

The OECD's Harmful Tax Competition Initiative and the Tax Havens: From Bombshell to Damp Squib

2008 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 1850128 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert T. Kudrle
Keyword(s):  
Tax Evasion ◽  
Information Exchange ◽  
Tax Competition ◽  
Personal Income ◽  
Cayman Islands ◽  
Tax Havens ◽  
Bank Secrecy ◽  
Automatic Information ◽  
Tax Haven ◽  
The Impact

The OECD's Harmful Tax Competition of 1998 departed in both tone and substance from almost anything the organization had published before. The roots of the associated project lie mainly in EU concerns that certain forms of intra-union competition were eroding both the corporate and personal income tax bases of member states. But it appeared impossible to deal with those problems unless policies were also changed in the 40 or so jurisdictions know as “tax havens.” HTC threatened sanctions against the tax havens if they failed to collect and share information upon request about individuals and corporations attempting to evade or avoid income taxes. HTC also set criteria for the legitimacy of claims about corporate location. A firm could claim location in a tax haven only if it had “substantial” activity there. The report created a furor among the tax havens, which complained loudly that they were facing a new form of colonial control by being held accountable for standards they had no role in setting. Over the next several years the corporate element of the project disappeared, and the style of the OECD's approach shifted from confrontation to cooperation. HTC was strongly supported by the Clinton Administration, and summaries of the project's development often stress how much change came with the election of George W. Bush. A careful look at OECD reports, however, reveals that much of the shift in direction occurred before the outcome of the U.S. election in 2000 had been determined. The revised focus on bank secrecy did yield results. Virtually all of the tax havens had acceded to the revised OECD demands for transparency and information exchange by 2004. This article looks at the data on tax haven liabilities to gauge the impact of the project on tax evasion. It employs the ARIMA technique to investigate both tax haven activity as a whole and the particularly important case of the Cayman Islands. No significant impact can be found probably because investment in the havens remains very easy to disguise and very difficult to detect. This suggests that an effective attack on personal income evasion will require more than the OECD demanded. Automatic information-sharing on the ownership based on an internationally consistent set of identifying numbers over a range of financial instruments holds greater promise for a significant decline in the use of the havens for tax evasion.

scholarly journals Logic of Appropriateness or Logic of Consequence?  Competing Explanations for the OECD Campaign against  Tax Havens

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Melinda Wood
Keyword(s):  
Information Exchange ◽  
Historical Development ◽  
International Institutions ◽  
Alternative Explanation ◽  
Transformative Change ◽  
Tax Havens ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Future ◽  
Underlying Causes ◽  
Tax Information Exchange

<p>This thesis provides an alternative explanation to existing constructivist accounts of the OECD campaign against tax havens. It reinterprets the OECD project through a neoliberal institutionalist lens and offers a different take on each major historical development. It brings the narrative up to date, describing the events of the past two years and explaining the underlying causes in a manner consistent with the neoliberal reinterpretation. It finishes by considering what this account might predict for the future of tax information exchange. The thesis finds that transformative change happens in accordance with state interests rather than with identities and norms. International institutions fundamentally exist to advance the interests of their memberstates and will adapt their goals to reflect changing collective interests. States that are coerced to change their behaviour can be expected to comply only to the extent required to avoid sanctions.</p>

scholarly journals Does Ecuador Comply with International Tax Information Exchange Standards Required to Apply the Multilateral Agreement on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters?

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 57
Author(s):  
Gabriela Rivadeneira Chacón
Keyword(s):  
International Organizations ◽  
Tax Evasion ◽  
Information Exchange ◽  
Multilateral Agreement ◽  
Practical Information ◽  
International Tax ◽  
Almost All ◽  
International Conventions ◽  
Tax Information Exchange ◽  
Administrative Assistance

The exchange of tax information is essential to prevent fraud and tax evasion. Accordingly, states and international organizations have developed international conventions regarding the exchange of tax information. One example is the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters. Some States, including Ecuador, have signed and ratified this Convention. However, it is unclear whether Ecuador currently meets almost all Convention's requirements.In this article, I investigated the Ecuadorian regulations and showed that Ecuador complies with most of the Convention’s standards. However, Ecuador does not have a specific comprehensive law that regulates information exchange. Therefore, Ecuador should develop policies and norms that exclusively regulate tax information exchange to facilitate practical information exchanging with other tax authorities.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document