Testimony to the U.S. Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Oversight, Agency Action, Federal Rights and Federal Courts: Opportunity Denied: How Overregulation Harms Minorities

Author(s):  
Timothy Sandefur
Keyword(s):  
2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
John F. Preis

Time and again, the U.S. Supreme Court has declared that the federal cause of action is "analytically distinct" from rights, remedies, and jurisdiction. Yet, just pages away in the U.S. Reports are other cases in which rights, remedies, and jurisdiction all hinge on the existence of a cause of action. What, then, is the proper relationship between these concepts?The goal of this Article is to articulate that relationship. This Article traces the history of the cause of action from eighteenth-century England to its modem usage in the federal courts. This history demonstrates that the federal cause of action is largely distinct from rights, closely related to (and sometimes synonymous with) remedies, and distinct from jurisdiction except where Congress instructs otherwise or the case implicates sovereign immunity. Sorting out these relationships provides several benefits, including refining the doctrine of prudential standing, clarifying the grounds for federal jurisdiction, and dispelling claims that Congress lacks power over certain causes of action.


Author(s):  
Timothy R. Johnson

This article discusses courtroom proceedings in U.S. federal courts. It begins by examining how federal district courts conduct trials. To make clear how these proceedings run it compares what really happens in most trials compared to how Hollywood portrays trials. In addition, it considers several key rights associated with trial proceedings. From there, it considers how federal circuit courts conduct business in open court. A key aspect of this section is how circuit proceedings differ across the country because each circuit has different rules governing arguments. Finally, it assesses the oral arguments in the U.S. Supreme Court as well as how these proceedings may affect the decisions justices make. In each section it provides a descriptive overview of the processes and then discusses current research and direction for future analyses.


Author(s):  
Union of Concerned Scientists Earthjustice

More than 180 preventable incidents at hazardous chemicals facilities occur each year, resulting in deaths, injuries, evacuations, shelter in place orders, environmental contamination, and facility shutdowns with permanent job loss. As of June 17, 2021, the Chemical Safety Board (CSB) had nineteen open site investigations of incidents that in total killed thirty-two people, injured at least eighty-seven people, led to thousands of residents sheltering in place or evacuating, and resulted in many millions of dollars in property damage. This document outlines twenty-one practical and measurable actions that the CSB can take to rebuild its investigative and recommendations capacity; set clear priorities for agency action; reform its governance policies; and increase public transparency and engagement. The proposed actions address incident investigations, safety studies, safety recommendations, agency governance, and public transparency and engagement.


Author(s):  
Elise C. Boddie

In 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 declared unconstitutional voluntary, race-based plans to integrate public schools in Jefferson County, Kentucky and Seattle, Washington. The decisionrested on a critical distinction in constitutional law between “de jure” segregation—resulting from purposeful discrimination by the government—and “de facto” racial imbalance derived from unintentional or “fortuitous” actions by state and private entities. The Court held that de facto school districts could not voluntarily assign students to schools according to their race for purposes of promoting integration. In a vigorous dissent, Justice Breyer argued the “futility” of the de jure–de facto distinction, contending that both districts should have been afforded the constitutional flexibility to pursue voluntary remedies that address racial imbalance in their schools. This chapter takes up Justice Breyer’s dissent to explore the complicated origins of school segregation outside the South and the federal cases that adjudicated its constitutionality. Its central contribution is to recover the often confusing legal narratives about segregation in the period after Brown and how federal courts struggled to discern the constitutional boundaries between de jure and de facto discrimination. The chapter briefly describes the constitutional turns that facilitated the Court’s decision in Parents Involved, including the advent of the intent requirement in equal protection and “colorblindness” doctrine, which treats any use of race as presumptively unconstitutional, regardless of its integrative purpose.


2021 ◽  
pp. 107-138
Author(s):  
James E. Pfander

This chapter describes the conflicts that arose as the new case-or-controversy requirement came to be seen as in conflict with the broad range of uncontested proceedings that had formed a traditional part of nineteenth-century federal practice. Courts, scholars, and litigants have questioned the power of federal courts to hear bankruptcy proceedings, petitions for naturalized citizenship, applications to approve testimonial immunity, warrant proceedings, petitions for habeas corpus relief, and a range of other matters. So far, at least, the U.S. Supreme Court has been reluctant to deploy its case-or-controversy rule to upset established forms of proceeding.


2020 ◽  
pp. 231-250
Author(s):  
Chimène I. Keitner

This chapter addresses the contested role of U.S. courts in adjudicating disputes with foreign elements. As a matter of domestic law, the Due Process Clauses in the U.S. Constitution constrain the scope of adjudicatory jurisdiction that legislatures can confer on State and federal courts. The Fourth Restatement restates the U.S. law of personal jurisdiction in civil proceedings as requiring that “sufficient contacts” exist between the defendant and the forum, “and that the exercise of jurisdiction be reasonable.” These criteria limit the reach of U.S. courts’ personal jurisdiction. The chapter explores these limits and Congress’s ability to extend them. It also revisits the history and jurisprudence of Fifth Amendment due process limits on personal jurisdiction, considering the Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act of 2018 (ATCA) and the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act of 2019 (PSJVTA).


Author(s):  
Edward A. Jr. Purcell

This chapter examines Justice Antonin Scalia’s views on Article III of the U.S. Constitution and the nature of the federal judicial power that it established. One of Scalia’s principal goals was to limit severely the power of the federal courts and to undo many of the decisions of the Warren Court, including their ability to create implied private causes of action, and the chapter argues that in pursuing that goal Scalia departed from originalist views and that the arguments he advanced were themselves self-contradictory. The chapter shows, moreover, that originalist doctrines and historical practices actually contradicted his claims about limits on the federal judicial power. Further, the chapter argues that his views were based not on originalist ideas but on the twentieth-century positivism associated with Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, and that in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, he explicitly acknowledged that his positivist ideas were not the ideas of the Founders. The chapter concludes that in this area, Scalia simply abandoned originalism and did so, once again, to achieve his own ideological and political goals


Author(s):  
James E. Pfander

Cases Without Controversies: Uncontested Adjudication in Article III Courts offers a new account of the power of federal courts in the United States to hear and determine uncontested applications to assert or register a claim of right. Familiar to lawyers in civil law countries as forms of voluntary or non-contentious jurisdiction, these uncontested applications fit uneasily with the commitment to adversary legalism in the United States. Indeed, modern accounts of federal judicial power often urge that the language of Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits federal courts to the adjudication of concrete disputes between adverse parties and rules out all forms of non-contentious jurisdiction. Said to rest on the so-called “case-or-controversy” requirement of Article III, this requirement of party contestation threatens the power of federal courts to conduct a range of familiar proceedings, such as the oversight of bankruptcy proceedings, the issuance of warrants, and the adjudication of applications for mandamus and habeas corpus relief. By recounting the tradition of naturalization and other uncontested litigation in antebellum America and coupling that tradition with an account of the important difference between cases and controversies, this book challenges the prevailing understanding of Article III. In addition to defending the power of federal courts to hear uncontested matters of federal law, this book examines the way the Constitution’s meaning has changed over time and suggests an interpretive methodology that would allow the U.S. Supreme Court to take account of the old and the new in defining the contours of federal judicial power.


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