Procedural Injustice and Emotions: An Experimental Investigation of the Role of Emotions in the Fair Process Effect

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Victor D. Quintanilla
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Investigation ◽  
Fair Process ◽  
Procedural Injustice ◽  
Fair Process Effect

An Experimental Investigation of Auditors' Liability: Implications for Social Welfare and Exploration of Deviations from Theoretical Predictions

2000 ◽  
Vol 75 (4) ◽  
pp. 429-451 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald R. King ◽  
Rachel Schwartz
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Investigation ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Strict Liability ◽  
Liability Rule ◽  
Optimal Response ◽  
Legal Regimes ◽  
Theoretical Predictions ◽  
Best Responses

This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to investigate how legal regimes affect social welfare. We investigate four legal regimes, each consisting of a liability rule (strict or negligence) and a damage measure (out-of-pocket or independent-of-investment). The results of the experiment are for the most part consistent with the qualitative predictions of Schwartz's (1997) model; however, subjects' actual choices deviate from the point predictions of the model. We explore whether these deviations arise because: (1) subjects form faulty anticipations of their counterparts' actions and/or (2) subjects do not choose the optimal responses given their anticipations. We find that subjects behave differently under the four regimes in terms of anticipation errors and departures from best responses. For example, subjects playing the role of auditors anticipate investments most accurately under the regime with strict liability combined with out-of-pocket damages, but are least likely to choose the optimal response given their anticipations. This finding implies that noneconomic factors likely play a role in determining subjects' choices.

How Do Intermediaries Affect the Effectiveness of the Four-Eyes-Principle? An Experimental Investigation

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Liangcong Fan ◽  
Zechun Ying ◽  
Yuemei Yuan ◽  
Xinchao Zhang ◽  
Bin Xu
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Investigation ◽  
Active Role ◽  
Positive Effect

Abstract Corrupt deals are commonly arranged by intermediaries. However, attempts to deter corruption pay little attention to the role of intermediaries in corrupt deals. This paper reports a laboratory bribery experiment on corruption designed to investigate how intermediaries with information about the lowest bribe that the official is willing to accept in a briber-initiated corrupt deal affect the effectiveness of the four-eyes-principle (FEP) on deterring corruption. We find that the introduction of the FEP significantly decreases the corruption level by increasing uncertainty. However, the presence of intermediaries with information completely offsets the positive effect of introducing the FEP on preventing corruption. Our findings suggest that further research on corruption should allow a more active role of intermediaries, and legislators should take the role of intermediaries into account when designing anti-corruption mechanisms.

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