Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanism and Intellectual Property Matters

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Apoorva Sharma
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Settlement Mechanism

More combative US moves raise risk of a ‘trade war’

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Market Access ◽  
False Alarms ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Donald Trump ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Trade War ◽  
Intellectual Property Theft ◽  
Settlement Mechanism

Significance Sharp rhetoric from President Donald Trump and his officials is raising the prospect of a trade war. Following a year of false alarms and intra-administration conflict, signs point to escalation of the increasingly protectionist US agenda, particularly towards China. Impacts The seventh NAFTA round will begin on February 26 -- services market access and the dispute settlement mechanism are the trickiest topics. Even if there is a NAFTA deal, it could struggle to pass Congress. China is ready to retaliate, both against prospective steel and aluminium tariffs and any punishment for intellectual property theft.

scholarly journals ASEAN Single Market: Revisiting Rules and Strategies on the Enforcement of Free Flow of Goods in ASEAN

2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 114
Author(s):  
Riyad Febrian Anwar
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Action Plan ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Normative Study ◽  
Member States ◽  
Highly Sensitive ◽  
Peak Points ◽  
To Come ◽  
Settlement Mechanism

Whether we are ready or not, people in Indonesia and the rest of Southeastern Asia will soon welcome the ASEAN Economic Communities (AEC) by the end 2015. Therefore, there are needs to evaluate the progress in ASEAN rules and strategies thus far. By employing normative study, this paper finds and further recommends the following: Firstly, ASEAN almost reached its peak points in eliminating the tariff barriers, yet to come are the elimination on ‘sensitive’ and ‘highly sensitive list’ tariffs on imported agriculture commodities; Secondly, Non-Tariff Barriers (NTB) remain to be one of the major problems in intra-ASEAN trades; Thirdly, Member States reluctances to invoke the ASEAN dispute settlement mechanism for their trading disputes may potentially hinder the effectiveness of AEC in the future; and Finally, the protection of intellectual property remains low in the region as the ASEAN Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Action plan 2011-2015 is still deemed ineffective to reforms the IP regulations within Member States.

scholarly journals ASEAN Single Market: Revisiting Rules and Strategies on the Enforcement of Free Flow of Goods in ASEAN

2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 114
Author(s):  
Riyad Febrian Anwar
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Action Plan ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Normative Study ◽  
Member States ◽  
Highly Sensitive ◽  
Peak Points ◽  
To Come ◽  
Settlement Mechanism

Whether we are ready or not, people in Indonesia and the rest of Southeastern Asia will soon welcome the ASEAN Economic Communities (AEC) by the end 2015. Therefore, there are needs to evaluate the progress in ASEAN rules and strategies thus far. By employing normative study, this paper finds and further recommends the following: Firstly, ASEAN almost reached its peak points in eliminating the tariff barriers, yet to come are the elimination on ‘sensitive’ and ‘highly sensitive list’ tariffs on imported agriculture commodities; Secondly, Non-Tariff Barriers (NTB) remain to be one of the major problems in intra-ASEAN trades; Thirdly, Member States reluctances to invoke the ASEAN dispute settlement mechanism for their trading disputes may potentially hinder the effectiveness of AEC in the future; and Finally, the protection of intellectual property remains low in the region as the ASEAN Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Action plan 2011-2015 is still deemed ineffective to reforms the IP regulations within Member States.

The Legitimate Regulatory Distinction Test: Incomplete and Inadequate for the Particular Purposes of the TBT Agreement

2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 543-562 ◽  
Author(s):  
JASON HOUSTON-MCMILLAN
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Technical Barriers To Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
The Creation ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Special Circumstances ◽  
Settlement Mechanism

AbstractPrior to 2011, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade had been somewhat neglected as a dispute-settlement mechanism, due in part to the lack of previous interpretation of the Agreement by WTO DSB Panels. In 2012, the Appellate Body adjudicated on three TBT disputes:US–Clove Cigarettes, US–Tuna II, andUS–COOL, aiming to officially interpret and clarify Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the Agreement by creating a distinct test for a measure's consistency with these Articles. This paper explores the relevant decisions of both the Panel and Appellate Body in the three disputes which led to the creation of the ‘legitimate regulatory distinction’ test. The substance behind this phrase, placed in context, is dissected along with the associated idea of ‘even-handedness’. The test attempts to simplify future interpretations regarding what will constitute unjustifiable discrimination, but at the cost of the necessary distinction between the GATT and the TBT Agreement being blurred. The result is a test which is incomplete and which fails to take account of the special circumstances surrounding the TBT Agreement.

EUROPEAN UNION IN WTO’S DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (XX) ◽  
pp. 33-49
Author(s):  
Małgorzata Czermińska
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
World Trade Organisation ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Settlement System ◽  
Dispute Settlement System ◽  
Trade Conflicts ◽  
Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Descriptive Method

The World Trade Organisation (WTO) serves as a forum for co-operation, currently for as many as 164 countries, and in addition, it allows for the resolution, also amicably, of trade conflicts between parties, consequently, settling disputes between them. One of essential provisions of the Uruguay Round (UR) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) included the introduction of a new dispute settlement mechanism, that is to say, the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), which became effective on 1 January 1995. Member States of the European Union were not only actively involved in developing the rules of the international trade system, but they also influenced, to a large extent, the form of both such rules and of ongoing trade negotiations, as well as they assumed and still assume responsibility for the final arrangements. Hence, their role in the multilateral trade system is both active and passive. This paper aims to demonstrate the functioning of the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism and show the role which the European Union serves in this system. The Article employs an analytical and descriptive method. It draws on sources from the national and international literature and WTO’s databases.

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